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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE: THE SOURCES OF INSTITUTIONAL 
QUALITY IN BOTSWANA 
by 
Angela Gapa 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor John F. Clark, Major Professor 
Botswana has recently garnered analytic attention as an anomaly of the “resource 
curse” phenomenon. Worldwide, countries whose  economies are highly skewed towards 
a dependence on the export of non-renewable natural resources such as oil, diamonds and 
uranium, have been among the most  troubled, authoritarian, poverty-stricken and 
conflict-prone; a phenomenon widely regarded as the “resource curse". The resource 
curse explains the varying fortunes of countries based on their resource wealth, with 
resource-rich countries faring much worse than their resource-poor counterparts.  
However, Botswana, with diamond exports accounting for 50percent of government 
revenues and 80percent of total exports, has achieved one of the fastest economic growth 
rates in the developing world in the last 50 years. Furthermore, the Freedom House ranks 
it as the safest, most stable, least corrupt and most democratic country on sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 In attempting to answer why Botswana apparently escaped the “resource curse”, 
this research assumes that both formal and informal institutions within the state acted as 
intermediary variables in determining its fortune. This research thus addresses the deeper 
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question of where Botswana obtained its unique institutional quality that facilitated its 
apparent escape of the resource curse. It traces Botswana’s history through four lenses: 
legitimacy and historical continuity, political culture, ethnicity and identity management, 
and external relations; as having explanatory value in understanding the Botswana 
exception.  
The research finds most evidence of Botswana’s institutional quality emanating 
from the country’s political culture which it found more compatible with the institutions 
of development and democracy that facilitate both positive economic and political 
outcomes. It also found evidence of legitimacy and historical continuity facilitating the 
robustness of both formal and informal institutions in Botswana, and identity 
management through assimilation as having buffered against the effects of ethnically 
motivated resource plunder. It however, found the least support for the assertion that 
external relations contributed to institutional quality.   
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The country of Botswana has recently garnered critical acclaim as one of sub-
Saharan Africa’s few developmental success stories.  Being among the poorest 
countries in the world at the time of its independence from the British in 1966, the 
country managed to achieve and maintain the highest sustained rate of growth in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)1 in the world, an average of 6 percent between 1966 and 
2000. By the year 2010, its annual per capita GDP of US$13,100 was well above the 
sub-Saharan African average (CIA, 2010). In addition, the country has been hailed as 
the best credit risk on the continent (Heritage Foundation, 2009). Botswana is a small 
country in southern Africa, bordered to the south by South Africa, to the northwest by 
Namibia and to the northeast by Zimbabwe. Despite being demographically challenged 
with a population of just above 2 million, and geographically challenged: the arid 
country is entirely landlocked; Botswana has fared well on indicators of human 
development. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimated an 
increase in the Human Development Index2 from 0.509 in 1975 to 0.649 in 2007. 
Literacy rates in the country have increased from 34 percent in 1970 to 82 percent in 
2007 and infant mortality experienced a drop from 108 per 1000 live births in 1975, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 GDP refers to Gross Domestic Product and is measure of the market value of all final goods and services 
made within the borders of a country in a year. It is often positively correlated with the standard of living of 
a country and is therefore used as an indicator for economic development. 
2 Human Development Index is an indicator created by the United Nations Development Program to rank 
the levels of human development using data such as infant mortality, life expectancy, standard of living and 
education. 
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58 by 1998 (UNDP, 2007). In addition, the county has been a beacon of peace, 
democracy and stability in an otherwise volatile part of the world (Samatar, 1997).  
Diamond mining has fueled much of Botswana’s economic expansion and 
currently accounts for more than one-third of its GDP. The country obtains about 70-80 
percent of its export earnings and about half of the government's revenues from this one 
resource (CIA, 2010). This fact makes Botswana’s developmental record all the more 
impressive, particularly when compared to the many resource-rich sub-Saharan African 
countries like Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for these 
oil and mineral dependent countries are poorer today than they were at independence. 
Nigeria has failed on many indicators of economic development and democratic 
governance. The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria is the premier oil-exporting 
nation on the continent. However, despite this fortune, the number of Nigerians living 
under the UN poverty threshold of a dollar a day has risen from 17.1 million in 1980 to 
112.47 in 20103, despite a development plan at independence to reach the income 
bracket of developed countries aimed at generating over $350 billion by the year 2000 
(Shaxson, 2005). In the case of the DRC, revenues from diamonds and coltan have 
been misused to sponsor violence motivated by greed, which has precipitated into one 
of Africa’s largest multinational wars to date (Kabemba, 2011). Furthermore, the 
country’s HDI has been estimated by the UNDP (2007) to be 0.239, and the country 
ranks 168th out of the 169 countries in the database. 
 Precedent and theory has reaffirmed what has now become well-established as 
the “resource curse,” a pattern that has seen resource-rich countries becoming less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐africa-­‐17015873	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wealthy and less competently governed than their resource-poor counterparts.  
According to Auty (1993), the resource curse refers to the paradox that countries and 
regions with an abundance of natural resources, specifically point-source non-
renewable resources like minerals such as diamonds and uranium, as well as oil, tend to 
have less economic growth and worse political development outcomes than countries 
with fewer natural resources. Botswana’s impressive record therefore raises the 
question: Why did Botswana, a country rich in diamonds, manage to escape the 
resource curse and achieve exceptional economic success, as well as peace and 
democracy? 
To answer this question, the empirical fact that natural resources are negatively 
correlated with positive economic growth, has been reconciled with the observation that 
there have been these varying outcomes across countries. An emerging group of scholars 
now argue that the effect of resources is not determined by resource endowments alone, 
but instead hinge upon the quality of a country’s institutions. The underlying reason 
cited in Botswana literature for its economic fortune, is that the country has exercised 
good economic governance, a factor that is important to any level of economic growth. 
Atushi Iimi (2006) argues that the reason why Botswana has apparently escaped the 
resource curse is that the country has sound institutions and good governance. He cites 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) who point out that Botswana’s good 
institutions, particularly in the private property area, have stemmed from among other 
factors, the political leadership’s choice of sound policies and the elite’s motivation to 
reinforce strong institutions. When compared to other countries in southern Africa and 
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around the world, Botswana fares well on indices that reflect a country’s sound 
institutions4. 
While it is true that Botswana managed to put in place the right policies and 
implemented them in order to escape the effects of natural resource endowment, it is 
unclear why other countries that are resource-rich have failed to achieve the same 
success as Botswana, despite having similar management and regulatory institutions 
surrounding the management of resource revenues. This therefore begs the question of 
why institutions aimed at curbing the resource curse and its effects, worked in 
Botswana and not in other countries like Nigeria, Angola or Congo. Although there is 
near consensus that institutions play a key intermediary role in determining the effects 
of the resource curse, it is unclear why despite having similar institutions; Botswana 
achieved success while other countries fell victim to the resource curse.  Thus, where 
Botswana obtained its institutional quality from is a key missing link in literature on 
Botswana, on institutions and fundamentally on the resource curse. As a result, the 
main goal of this dissertation is to address this gap in the literature and answer the 
specific question:  
 
How did Botswana succeed in establishing the institutional 
quality that enabled it to turn its mineral wealth into a 
developmental asset? 
In other words, what are the sources of Botswana’s institutional quality? The goal 
of this dissertation is to answer this question.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See appendices for Botswana’s Bertlesmann Transformation Indices.	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The Case of Botswana: Escaping the Resource Curse 
Botswana has been hailed as an exception to the resource curse. This is mainly 
because it is relatively peaceful; there has been no documented incidence of intrastate 
violent conflict in Botswana to date (Eleazer, 2009)5. Second, it is a nominally 
democratic country with peaceful political turnover6. Third, it has had one of the fastest 
growing economies in the developing world during the past five decades (Basedau, 
2005)7. All this has occurred despite Botswana’s endowment of valuable non-
renewable natural resources as the basis of its wealth. 
As mentioned above, the underlying reason cited in Botswana literature for its 
economic fortune has been that the country has exercised good economic governance, 
a factor that is important to any country’s economic growth. Using Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi’s (2003) data, Iimi (2006:9) shows that Botswana has fared well in 
indicators such as voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. He argues that 
Botswana has done well in voice and accountability, which is required for 
developmental state to reflect civil liberties and political rights. This makes resource 
extraction transparent and authority will in turn exercise discipline. Second, Botswana 
fares well in indicators of government effectiveness. Mineral revenue in Botswana is 
used to support and finance investment expenditures particularly on health and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Appendix I 
6 See Appendix II 
7 See Appendix VI 
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education. This thus increases the quality of public services and competence of civil 
servants. 
Third, the regulatory quality of Botswana is another reason for its economic 
development. In Botswana, diamond mining leases are provided for up to 25 years. The 
Botswana government retains 50 percent of the shares of its joint venture with De 
Beers: Debswana. The country’s Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources 
has direct responsibility for natural regulation and management. Rule of law and 
control of corruption are the fourth and final indicators for success in Botswana. 
Botswana is currently ranked as the best credit rick country in sub-Saharan Africa 
(CIA, 2011). In a country where the economy is open, more efficient distribution of 
resource revenues is possible, leading to growth and development. Iimi (2006) argues 
that the budgetary process in Botswana is relatively transparent. The constitution of the 
country gives autonomy to the attorney general’s office, making it independent from 
governmental and political influence (ibid). 
These same good policies are the ones which enabled Botswana to become 
immune to effects of the resource curse such as the “Dutch Disease”, the apparent 
relationship between the increase in exploitation of natural resources and a decline in 
the manufacturing sector. Amy Poteete (2009) argues that in order to escape the effects 
of the Dutch Disease, the Botswana government benefitted initially from being a 
member of the Rand Monetary Area, controlled by the South African government. 
Only ten years after the discovery of diamonds at Orapa mine did Botswana introduce 
its own currency, the Pula. With the introduction of the new currency in 1976 came 
Botswana’s vulnerability to the expected appreciation of the currency due to diamond 
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exports. However, as Poteete (2009) argues, several mechanisms prevented this 
outcome. The first mechanism implemented by the Botswana government was the 
frequent but small adjustments to the currency’s nominal exchange rates between 1976 
and the late 1990’s. Thus during this period, the currency did not float.  The 
government maintained a stable real exchange rate with the South African Rand, 
Botswana’s main import currency, until the late 1990’s. Depreciation of the Rand 
against the US dollar, Botswana’s main export currency, prevented the appreciation of 
the Pula against the US dollar. Thus, Poteete (2009) contends that the relative stability 
of the Pula vis-a-vis the rand and the sustained depreciation of the pula against the US 
dollar (and thus it not floating), enabled the country to escape the Dutch disease 
symptoms that other resource-rich countries face. 
During the late 1990’s the Pula drastically appreciated against the South African 
Rand, a phenomenon that coincided with an equally sharp depreciation against the US 
dollar. Preventing currency fluctuations enabled other tradable goods to maintain 
competitiveness on world markets and hence encouraged economic diversification, 
something other resource countries in Africa have failed to do (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 
2001).  As a result, Botswana gained purchasing power and increased competitiveness 
in its main import market, South Africa. Poteete (2009) argues that by 2004, following 
a depreciation of 7.5percent against the US dollar, real exchange rates began to 
stabilize.  In 2005, the Botswana government combined a steep 12.5 percent 
devaluation with the introduction of a crawling peg in order to decrease the probability 
of future currency overvaluation, conditions that still persist today (Poteete, 2009). 
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Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001) argue that in order to avoid excessive increases in 
expenditure during boom periods, the Botswana government accumulated international 
reserves and ran budget surpluses earmarked for stability spending in leaner periods. In 
doing so, the government avoided drastic cuts to expenditures during bust years and 
reduced inflationary pressures. Second, they also managed the nominal exchange rate 
to avoid appreciation of the local currency. This was largely achieved through 
accumulation of international reserves. In spending its revenues, the Botswana 
government based its expenditure levels on long-term expectations of export earnings 
and government revenues. Excess revenue generated was used to build up foreign 
exchange reserves at the Bank of Botswana, thus providing reserves in times when 
revenue generation was low. The Botswana government in addition astutely avoided 
undertaking capital intensive developmental projects where no provisions of long term 
recurrent costs existed (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). It consistently based its spending on 
National Development Plans that were voted into force by parliament. Parliamentary 
approval was always required before the inception of a project and such projects 
requires provisions for cost recovery. In the face of resource busts, the Botswana 
government took the precautionary measures of assuming long term crises rather than 
temporary ones. This was reflected in the experience of the 1981-82 decline in 
diamond earnings. Faced with uncertainty, the government adopted a package of 
adjustment policies including limits in lending, increases in the primary lending rates, 
freezing wages and salaries and devaluing the pula (Sarraf, 2001). This selection of 
policies was implemented well and yielded the desired results. 
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However, economic explanations like the one provided above are insufficient 
in explaining varying outcomes across countries.  In contrast to Botswana, other 
resource-rich countries like Nigeria have not benefitted as much from the large 
increases in oil prices as well as technological improvements that come with oil 
extraction. Nigeria has been marred by years of balance-of- payment problems and 
debt crises, despite selecting similar legal and regulatory frameworks surrounding the 
management of its extractive industry as Botswana. Botswana has undoubtedly fared 
better than its other resource-rich counterparts who are poorer today than they were at 
the time of their independence. It is therefore not clear why countries like Nigeria, that 
are resource-rich, failed to achieve the same success that Botswana reached in 
implementing growth-promoting policies. This study is of the view that the economic 
and institutional explanations of the resource curse are incomplete, and fail to address 
the origins and sources of institutional quality, which ultimately determine whether a 
country will be successful in escaping the resource curse.  Using the anomalous 
experience of Botswana as a case in point, this dissertation attempts to uncover the 
roots and sources of  institutional quality, that are apparently absent in other 
resource-rich countries.  
 
Hypotheses and Overview of Remaining Chapters 
This dissertation isolated four hypotheses in order to ascertain the sources 
of institutional quality in Botswana that enabled it to escape from the resource 
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curse. These hypotheses are addressed in four substantive chapters in this 
dissertation.  
Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the research problem and states the 
research question. It describes the Botswana anomaly within the context of the 
resource curse, and asks the question of why Botswana escaped the resource 
curse. Chapter 1 also illustrates Botswana’s economic and political achievements 
in comparative perspective to other natural resource exporting countries in 
Africa.  It concludes with an analysis of the significance of this study.  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature of the resource curse in depth, and 
provides a conceptual framework under which to analyze the phenomenon. It 
provides analyses of the three main resource curses: the curse of economic 
stagnation, the curse of violent conflict, and the curse of authoritarianism, all 
empirically observed across resource-rich countries. Chapter 2 analyzes the role 
of institutions as intervening variables in addressing the resource curse. It 
provides operational definitions of what institutions are, describes the different 
types of institutions and explains the concept of most relevance to this 
dissertation: institutional quality, including its measures. 
The next four chapters are divided into two parts. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
address what are referred to as the “endogenous sources of institutional quality in 
Botswana” and focus on processes that evolved within Botswana at three 
different periods: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. Chapter 6 addresses 
the “exogenous sources of institutional quality in Botswana,” emphasizing 
imported sources of institutional quality.  
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Chapter 3 addresses the first endogenous source of institutional quality 
identified in the following hypothesis:  
H1a: The legitimacy and historical continuity of Botswana’s political 
institutions from pre-colonial, through colonial and into the post-colonial era, 
made Tswana institutions legitimate thus fostering institutional strength and 
quality in resource management. 
This hypothesis stems from a rich set of literature that argues that the reason most 
African countries lack good governance and institutional quality is because their 
institutions were disrupted by institutions of slavery and colonialism. The basic 
assumption of the chapter is thus:  where pre-colonial institutions were not disrupted, or 
where they were left untouched from pre-colonial, through colonial and into post-
colonial times, there will be high levels of institutional quality and good governance. It 
therefore looks at the role of institutional continuity in strengthening institutional 
quality. This research assumes that where institutional continuity exists, particularly in 
sub- Saharan Africa, it can legitimize the rule of law and the institutions themselves. 
Political legitimacy is important to political organization as it minimizes the need of a 
regime to use excessive force or coercion on its citizens. Hence the hypothesis assumes 
a high level of continuity and legitimacy of political and economic institutions in 
Botswana that are otherwise absent elsewhere on the continent or in other resource-rich 
countries.  
According to Gilley (2006), a legitimate state is less dominating over its citizens 
because the legitimate use of power minimizes the negative consequences of power. As 
a result, the citizens gain a certain level of trust in the system, which does not result in 
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grievances brewing within the population. According to Lipset (1983), legitimacy 
involves the capacity of the political system to engender and maintain the belief that 
the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society8. Pierre 
Englebert (2000) defines state legitimacy as “the condition when a state’s structures 
have evolved endogenously to its own society and there is some level of 
historical continuity to its institutions”. State legitimacy is thus a historical, structural 
condition of the entire state apparatus. The study assumes that most African states 
lost their legitimacy historically through the adoption of colonial structures and the 
acceptance of colonial territorial boundaries. However, it also assumes that due to the 
arbitrary nature of the exercise of colonialism, some countries suffered more disruption 
than others, Botswana being among the lucky few to escape disruption.   
 
Chapter 4 explores the hypothesis: 
H1b: Botswana’s distinctive political culture enabled it to build strong enough 
institutions to help manage its mineral wealth. 
This hypothesis suggests that there are aspects of Tswana political culture that 
enabled it to form strong institutions and aided in the translation of mineral wealth to 
national wealth.  Political culture in this context refers to “the sets of symbols	  and 
meanings involved in securing and exercising political power” (Olick and 
Omeltchenko (2008, 300-01). It refers to the attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that offer 
meaning to political processes. In this sense, political culture also provides the 
fundamental assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system.  
Political culture embraces the political ideals and operating norms of a polity or 
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community, and is the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and 
subjective dimensions of politics.  Political culture is a product of a political system’s 
collective history and life histories of members of the system. It is rooted in public 
events as well as private experience. This dissertation argues that Botswana’s peculiar 
political culture provided the foundation onto which newer institutions could be 
entrenched.  
Chapter 5 addresses the third hypothesis for the research: 
 
H1c: Botswana’s high relative level of ethnic homogeneity enabled the 
building of robust institutions and deemed violent conflict over resources 
based on ethnic grievances infeasible 
One of the most cited sources of the lack of institutional quality in Africa is 
ethnic fractionalization. Particularly, Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that this reason 
is what accounts for Africa’s economic growth tragedy despite ranking African 
countries growth potential ahead of East Asia’s in the 1960’s. They argue that ethnic 
diversity has led to social polarization and entrenched interest groups in Africa and has 
thereby increased the likelihood of selecting socially sub-optimal policies. Furthermore, 
this hypothesis is supported by the notion proposed by Ross (2002) that groups in 
resource-rich societies form factions to gain access to resources based on ethnic 
cleavages. According to Gurr (1997) ethno-political conflict occurs when groups define 
themselves in reference to some combination of common descent, values and cultural 
traits, as well as shared historical instances on behalf of collective interests against the 
state or other groups. Therefore, this hypothesis assumes that in the absence of these 
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ethnic divisions, violent conflict and institutional deterioration are deterred. It 
hypothesizes that where the ethnic divisions are not significant enough to form societal 
cleavages that will encourage rent-seeking behavior or recruitment into rebellions 
based either on greed or on grievance, the violent resource curse will not occur. It also 
assumes that ethnically homogenous states have greater institutional quality.  
Chapter 6 addresses how forces external to Botswana had an influence (if any) in 
the selection or shaping of Botswana’s economic and political institutions through the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Botswana’s relationship with external actors (such as former 
colonizer Britain, regional hegemon South Africa, and invasive 
multinational De Beers) helped to shape its institutions, due to a perceived 
interest in functional institutions in Botswana. 
 
This hypothesis suggests that Botswana’s institutions reflect the interests of 
its former colonizer Britain, its hegemonic neighbor South Africa, and its intrusive 
yet secretive economic partner, De Beers. As a result, it argues that Botswana had an 
external source of stability through its relations with these three actors since it was in 
their best interest for Botswana to have institutional quality.  I hypothesize that 
British colonialism put in place institutions for the benefit of Britain. I hypothesize 
that apartheid South Africa had a vested interest in a non-radical Botswana thus 
investing in creating a functional Botswana state and establishing control over 
Botswana’s trade globally. I hypothesize that as it was in De Beers’ best interest to 
have a steady supply of diamonds; it buffered Botswana from the vulnerabilities of 
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the diamond industry and funded its ruling political party. Whether these assertions 
are true is what this dissertation aims to uncover.  
 
Research Design, Methods and Data Collection Techniques 
The research utilized the case study design, defined by Yin (1994:13) as “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident”.  The case study design was utilized to deliberately study the contextual 
conditions of Botswana’s sources of institutional quality. As a “deviant case study,” (i.e. 
deviating from the standard generalizations of established theory supporting the “resource 
curse”), it had comparative aspects to it, and drew counter-perspectives from resource-
cursed countries particularly Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It 
employed the problem-driven approach of analytic eclecticism	  (Katzenstein and Sil 
2008), featuring the extraction, adaptation, and integration of discrete concepts, 
mechanisms, logical principles, and interpretations from various fields, and thus relied on 
multiple sources of evidence. These sources of evidence included: key informant 
interviews conducted in Gaborone, Botswana over a period of five months, statistical data 
from Afrobarometer, archival data, secondary data and participant observations.  
 A total of 33 interviews were conducted with experts and key informants who 
are members of Botswana’s academic, political, economic, civil society, traditional, 
administrative and bureaucratic elites, each very knowledgeable of their particular 
niche in Botswana society. Among the elites interviewed were economic elites such 
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as the Chief Executive Officer of De Beers Botswana;  political elites including 
legislators and members of the leadership of the Botswana Congress Party and the 
Botswana Democratic Party; traditional elites, including representatives of the House 
of Chiefs (Ntlo ya Dikgosi); academic elites including professors of political science 
and administration at the University of Botswana; administrative and bureaucratic 
elites from the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ministry of Trade and Industry, and 
the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning; as well as civil society elites 
including the leaders of  minority civil rights organizations. These open-ended 
interviews were conducted primarily to gain expert knowledge on the various 
variables under scrutiny, but also utilized the narratives that emerged. 
The study employed basic statistical analysis of Afrobarometer data as a 
measure of legitimacy and political culture in Botswana. Afrobarometer is a research 
project that measures public attitudes on economic, political, and social matters in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and is based on face-to-face and house-to-house interviews of 
individuals. It is generally considered to be reliable and generalizable.  
In addition, the research utilized participant observation. The immersion into 
Botswana society as well as the development of rapport among locals, gave the study 
insight into the political socialization processes present in Botswana, reflecting the 
country’s political culture, legitimacy, identity dynamics and views on external 
factors.  It utilized archival data obtained from the National Archives of Botswana as 
well as the Botswana section of the library at the University of Botswana. Among the 
archival data analyzed were masters and doctoral dissertations dating as far back as 
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1975, as well as minutes to various symposia conducted in Botswana surrounding the 
themes of governance and democracy. Finally, the research utilized secondary 
sources of information including newspaper articles particularly from Mmegi, Sunday 
Standard, the Voice and the Botswana Gazette. Particularly the research was 
interested in letters to the editor of a political nature, as well as political discussions 
on the respective newspapers’ facebook pages. This helped to gauge the level of 
political participation in Botswana, as well as helped identify issues of key 
importance to ordinary Botswana citizens.  
 
 
Significance of the Study 
 
This study extends the understanding of explanations attached to the “resource 
curse” phenomenon and its escape thereof. Beginning from a point of near-consensus 
that institutions play an intermediary role in determining the fortune of resource-rich 
countries, this research protracts the institutionalist argument of proponents like 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), filling a sizeable gap in the literature. 
Although good institutions are widely accepted to help countries escape the resource 
curse, explanations as to why even though two countries can adopt similar institutions 
and yet have drastically divergent economic and political outcomes, are still missing 
from the literature. This study addresses that missing link.  
It doing so, the study combined three distinct sets of literature on the way natural 
resources affect economic and political outcomes in resource-rich countries, making 
some countries prosperous, stable and democratic, while others remain corrupt, violent 
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and repressive. These are the curse of underdevelopment, proponed by Richard Auty 
(1993) and Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995); the curse of violent conflict put 
forward by Philippe LeBillon (2005)  and Michael Ross (2006), as well as the curse of 
authoritarianism, emphasized by Douglas Yates (1996) and Terry Karl Lynn (1997) to 
name a few. By focusing on Botswana, a case which has ostensibly escaped all three 
curses, the study illuminates the key variables of importance in providing context to 
the resource curse and its ultimate escape. In addition, it provides a grounded analysis 
where traditional emphasis of past research has been on policy choices, the macro-
economic environment and the political economy of non-renewable natural resources. 
 
  The study examines four key variables that enhance (or hinder) institutional 
quality. These are legitimacy and historical continuity; political culture; level of 
ethnic heterogeneity as well as the role of external influences. Largely an empirical 
project, it employs an eclectic problem-driven approach to research, in which the 
pursuit of understanding, lead to a variety of methods and insights from purportedly 
incompatible research traditions. It is expected that the study’s results and 
conclusions will have great implications on the understanding of the way good 
institutions are brought about, and on the way the resource curse phenomenon will be 
studied and understood in the future. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Chapter Two maps out the key concepts that give context to Botswana’s 
developmental rarity.  Being a diamond exporting country, Botswana is understood as an 
anomaly of the “resource curse” phenomenon. This dissertation argues that Botswana 
escaped the resource curse due to its institutional quality. It aims to ascertain how the 
small landlocked country achieved this high level of institutional quality. This chapter 
provided the conceptual framework of the three resource curses: the curse of 
authoritarianism, the curse of violent conflict and the curse of underdevelopment, all 
empirically observed in resource-exporting countries. The later sections of the chapter 
will later provide definitions of key terms: institution and institutional quality, and will 
operationalize these terms in how they will be used to examine the Botswana case.  
The “Resource Curse” 
The “resource curse”, also referred to as the “paradox of plenty” refers to the 
contradiction that states whose exports are heavily skewed towards natural resources 
[(Auty, (1993); Lynn (1997)]. These resources, particularly point-source non-renewable 
resources such as oil and minerals, tend to have lower economic growth rates and worse 
development outcomes than their resource-poor counterparts.  Many reasons have been 
posited for this, including a reduced competitiveness of the manufacturing industry 
through short-term currency appreciation known as the Dutch disease, to the volatility of 
revenues from resource exports caused by booms and busts in the global economy, 
government mismanagement of resource revenues, as well as weak and corrupt 
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institutions which divert resource wealth for personal benefit [Collier (2003), Sachs and 
Warner (1995) and Gylfason (2001)].  
Evidence of the curse is wide-ranging in scope: from diamond mines in Central 
and Western Africa, to the oilfields in the Gulf of Guinea and Persian Gulf, where 
millions of lives have been devastated by the mismanagement of vast revenues 
originating from non-renewable natural resources. Empirically, a correlation has been 
established between resource-rich countries and reduced investment in human capital, 
increased corruption and risky reductions in economic diversification, often resulting in 
the stagnated economic growth of an otherwise privileged country (Araji and Mohtadi, 
2013).  The empirical observations of the correlation of resource exports with three 
negative outcomes, has divided the literature on the “resource curse” into three tiers: 
the curse of underdevelopment; the curse of authoritarianism and the curse of 
violent conflict. Botswana, with its record of high levels of economic growth, peace 
and stability as well as democracy, is assumed by this dissertation to have escaped 
all three of these resource curses.  
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THE THREE RESOURCE CURSES 
 
The Curse of Underdevelopment 
 
The first dimension of the resource curse has been its relative effect on a 
country’s rate of economic growth. Countries that are rich and heavily dependent 
on their extractive sectors generally tend to have slower rates of growth than 
countries dependent on manufacturing and service sectors. Resource-rich countries 
are also notorious for not being able to translate windfalls from natural resource 
wealth into concrete economic and developmental planning. 
In a 1995 study, Sachs and Warner examined ninety-seven countries over a 
period of two decades, using regression analysis to determine the impact of mineral 
and other natural resource exports on GDP growth. Their study revealed that states 
with a high natural resource exports to GDP ratio, had unusually slow growth rates 
between 1971 and 1989. In addition, the correlation remained significant even after 
Sachs and Warner controlled for a variety of growth- related variables, including 
initial per capita income, trade policy, investment rates, region, bureaucratic 
efficiency, terms-of-trade volatility, and income distribution. A study by Weinthal 
and Luong (2006) discovered that during the period 1965-1998, members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) experienced nearly 
universally low or negative annual growth rates. In addition, they revealed that 
mineral and oil exporters were more likely to incur greater debts even as world 
commodity prices soared, and were thus forced to commit a significant percentage 
of their GDP to debt servicing. The authors also observed that mineral rich 
countries ranked low on indices of the World Bank Governance Research 
Indicators and the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
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In addition, citizens in such countries suffered higher levels of poverty, child 
mortality and income inequality, and had authoritarian regimes as the modal 
governmental forms. In the past thirty years, the developing world’s star performers 
have been the resource- poor “Asian tigers”: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore; while many oil and mineral-rich economies such as Iraq, Nigeria, 
Angola and Venezuela, have lagged behind or stunted economically (Weinthal and 
Luong, 2006). 
Of sixty-five resource-rich countries, only four managed to attain both long-
term investment exceeding 25 percent of GDP on average from 1970 to 1998, 
similar to that of various industrial resource-poor countries, and per capita GNP 
growth exceeding 4 percent per year on average, over the same period (Gylfason, 
2001). These four are Botswana, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The three 
Asian countries achieved this success through diversifying their economies and 
industrializing, while Botswana, rich in diamonds, mostly without doing so. 
Between 1960 and 1976 the leading hard-rock mineral exporters in the developing 
world had average per capita GDP growth rates of 1.9 percent, nearly half the rate 
of a control group of non-mineral states (ibid). 
 
A number of explanations have been put in place to try to understand the 
mechanisms and effects of the resource curse on a country’s economic development. 
The traditional explanation for the resource curse has been what the Economist (1977) 
dubbed the “Dutch Disease,” after the effects of the North Sea gas on the Dutch 
economy. In the 1970’s the Netherlands experienced a boom in production of natural 
gas and exported the fuels in great quantities. The revenues from the gas exports 
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resulted in the appreciation of the Dutch guilder against other international currencies. 
This resulted in Dutch exports becoming more expensive to purchase. As a result, 
Dutch industries faced more intense foreign completion in international trade, which 
impacted employment rates and slowed economic growth in the country. 
 
The experience of the Dutch disease in the Netherlands was also reflected in 
other cases around the world. One example is Nigeria, particularly in the1970’s. As 
revenues from crude oil built up in the country’s economy, Nigeria’s exports of 
peanuts and cocoa, in which the majority of the population participated in, became 
unprofitable as this sector became less attractive to investors and their production 
collapsed. This hurt the farmers who had produced them, but didn’t itself curtail the 
growth process because traditional export agriculture was generally not a very dynamic 
sector with many opportunities for technological progress and productivity growth. 
However, in this case, as Collier (2007) argues, Dutch disease damaged the 
growth process by crowding out export activities that otherwise would have the potential 
to grow rapidly. According to Collier (2007), the Dutch disease generates sectorial 
reallocation of productive resources in response to a favorable price shock. As a result, 
there is a transfer of resources, particularly capital and labor, from other sectors such as 
agriculture and manufacturing. In a country suffering from the Dutch Disease, the 
growing sector usually entices rural workers away from agricultural production. 
According to Collier (2007) this contributes to a relative devaluation of local crops. 
 
According to Yates (1996) booming oil (and mineral) sectors distort the 
patterns of growth on the agricultural and other taxable producing sectors of the 
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economy that drive long lasting economic growth. In resource-rich countries, there is 
a temptation for governments to maintain this artificially high exchange values for 
their national currencies in order to facilitate the purchasing power of their money. 
As a result, other sectors within the economy suffer particularly the labor intensive 
manufactures and services that are believed to be key in driving economic growth, as 
has been demonstrated in China and India. 
 
Apart from the Dutch Disease explanation, another reason for the development 
resource curse is the volatility of natural resource commodity prices. Revenue volatility 
in an oil or mineral exporting developing country hampers planning, increases deficits, 
escalates spending and tends to raise national debt (Shaxson, 2005). With regards to 
the last point, when oil or mineral prices are high, countries become more creditworthy 
to the IMF, World Bank, sovereign donors, and privates credits, and tend to borrow 
more. However, when prices fall, arrears build up on unpaid debts, increasing debt 
further.  As a result, this boosts prices, interest rates and real exchange rates, thus 
generating Dutch disease effects that stifle economic growth. Moreover, countries 
reliant on  resource exports discover that the steep price variability on the global 
market shifted to the domestic economies, making government incomes and foreign 
exchange supplies unpredictable and private investment prohibitively risky (Ross, 
1999). 
 
Rent-seeking is another way in which negative economic growth can result 
within a natural resource-rich setting. Arezki (2008) highlights that in the absence of 
definitive property rights; natural resources introduce a common pool problem and 
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prompt rent-seeking. According to Visal Khan (2010) rent-seeking occurs when 
individuals or organizations attempt to produce revenue by seizing economic rents via 
the manipulation and exploitation of the economic and political environment, in place 
of earning income through economic transactions and the production of supplementary 
wealth. In other words, a rent-seeker obtains economic profits without contributing to 
any economic production. Most instances of rent-seeking occur where there are 
extractive natural resources or through obtaining the control of land.  Rent-seeking can 
also occur through the imposition of regulations that affect consumers and businesses, 
and enable the capture of monopoly privileges. 
 
Rent-seeking is thus prevalent in what are known as “rentier” states. Yates 
(1996) broadly defines “rentier” states as those countries whose main source of revenue 
is external to the domestic economic system. The structures of most resource-rich 
countries in Africa can be deemed as rentier due to the fact that they exhibit four 
characteristics identified by Yates (1996): 
 
1.   Rent situations predominate in the economy. 
 
2.   The origin of the rent is external to the local economy. 
 
3.   Only a few are engaged in the generation of rent, while the majority is 
involved in its distribution and consumption. 
4.   The government is the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy 
(Yates, 1996). 
 
One of the consequences of large amounts of external rents is the fact that the 
state tends to relax constraints on foreign exchange. This is mainly because in a rentier 
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economy, foreign exchange is easily obtainable, thus the state can afford importing 
goods more cheaply. Imported goods as a result replace domestically produced goods, 
particularly in agriculture and manufacturing, which cannot compete with foreign 
goods produced under economies of scale. Another consequence is that government 
can embark on big capital-intensive development projects. This is mainly due to the 
fact that, with foreign exchange obtained from external rents, a state can afford more 
foreign technology, creating the façade of modernization without sustaining the 
“goods-producing” capacity of the economy (Yates, 1996). 
 
Yates (1996) quotes Mahdavy, who first advanced the rentier-state concept as 
arguing that resource rents make state officials both “myopic and risk-averse”.  Upon 
receiving significant rents, resource-exporters were observed to actively avoid 
wealth-generating policies due to the guaranteed rents they would obtain from natural 
resources. He argues that essentially governments develop an irrational sense of 
optimism about future revenues and dedicate a significant portion of revenues to 
safeguarding the status quo at the expense of sustained development and democracy. 
With this observation, Ross (1999) concluded that resource exporters are revenue 
“satisficers,” not revenue “maximizers”. In other words, he observed that when a 
state’s demand for revenue diminishes, so will the soundness of its economic 
policies. 
 
Leonard and Strauss (2003) argue that it is the enclave nature of resource 
productivity that makes it hinder economic development.  Enclave production 
entails export of primary products that are usually extractive, and that are generated 
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in a geographically concentrated area which is widely practiced in the sectors of 
mining and oil drilling.  The enclave idea implies that production is geographically 
concentrated, a large portion of capital goods and land involved in export 
production cannot be allotted to other lucrative purposes, and that mobile labor is a 
minor share of the production cost. Most states on the African continent have a tax 
base that is built overwhelmingly on revenue generated from commodity sales (oil, 
minerals, cash crops etc.), and many derive most of their export income from 
enclave production, thus, making them “enclave economies.” Enclave economies 
are rentier and do not depend on widespread productivity in the population, which 
goes counter to the labor intensive development models of South Korea, China and 
Singapore. The state itself does not contribute significantly to the value of 
production, sometimes not even through provision of physical infrastructure or 
assurance of security. In that sense, the state collects “rents” from these economic 
activities, collecting revenue without enhancing productivity. Moreover, production 
is detached from the general population’s economic productivity. Revenue 
generation is materially confined to small areas, and the main markets are external, 
making the economic health of areas outside the enclave secondary and at times 
irrelevant. Thus, the elite do not have a vested interest in mass prosperity, a 
situation that increases income inequalities within such economies. 
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The Curse of Authoritarianism 
 
 
The second dimension of the resource curse is the effect of natural resources on 
political development. Namely, natural resources have been linked to undemocratic 
political development and authoritarianism. It has for a while been a curious 
phenomenon that countries that are rich in resources are the ones which fail to exert 
pressures on their governance structures in for democratic change. By far the most 
undemocratic region in the world, the Middle East, still remains under the rule of 
authoritarian regimes. Only five of twenty-five oil-reliant exporters are referred to as 
democracies. These are Venezuela8, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. The rest: Syria, Iran, Iraq, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Cameroon, Brunei, Nigeria, Yemen, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Oman, Congo-
Brazzaville, and Saudi Arabia, were not described as democratic by the Democracy 
Index (2010). Sub- Saharan African countries currently under dictatorships include 
Angola, under Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Equatorial Guinea under Teodoro Obiang 
Nguema Mbasogo, Cameroon under Paul Biya and Sudan, under Omar Hasan Ahmad 
al-Bashir. All of these countries derive a great proportion of their Gross Domestic 
Product from the export of oil (CIA, 2010). Other oil and mineral-rich countries have 
also suffered periods of authoritarian rule in history, including Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein, Nigeria under Ibrahim Babangida and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of 
Congo) under Mobutu Sese Seko. In fact, Mobutu utilized the mineral resources in his 
country for his own self-enrichment, approximated by Transparency International to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In Venezuela, President Chávez currently governs by Presidential decree thus undermining the judicial 
branch and the legislature, etc.  “To all appearances, Venezuela seems to be a democracy in the process of 
failing.” 
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total US$5 billion thus leading to a kleptocratic government (Transparency 
International, 2006). 
In his groundbreaking paper “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” Michael Ross 
isolated three mechanisms in which the resource curse may impede political 
development. These are a) the interplay of the rentier effect, b) the repression of oil 
states, and c) the lack of modernization that inhibits the development of democracy. 
According to Ross (1999), the rentier effect separates fiscal relationships between the 
government and citizens, and occurs through three mechanisms: the taxation effect, the 
spending effect and the group formation effect. The taxation effect refers to the relief 
of an oil-rich state from levying a tax burden on its population. The citizens are relived 
from paying taxes to the state because revenues from the oil or mineral rents are 
sufficient to run state budgets. Traditionally, the payment of taxes is what links civil 
society to the democratic process, and in the absence of a tax base, the government 
thus becomes less accountable to the society that it governs (Ross, 1999). In a rentier 
state, setting up a tax system would only produce a small fraction of the tax revenue 
obtained from the resource rent. As a result, this has the effect of reducing citizens’ 
democratic voice, as the dictum goes “no representation without taxation.” The 
absence of representative institutions like taxation thus makes the government less 
accountable. 
The second way the rentier effect works is through a “spending effect.” The 
spending effect occurs when a state that is heavily dependent on resource rents, spends 
or is prone to spending a lot of money establishing and maintaining patronage 
networks. According to Berman (1997), patron-client relationships have remained 
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fundamental state-society linkages in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, those who favor 
lengthened political incumbency pay off clients with revenues generated from resource 
sales in order to gain politically. This poses a serious challenge to the forces of 
democratization. 
 
 
The second broader mechanism that Ross isolates is the “repression 
mechanism”. Generally, Ross argues that when a state is rentier, it invests in security 
forces that secure political incumbents from challengers to their office. This greatly 
diminishes the political voice of the citizens. An example of this is in countries where 
peaceful demonstrations are deemed illegal. Large flows of oil money encourage 
leaders to spend excessively on regime defenses. For example, since before 1979, 
Iranian expenditure has been spent on the security of the Shah and the survival of his 
regime (Global Security, 2011). Qatar and Oman, both oil-exporters, spend over 10 
percent of their GDP on military expenditures (ibid). The presence of elite defense 
“national guards”, known as the Mukhabarats in Middle Eastern countries, had the 
effect of suppressing opposition. Oil wealth, in addition, increases expenditure on 
arms. Global Witness (2002) argues that in Angola, various illegal schemes were put 
in place to facilitate the exchange of oil for arms that fueled the ongoing civil war. 
 
The third mechanism that Ross describes when discussing the effects of 
resources on democracy is known as the “modernization effect,” following the work of 
Inglehart and Welzel, (2005). Generally, Inglehart’s research demonstrates a positive 
correlation between economic development, education and democracy. Citing Inglehart 
and Welzel (2005), Ross (1999) argues that democracy is most likely to emerge and 
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survive when certain social and cultural conditions are in place.  He argues that when 
modernization sets in, it tends to permeate other aspects of life, bringing with it 
positive feedback, and reinforcing transformations to political institutions. This has the 
effect of enhancing occupational specialization, prompting urbanization, raising 
educational levels, life expectancy and other human development indicators, as well as 
increasing the primary rate of economic growth. Additionally, modernization raises 
mass political participation and ultimately enables the fortification of democratic 
political institutions. According to Gylfason (2001)’s empirical research, resource-rich 
countries tend to spend less on education than their resource-poor counterparts, thus 
limiting democratic growth. 
 
Natural resources provide the structural base for personal rule and 
neopatrimonialism (Englebert, 2000). Neopatrimonialism has been viewed in sub-
Saharan African literature as the equilibrium result of the mismatch between pre-
colonial and colonial political organization (ibid). In sub- Saharan Africa, 
neopatrimonialism has well been established to be the modal form of politics (Bratton, 
1994). In such countries, regimes collect and distribute “rents” as patronage instead of 
developing infrastructure and institutional capacities for broad-based markets. One key 
element of personal rule is the counterproductive development policy, in the forms of 
unpredictable economic policy and strategies of private accumulation through public 
means.  Countries characterized by personal rule have a number of key characteristics 
identified by Leonard and Strauss (2003). These include the fact that 
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1. Appointment and position in government generally depend on loyalty to one’s 
superior and not on adherence to impersonal norms; 
2. Transactions are personalized and office is treated as a form of personal property 
and a source of private gain (known in Weberian terms as a “prebend”); and, 
3. A clear sense of a public interest that transcends private ones does not exist. 
This type of political system has been attributed to Africa’s colonial history (Leonard 
and Strauss, 2003). In pre-colonial times, small African states existed which were 
highly centralized and hierarchical. The chief was in many cases the singular 
custodian of natural resources, and access and distribution of those resources was done 
along patron-client lines.  Hyden (1997) asserts that historically, personal rule existed 
in most world regions and that a lineage orientation persisted where kinship networks 
and other primary reciprocities governed communities. However, informal rules have 
greater salience than formal ones and rational-legal authority has gained less traction 
in modern African settings. While other countries have moved on to more efficient 
forms of governance, Africa has maintained its hierarchical “community-centered 
orientation” (Hyden 2006:56). 
 
Natural resources help fuel personalistic rule. One extreme example is that of 
Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo). In his thirty years in 
power, Mobutu succeeded in generating huge amounts of wealth for himself and his 
clients, while 99 percent of that country’s population faced a disintegrating economy. 
To survive, Mobutu only needed to maintain diamond, gold, copper, cobalt and other 
minerals, as well as collect foreign aid to protect his state and perpetuate his rule 
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(Dunning, 2005). Thus, in this example, natural resources were used to sustain a 
corrupt government. 
Hanne Fjelde (2008) argues that political corruption accommodates opposition 
and pacifies restless groups by offering private privilege for political loyalty. As a result, 
this provides an economic foundation for clientelist rule (Fjelde, 2008). This author cites 
Gabonese President Bongo’s administration as a classic manifestation of cronyism. 
According to Fjelde, Bongo after the 1970’s pursued a co-optation policy of the middle 
class through public expenditure. Nevertheless, political stability in Gabon has greatly 
depended on the president’s patronage networks. In addition, limited organized 
opposition to Gadhafi’s regime in Libya made rent-seeking dominate citizenry behavior 
as the government used oil revenues as a strategic commodity in buying off political 
competitions, resulting in rentier peace.  Events in 2011, however, suggest the limits of 
using resource revenues to buy off the political opposition, at least in Libya. 
The resource curse has resulted in diverging experiences for countries where 
peace and stability are concerned. On one end, it has fostered rentier peace through 
authoritarianism and neopatrimonialistic networks, and on the other hand, it has been 
linked to an increase in civil war and violent conflict. The following section looks at how 
natural resource abundance leads to violent conflict.  
 
The Curse of Violent Conflict 
 
In addition to having negative effects on countries’ economic growth, natural 
resources have also been seen to affect the incidence of violent conflicts worldwide. 
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Needless to say, the geography of conflict is curiously located in areas with a large 
amount of valuable natural resources and these regions have as a result, gained 
strategic importance and concern in the military planning of the US and the United 
Nations (Klare, 2001).  The 2003 and 2004 coup attempts in Equatorial Guinea, and the 
Congo- Brazzaville’s civil wars of the 1990’s, have been greatly attributed to the levels 
of oil exportation in these countries. The oil-rich region of the Niger Delta has also 
been the setting of many conflicts, such as the Warri (Port Harcourt) conflicts between 
the Niger Delta Vigilantes and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and the Ijaw-
Itsekiri conflicts (Human Rights Watch, 2005). In addition, one of the world’s most 
famous and valuable diamonds, the Millennium Star, a 203.04 carat (155.4g) 
originated from the DRC in the years preceding its civil war9. 
Other natural resources, like diamonds mined in war zone areas, have been used 
to finance insurgencies and warlord activities. These have now come to be named 
“conflict diamonds” or “blood diamonds.” The 1974-2001 civil war in Angola saw one 
side of the war; the government backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) being funded by oil revenue, and the rebel group the National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) being funded by diamond revenues. In 
fact, according to Arnold (2000:131), UNITA sold diamonds, in the value of US$3.72 
billion towards funding the war against the Angolan government. Cabinda, an oil rich 
enclave of Angola, has played host to a violent secessionist movement, the Front for 
the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), whose ethnic group, the Bakongo 
planned in order to separate the province from Angola. 
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  http://burbankdigest.com/node/37	  	  
35 
	  
The rationale for the relationship between resource wealth and violent conflict, 
stemmed mainly from two hypotheses which provide the motivation for civil war as a 
result of resource endowments. These competing rationales are the greed theory and the 
grievance theory. The greed theory postulated by Collier & Hoeffler (2005) argues that 
wealth in primary commodities escalates the probability of civil war onset by providing 
occasions and motivation for armed rebel activity. The “greedy rebels” mechanism thus 
suggests that the booty character of natural resources encourages rebels to take up arms 
or continue fighting. Furthermore, “greedy outsiders” might be ready to intervene 
militarily either directly or through support for internal warring factions as a way to 
gain or maintain control over productive resources, such as was the involvement of 
Rwanda and Uganda in the Second Congo War. 
 
In contrast, the “grievance” transmission channel suggests that the perceived 
deprivation of producing regions and social groups, or the indirect negative economic 
consequences of resource wealth, create grievances that trigger violent uprising, 
particularly secessionist movements. In such cases, resource wealth promotes civil 
war by giving people who live in resource-rich areas the economic incentive to 
establish a separate state. Most regions that are resource-rich coincidentally tend to be 
inhabited by people of distinct ethnic, linguistic, or religious identities that set them 
apart from the majority population and as a result, they are usually disenfranchised. 
This has been the rationale behind secessionist movements in the natural gas rich 
region of Aceh in Indonesia, the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda in Angola, oil-rich Biafra 
in Nigeria, and natural gas-rich southern Sudan. However, most authors including 
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Collier and Hoeffler (2005) place more emphasis on greed being a motivation for civil 
conflict instead on the grievance mechanism. 
 
Michael Ross (2002) argues that there are other mechanisms that could result 
in resource abundance leading to civil war, such as a rapid decline on economic 
growth. He observed that the civil wars in DRC, Sierra Leona and Liberia were all 
preceded by a rapid decline in GDP per capita. In addition, he argues that natural 
resources weaken a state’s institutions and bureaucracy, and fosters corruption. Most 
corruption is found in resource-rich countries, for example, an IMF report indicates 
that Angola failed to account for almost $1 billion due to corruption. 
 
Ross (2002) posits that resource dependence overwhelms a state’s budgetary 
processes. Incumbents tend to use money to obtain patronage, which further weakens 
state institutions and makes it corrupt. As a result, states lack accountability to their 
citizens, and fail to provide for the necessary state security apparatus that would keep 
the country stable. They do however; build up security forces in order to protect the 
regimes themselves, but not the citizens of the country. 
 
Finally, Ross (2002) argues that resource abundance provides an opportunity for 
rebel financing. When Angola’s UNITA lost its financial backing from the United 
States at the end of the Cold war and the apartheid era in South Africa, it turned to its 
diamond revenue for supporting military expenses.  Similarly, the Khmer Rouge of 
Cambodia sold timber and gemstones to fund its military exploits, and the FARC in 
Colombia trafficked cocaine. Resources like diamonds and oil produce high rents and 
are usually done in a specific location, making looting and extortion feasible. 
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According to Pierre Englebert and Ron James (2006), in 1997 in Congo-Brazzaville, 
the private militia of President Sassou-Nguesso was funded by the sale of war booty 
and the rights to future exploitation rights to the country’s oil reserves. 
Although natural resource wealth has been blamed for inducing slow economic 
growth, authoritarianism, and sparking violent conflict, this research argues that these 
effects are mediated by the quality of institutions that are in place. The following 
section provides a background to the intermediary role played by economic and 
political institutions.  
INSTITUTIONS AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
Despite the fact that a resource curse is apparent in many resource-rich 
countries, it is not a universal phenomenon. For every two or three countries that 
exhibit symptoms of the curse, there is a relative success story. Thus, the empirical fact 
that natural resources are negatively correlated with economic growth must be 
reconciled with the fact that there have been these varying outcomes across countries. 
An emerging group of scholars are now arguing that the resource curse is far from 
inevitable. Citing the relative successes of countries like Norway and regions like 
Alaska having become affluent thanks to their resource endowments, they argue for a 
new interpretation for the fate of resource-rich countries. Boschini, Petterson and Roine 
(2007) argue that resource wealth alone does not affect whether a country suffers the 
resource curse. Instead, the incidence of the curse hinges upon the quality of a state’s 
institutions. Therefore, in the view of proponents of the view, given the right 
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institutional framework, non-renewable resources can potentially boost a country’s 
economic and human development (Boschini, Petterson and Roine, 2007). 
Three divergent strands of thought have emerged within the literature as to how 
institutions affect the resource curse. The first are those who argue that institutions do 
not play a significant role; rather, it is resources that directly cause the curse. A second 
strand argues that institutions are depreciated by resource wealth and thus constitute an 
intermediary causal relation between resources and economic performance. A third 
strand argues that resources interact with institutional quality. When institutions are 
good, resources become a blessing and when they are bad, the resource curse occurs.   
Michael Ross falls within the first strand in his research of the relationship 
between oil dependency and democracy. He shows that oil dependency hinders 
democracy. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) on the other hand, reject the 
hypothesis that institutions or bureaucratic quality play a role in explaining the 
resource curse, instead placing heavy emphasis on the Dutch disease as an 
empirically relevant explanation for the resource curse. 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2005) however, predict that in countries with 
functional institutions, resource wealth invites entrepreneurs into production, and in 
countries with fragile institutions, entrepreneurs are sidetracked from production and 
into unsustainable rent appropriation. They assert that the variance of growth 
performance among resource exporters is primarily due to rents being dispersed 
through a country’s institutional arrangements. They distinguish between “producer-
friendly” institutions in which rent-seeking activities complement economic 
production, and “grabber-friendly” institutions, where rent-seeking competes with 
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production. The aims of grabber-friendly institutions according to the authors, is to 
gain from specialization in unproductive environments characterized by weak rule of 
law, malfunctioning bureaucracy and corruption. They attract entrepreneurial 
resources out of production, implying negative economic growth. Similarly, Robinson, 
Torviki and Verdier (2005) argue that depending on the quality of institutions, 
politicians favor certain policies over others in reaction to incentives brought about by 
resource booms. Low quality institutions attract bad policy choices since they permit 
politicians to participate in inefficient redistribution in order to influence election 
outcomes. In contrast, good quality institutions make such political strategies 
infeasible or relatively unappealing. Scholars who emphasize the role of institutions in 
the resource curse have an optimistic outlook on escaping the resource curse and 
believe that with the right laws and structural adjustments, resource-rich countries can 
escape the resource curse. They look to the creation of savings funds, policies aimed at 
the diversification of the economy to relieve dependency on resources, and income 
redistribution, as ways in which resource-rich countries can gain favorably from their 
resource endowments (Alayli, 2005). 
However, one problematic of this view is its simplified view of primitive 
predatory behavior. Rosser (2006) argues that the nature of institutions in resource 
exporters is determined by enduring social patterns and dynamics, principally where 
natural resource domination of the economy occurred subsequent to state formation. 
In such instances, resource endowments entered into ongoing processes of 
development and into a constellation of identities.  Michael Watts extended this line 
of thought in his research on Nigeria. He explores how petro-capitalism produced 
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forms of rule and political authority, what he called “governable spaces” from the 
realities within which it was inserted (Watts, 2004). Therefore the counter-argument 
to the resource curse is that the difference between countries that benefit from 
resources and those that do not is the institutional setting into which the natural 
resources are inserted. 
The evolution of institutional arrangements has not been immune, however, to 
the effects of natural resources. According to Basedau (2005), adversarial colonial 
legacies and rentierism weakens state institutions and elicits poor economic policies. 
Historically, in African resource-rich countries, political institutions and property 
rights where developed in order to ensure the efficient extraction of valuable natural 
resources.  In colonial Africa, institutions were created with a bias towards 
empowering the colonial elite to extract minerals or plant cash crops. As a result, 
secure property rights were only provided for the politically and socially powerful 
colonial elite. 
Institutional quality is thought to be determined by the reliance of economic 
rents from natural resources. Ross (2003) argues that natural resource revenues can 
deteriorate a government’s resolve to address social conflicts in two ways: by 
impeding the state bureaucracy’s effectiveness, and by weakening the state’s 
monopoly on territorial control. He argues that a state’s strength comes from its ability 
to tax its citizens. In the presence of abundant natural resources, this capacity is 
undermined as the state find less incentive to establish tax infrastructure due to the 
ease of obtaining economic rents.  
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Furthermore, if a country has valuable resources that can be artisanally mined, 
like coltan, tanzanite, and alluvial diamonds, the state’s monopoly on law and order in 
the extractive region may be compromised. Such “lootable” minerals attract rural 
miners who usually resort to extralegal and sometimes violent measures to establish 
claims and adjudicate disputes. The high value-to-weight ratios of these resources 
compromise their taxability, facilitating for easy smuggling. Furthermore, as Basedau 
(2005) argues, they produce high corruption levels inside the government and beyond. 
In certain cases, this combination of weak institutions, corrupt government, 
compromised authority, and resilient criminal organization, can escalate to the rise of 
rebel movements. 
In the case of Botswana, however, resource abundance has not come at the 
expense of economic development, peace and security, or even democracy. The 
existence of diamond wealth has not acted as an incentive for the economic elite to 
create neo-patrimonialistic network systems. Neither has the presence of diamond 
wealth created a disincentive for taxation. Property rights have been efficiently 
allocated, and the state has great monopoly over the control of resource extraction. 
This dissertation begins from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001)’s assertion 
that despite initial economic and geographic disadvantages during the colonial 
period, Botswana attained rapid development due to quality institutions. This begs 
the question: Why have Botswana’s institutions been so robust? Why has diamond 
wealth not been as much of an incentive for bad behavior in Botswana as it has been 
in other sub-Saharan natural resource-rich countries? The following section will 
42 
	  
operationalize the terms “institution” and “institutional quality” within the context 
of this dissertation.  
 
Defining Institutions 
According to Michael Bratton (2011), institutionalism assumes that ordinary 
people, when thinking and acting politically, obtain cues from the customary structures 
predominant in their local polities. Therefore, institutions provide a revealing aperture 
through which to view and explain uniformities in human behavior, public opinion and 
mass participation. Douglass North (1990) defines institutions as “humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction.” Institutions, he 
argues, consist of both informal constraints, such as taboos, sanctions, customs, traditions 
and codes of conduct, as well as formal rules, such as constitutions, laws and property 
rights. Throughout history, institutions have created order and reduced the uncertainty 
normally attached to exchanges.  
North states that understanding the need to constrain human interaction with 
institutions can best be explained within a game theoretic context. Wealth-maximizing 
individuals usually find it worthwhile to collaborate with other players when three 
conditions are met. These conditions are: repeated plays; access to knowledge about the 
past performance of the other player; and a small number of players. In contrast, the 
sustainability of cooperation is problematic when the game is not repeated or there is an 
endgame; when there is a lack of information on the other players; and where the number 
of players is large.  
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In an economy, North (1990) argues that institutions provide an incentive 
structure, and as this structure evolves, so does the direction of economic change towards 
growth, stagnation, or decline. However, there exists a difference between formal and 
informal institutions.  
 
Formal vs. Informal Institutions 
Formal institutions consist of written rules and constraints such as a constitution, 
the law and regulations etc. (Siedler, 2011:4). According to Frances (2004:6), “they 
contribute to political stability, prevent corruption, enhance public sector efficiency, and 
protect private property rights from misappropriation by private parties or government10”. 
Four constitutional constraints serve to limit government predation. These constraints are 
plurality, proportional representation, judicial independence, and constitutional review, 
and can be classified as either electoral rules or judicial constraints. Electoral rules, 
indicated by plurality and proportional representation, act as checks on executive power, 
while judicial constraints, measured by judicial independence and constitutional review, 
capture the limits on the executive dispensed by the judiciary (Williamson and Kerekes, 
2011). 
For Bratton (2007:2), “formal institutions are the organized routines of political 
democracy, such as regular elections for top officeholders and legal constraints on the 
political executive”. Bratton (2007) refers to proponents who favor explanations 
emphasizing the role of formal institutions as “formalists”, and argues that in studying 
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Africa, “formalists” contend that the nature of official state institutions decisively shapes 
citizens’ stances toward democracy. Relevant formal institution variables include whether 
the constitution is unitary or federal, presidential or parliamentary; whether the electoral 
system is majoritarian, plurality-based, or proportional; and whether the party system is 
fragmented or if one party dominates it. For instance, Donald Horowitz, who Bratton 
identifies as a “formalist”, has argued that federal constitutions help to ease political 
conflict in deeply divided societies such as most in Africa. Furthermore, Andrew 
Reynolds recommends proportionate representation as an electoral formula to safeguard 
minority rights. Similarly, Daniel Posner argues that effectiveness of the party system 
affects whether ethnic groups organize along language, cultural or tribal lines. These are 
all explanations that emphasize the role of formal institutions in economic and political 
developmental outcomes.  
Informal institutions, on the other hand, are unwritten norms of repeated human 
interactions. They embody moral codes and norms, which can be very diverse across 
cultures (North 2005:50).  Williamson and Kerekes (2011) describe informal institutions 
as those rules that shape human behavior but are outside of government and are not part 
of a written legal framework. These private mechanisms guide everyday interactions and 
shape a way of life within a given region include social norms, customs, attitudes, beliefs 
about right and wrong, and rules of enforcement (North 1990). In informal institutions, 
constraints are persistent over time and show depth and durability. 
Williamson and Kerekes identified four separate classes of culture that they 
assume constrict behavior related to economic and societal interaction. These four are 
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trust, respect, individual self-determination and obedience. Trust, they argue, reduces 
transaction costs, resulting in efficient outcomes and the continuance of market exchange 
(Fukuyama 1996; La Porta, Lopez de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997 etc.). The second 
component of culture captures the determination of individuals to succeed, which is 
determined by the level of individual self-control individual over choices. The third 
cultural trait is defined as respect. Some societies condone opportunistic behavior outside 
immediate networks, while others promote social interactions beyond immediate groups. 
The fourth and final cultural trait captures obedience as an important to society. Tabellini 
(2009) argues that certain societies teach that disparage individualism and find it to be 
destructive. 
Within the African context, Bratton (2007) refers to informal institutions as the 
patterns of patron-client relations by which power is exercised. He argues that 
“informalists” (those who emphasize the efficacy of informal institutions), view official 
state institutions as generally weak in Africa, where unwritten rules hold far more sway. 
He argues that the role of informal institutions in Africa derive from a social logic known 
as “the economy of affection.”  He posits that informal institutions such as charisma: the 
authority relationships based on personal trust; clientilism: the expression of political 
loyalty to providers of patronage; pooling: horizontal exchanges within small groups; and 
collective self-defense:  such as the development of common norms of sovereignty and 
noninterference, are what prevail in Africa (Bratton, 2007:98). He argues that in nascent 
democracies, formal institutions are either underdeveloped or ignored with impunity, 
usually in deference to individual or communal ties. This results in the influence of 
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formal institutions being sharply attenuated as political actors align themselves with more 
familiar relationships and practices. 
Table 2.1 provides a hierarchy of institutions according to an “informalist,” 
Valentin Siedler (2011). As is reflected in the table, informalists argue that informal 
institutions impose the most constraints on formal institutions. As a result, they rank 
informal institutions highest within the institutional hierarchy. Their assumption views 
human behavior as being shaped more by informal institutions, such as moral codes 
based on kinship, more than by formal institutions such as the written law, particularly 
when the two are  in conflict (Williamson 2000: 596-598). 
 
Table 2. 1: Hierarchy of Institutions 
Level Examples Changeability Effect 
1. Informal 
institutions related to 
social structure of the 
society 
Cultural norms, 
religion, customs 
Very persistent to 
change. 100-1000 years 
Defines the way a 
society conducts itself 
2. Formal 
institutions related to law 
and bureaucracy 
Formal rules defining 
property rights, the 
judiciary system 
Long horizon to change 
(10-100). Shocks and 
crises may affect 
sudden change.  
Defines overall 
institutional 
framework 
3. Formal 
institutions related to 
governance and rules of 
doing business 
Specific laws and 
regulations defining 
contractual relations 
(e.g. limitation of 
liability, business 
contracts) 
Mid-term horizon (1-10 
years) 
Defines the “rules of 
the game” 
4. Formal 
institutions which 
regulate resource 
allocation (incl. 
employment) 
Adjustments of prices 
according to 
neoclassical analysis, 
setting incentives 
Short time adjustments, 
continuous 
Define marginal 
conditions under 
markets function.  
Source: Siedler, 2011:5 (based on Williamson 2000 and Jütting 2003) 
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This dissertation acknowledges the contribution of both formal and informal 
institutions in determining Botswana’s developmental success.  
 
Defining Institutional Quality 
According to North (1990), effective institutions raise the benefits of cooperative 
solutions or the costs of defection. They reduce transaction and production costs per 
exchange so that potential gains are realizable. According to the Bertlesmann 
Transformation Index (2010), institutional quality can be determined by indicators such 
as the level of stateness, a country’s monopoly on the use of force, the level of political 
participation, the exercise of free and fair elections, association and assembly rights, 
freedom of expression, the rule of law, separation of powers, independent judiciary, 
prosecution of office abuse, and stability and performance of democratic institutions. 
Economic institutional quality is determined by levels of market organization, anti-
monopoly policy, currency and price stability, macro-stability and private property. In 
this study it has been well established that Botswana has a high level of institutional 
quality. According to the Bertlesmann Transformation Index (2010), Botswana scored a 
value of 8.4 for democracy status, 8.0 for rule of law, and 9.0 for stability of political 
institutions. This is in comparison with Angola, Nigeria and the DRC who scored 4.85, 
4.80, and 3.60 for democracy status respectively, 4.0 5.3 and 2.8 for rule of law 
respectively, and 3.0, 2.0 and 2.0 respectively for stability of democratic institutions, with 
the highest ideal score achievable for all areas being 10. Similarly, whereas Botswana 
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scored 7.2 for market economy status, Angola, Nigeria and DRC scored 4.25, 5.04 and 
2.79 respectively (BTI, 2010)11. 
This dissertation describes institutional quality as institutions that reflect 
characteristics of good governance. These eight characteristics are transparency, 
accountability responsiveness, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient, follow the 
rule of law, participatory and consensus oriented.  
 
Figure 2.1: The Eight Characteristics of Institutional Quality 
Own Adopted from UNESCAP (2013) 
Institutional quality connotes freedom of association and expression as well as an 
organized civil society. Hence, participation is a keystone of institutional quality. 
Institutional quality reflects fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It 
requires protection of human rights, particularly of minorities, as well as vulnerable and 
marginalized populations. Enforcement of laws should be impartial and police force 
should be incorruptible. Transparency refers to the taking of decisions in a manner that 
follows rules and regulations. Information is freely available and directly accessible to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For more statistics on the Bertlesmann Transformation Index, please refer to Appendix III, IV and V 
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those affected by decisions and their enforcement. Institutional quality connotes that 
processes serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.  Institutional quality is 
also consensus oriented and open to a plurality of viewpoints. It requires mediation of 
different interests to reach a broader consensus in society. This consensus should also 
bear a long-term perspective, and reflect an understanding of the historical, cultural and 
social contexts of a given society or community. Institutional quality insinuates societal 
wellbeing as dependent on equity and inclusiveness. Furthermore, it means institutions 
and processes produce results that meet societal needs and make the best use of societal 
resources.  Efficient institutions sustainably utilize natural resources and protect the 
environment. Accountability is a key indicator of institutional quality. Institutions should 
be accountable to those affected by their decisions and actions, and cannot be enforced 
without transparency and the rule of law,	  UNESCAP (2013).  Appendices III, IV and V 
depict institutional quality scores according to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index in 
comparative perspective.  
This dissertation will use these criteria as measures of institutional quality and 
will qualitatively evaluate to what extent historical continuity and legitimacy, political 
culture, ethnicity and identity management as well as external actors, affected these 
measures that reflect the robustness of institutions in Botswana.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
LEGITIMACY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY IN BOTSWANA 
This chapter explores Botswana’s history and the context that it created for the 
establishment of Tswana institutions. Specifically, the chapter tests the idea that due to a 
lack of institutional disruption from pre-colonial, through colonial, to post-colonial times, 
Botswana experienced a rare level of institutional continuity that other sub-Saharan 
African countries did not experience. As a result, the adoption of post-colonial 
institutions whose principles greatly resembled those of pre-colonial institutions had the 
added benefit of legitimizing the type of authority that was exercised by Tswana rulers. 
As a result, Tswana authorities did not have to compete with newer forms of governance 
as in other African countries disrupted by the forces of slavery and imperialism. 
Before Botswana became an independent country in 1966, the poor, arid, and 
landlocked country was one of the most neglected crown colonies12 of the British Empire. 
It was surrounded by states ruled by hostile white regimes, including Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) to the east, South West Africa (Namibia) to the west, and apartheid South 
Africa to the south. Many argue that Botswana was actually never fully colonized 
(Keene, 2001), but rather was a protectorate of Britain (Morton, Ramsay and Mgadla, 
2008). British colonial policy greatly varied in sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, the 
British exercised indirect rule, whereby the colony was administered through existing 
traditional structures. In the case of Nigeria, the chiefs where used to run the British 
administration. In most of southern Africa however, because most of the colonies were 
settler colonies, where people of European descent established permanent settlements, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Crown Colony 
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system of segregation was put in place. The most commonly known form of this was 
apartheid (Gallagher, 2002), which greatly undermined the authority of traditional 
governance systems and imposed new power structures to the detriment of indigenous 
populations. However, unlike its neighbors, Botswana had minimal hostilities with its 
white population, who generally never seriously attempted to permanently settle in the 
country. Upon independence, the native Botswana population was able to reach a cordial 
compromise, adopting British institutions, not entirely as a result of coercion, but as a 
pragmatic negotiation that would equally represent all Botswana citizens without the 
disturbance of tribal politics. Furthermore, the principles of liberal democracy espoused 
by the British institutions such as the rule of law, equality, and freedom of expression, 
greatly resembled those of traditional Tswana institutions.  
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section will provide a 
theoretical framework of the concepts of legitimacy and continuity. The second section is 
a historical exploration into the foundations of state and political legitimacy in Botswana 
throughout the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial period. The third section consists 
of views by respondents of this research about their views on the legitimacy of 
Botswana’s pre-colonial institutions in the post-colonial era. The fourth section explores 
legitimacy and continuity on a comparative perspective and the fifth section concludes 
the chapter.  
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Chapter’s Theoretical Framework: The Concept of Legitimacy 
Central to this chapter’s argument is that Botswana has a rare level of legitimacy 
that does not occur to the same extent in other resource-exporting countries in Africa and 
beyond. In Economy and Society, Weber (1978) [in Roth and Wittich (1978)], argued that 
“the medium for all forms of exchange in society is power in all of its manifestation”, a 
foundational understanding that is still generally accepted. According to Weber, 
confidence in a political system’s legitimacy directly enhances the state’s stability. 
Emphasizing the behavioral facets of power, he gave political domination preeminence as 
the key variant of power. For Weber, the level of domination is the likelihood that 
specific commands will be followed by a given group or community, of their own free 
will, without intimidation or coercion. He argued that there are precise conditions that 
qualify for domination to occur. These are “custom and the material calculation of 
advantage”.  However, these do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for domination. 
Instead, a further element of domination that abets this advantage is the belief in 
legitimacy [Weber, in Roth and Wittich (1978)].  
Thus Weber notes that while solidarity, the material advantage, and custom are 
essential to exercise authority, they are inadequate in supporting it. Only when a strong 
belief in the legitimacy of the authority in question occurs, will there be sufficient basis to 
decree the authority and activate its power. It is important to note that Weber did not 
mean that domination is legitimate, i.e., that it ought to exist. Rather, he meant that a 
community has belief in the legitimacy or validity of an authority under question, which 
in turn expedites their control over that community. Domination in this context requires 
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what Weber calls a “staff,” - the agents of the ruler13 (in this case the community). Thus, 
the presence of domination is a triangular linkage between the ruler, the staff, and the 
subjects.  
This dissertation argues that the fact that Botswana has been a peaceful and stable 
country and a nominally democratic country in sub-Saharan Africa is a result of the 
voluntary endorsement of the authority bestowed upon the state by its citizens. This 
endorsement reveals its legitimacy.  
Weber isolates three bases for legitimate authority. The first basis is on rational 
grounds. Rational legitimacy rests on a belief in the legality of rule and of those put into 
power under those rules to issue commands. The second basis of legitimacy occurs on 
traditional grounds, resting on “the belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the 
legitimacy of those exercising authority under them”. Lastly, charismatic legitimacy rests 
on “the devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an 
individual person or a group and the normative patterns of orders revealed or ordained by 
him”/them [Weber in Appelrouth and Edles (2009:179)]. These sources of legitimacy are 
rarely found in their pure form.  Rather, Weber conceives them as archetypes of 
authority, which are not mutually exclusive. As a result, more ways than one can exist of 
legitimizing authority [Weber, in Roth and Wittich (1978: 263)].   This dissertation 
argues that all three forms of legitimacy played a role in nurturing institutional quality in 
Botswana, evidence of which will be presented later in the chapter.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 http://forums.infoshop.org/viewtopic.php?f=29&t=8797  
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The legitimacy of authority that Weber posits depends on the level of analysis of 
the case in question. The level of analysis adopted by this research is the state level. Max 
Weber’s state is a “human community that successfully claims monopoly of the 
legitimate use of use of physical force within a given territory” [(Weber 1958:78) in 
Warren 2004:6)]. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959:86), states that state legitimacy “involves 
the capacity of the political system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society”. This definition 
conjures up a positive orientation among the populace toward the governing political 
regime as providing a satisfactory order, and holding the belief that no alternative would 
be superior. This is essentially a Weberian understanding of “legitimacy” in that its 
conceptualization depends not so much on the conduct of leaders or the design of 
institutions, but on how these are judged by those whom the leaders and institutions claim 
to governance.  
In relation to the territorial state, generally regarded as the ideal form of state, 
legitimacy empowers central state agents to inspire the willing cooperation and 
compliance of individual citizens without a heavy reliance on surveillance or coercion. 
This ability comes from the regard by most citizens that the agents are the most 
appropriate for making and implementing laws, policies, and programs on their behalf. 
This occurs regardless of the short-term performance or popularity of singular programs, 
policies, or the leaders who endorse them. Thus, an exploration of the level and sources 
of state legitimacy is essentially an analysis of the evolution and structure of state–society 
relations, with “society” denoting the array of institutions and social relations constructed 
by sub-state actors (Sil and Chen, 2004). 
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When historical patterns of statecraft are considered, various types of states 
evolved over centuries.  These were shaped by domestic relations of power and by 
warfare with neighboring entities, as the case in most of Western Europe. Others were 
essentially unchallenged by external forces for very long periods of time and developed 
into large-scale empires and some from having been born of social contracts. Throughout 
history, there have been three distinct modes of legitimacy. In monarchies, the ruler 
gained legitimacy through the popular perception that he possessed “divine right” of 
ruling over a people and/or a territory. In a similar vein, nationalism as a source of 
legitimacy stemmed from the “devotion to the interests or culture of one's nation” (Lee, 
2007: 54). Thirdly, ideology as a source of legitimacy looked to a well-defined set of 
doctrines and beliefs to form the basis of a political, economic, or social system (ibid). 
Independent African countries, however, have been known to lack the Weberian modes 
of political legitimacy. As Englebert (2000) notes, the majority of contemporary African 
states are exogenous institutions superimposed over pre-existing political structures and 
inherited by domestic Westernized elites at independence. The only reason why the 
political borders of this region are where as they are today, is because of external 
influences predominantly from Europe that drew artificial boundaries arbitrarily around 
territories on the continent for their own mercantilist agendas. The new African states that 
emerged after World War II were not endogenous creations of local history and are not 
embedded in domestic power relations. Thus they lacked legitimacy (i.e. were 
illegitimate). 
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To be “illegitimate”, Englebert (2000) argues that states must have all of the 
following characteristics: they were colonized; they had human settlement before 
colonization that was not reduced to insignificance or assimilated under colonialism; they 
did not re-create a pre-colonial sovereignty through gaining independence and after 
independence, they did severe violence to existing institutions. The foundations of 
political authority in independent African states bore little resemblance to those in pre-
colonial societies and rarely either had the colonial state borne any relation to the 
economic systems, political organizations, and networks of social identification of the 
indigenous people. Furthermore, preparation for independence was never an objective of 
the colonial state (Englebert, 2000: 77). This research argues that there were varying 
levels in which African countries were affected by colonialism and disruption of internal 
governing institutions. It argues that African countries were not uniformly colonized and 
did not all experience the same degree of violence to existing institutions.    Hence, it 
hypothesizes that some countries like Botswana may have been affected to a lesser extent 
than other countries in Africa and as a result, experience higher levels of legitimacy. This 
higher level of legitimacy and lack of disruption (i.e. continuity), would thus be a source 
of institutional quality in Botswana.  
CONTINUITY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGITIMACY IN BOTSWANA 
This section will explore the evolution of institutions in Botswana and explore 
how they achieved a relative level of legitimacy and continuity that other resource-rich 
countries in Africa and beyond failed to foster. It analyzes the Tswana state in three 
distinct phases: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial, emphasizing key aspects at 
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points of transition that facilitated continuity of pre-existing institutions.   It will also 
address the evolution of political practices during times of transition, and evaluate the 
extent to which new institutions gained legitimacy.  
 
Pre-Colonial Botswana 
Early Political Organization 
The first forms of collective organization in Botswana can be traced back to era of 
the Bantu14 migration from the northwest part of the African continent, which accounts 
for the existence of blacks of Bantu ancestry in contemporary Botswana.  Accounts by 
Tlou and Campbell (1984) assert that the Bantu people first settled in the Transvaal 
region of modern South Africa, building villages of an estimated hundred huts. Modern 
day BaTswana are generally regarded as the western group of the Sotho people, who had 
settled in Transvaal by the middle of the 11th century. The first to arrive were probably 
the group known today as the Kgalagadi15. During the 16th century to the early 19th 
century divisions of the groups began occurring, beginning with the BaKwena, and later 
the Kaa16 breaking away from the BaRolong. In 1769, the BaKwena lived in three 
separate villages. The BaNgwato, who occupied one village were the first to break away, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The term “Bantu” refers to a group of over 400 closely related languages spoken in central, east-central, 
and southern Africa, belonging to the South Central subgroup of the Niger-Congo language family and 
including Swahili, Kinyarwanda, Kirundi, Zulu, and Xhosa. It also refers to the people and identity groups 
who speak these languages. Also referred to as Niger-Congo B,  Bantu is particularly distinct from Niger-
Congo A, Nilo-Saharan, Khoi-San, Afro-asiatic and Austronesian language groupings.   
15 Contemporary minority group not considered Tswana. Chapter 5 will address ethnicity and tribal politics 
in greater detail. 
16 Contemporary minority group not considered Tswana 
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followed by the BaNgwaketse. The BaHurutshe17 at Shoshong moved northwest to the 
Botetu River and the BaLete fled to Mosi on the end to the Makgadagadi. In 1795, the 
BaNgwato split again and a large group under BaTawana went first. Thus emerged a 
number of groups, each numbering perhaps ten to twenty thousand moving long distances 
to settle areas sparsely populated in the past. These groups would provide the backbone 
of the eight Tswana major tribes that are recognized today: BaKwena, BaTlokwa, 
BaRolong, BaNgwato, BaNgwaketse, BaTawana, BaLete and Bakgatla (Tlou and 
Campbell: 1984: 233); a situation that will be analyzed in greater depth in this 
dissertation’s fifth chapter.   
Pre-colonial Tswana political organization was a highly centralized and 
hierarchical (Samatar, 1999). The center of authority in the BaTswana nations (the 
morafe) was the chief (kgosi). The link between royalty, particularly the king and the 
population was cemented materially through the circulation of resources, particularly 
cattle.  According to Olufemi (2003) the chief had the power to discharge major political, 
social, religious, and economic responsibilities or to delegate these duties to trusted 
subordinates. These duties gave him ultimate responsibility for administering important 
aspects of daily life, especially allocating land, assigning ownership of stray cattle, 
mobilizing local people for communal labor and warfare, and controlling religious rites. 
In recognition of these important social, political, economic and religious roles, 
local people paid tribute in the form of cattle, ivory, skins, corn and labor. In times of 
famine, the chief had to redistribute resources among his subjects. Furthermore, the chief 
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could lend cattle out to trusted subjects in need. Cattle were a principal form of wealth 
and the kgosi controlled or owned large herds. The king used his herd or patronage to 
bind to him clients whom he depended on for support, a system which helped him foster 
legitimacy. He loaned cattle to those clients who were supposed to care for it and use 
their products. As trusted advisors, councilors assisted the ruler in forum-making policies, 
allocating land and introducing new laws, as well as accepting important religious duties 
that had critical social implications for the community, notably those of rain-making, 
ploughing and harvesting (Tlou and Campbell, 1984). 
One key chiefly function was to preside over the kgotla. According to Morton, 
Ramsay and Mgadla (2008) the kgotla was, and continues to be, the basic sociopolitical 
unit within traditional Tswana society. The word refers to the enclosures that serve as the 
loci for participatory decision-making and public legitimization of decisions. DiKgotla 
exist and operate at all levels of Tswana society, from the family unit to larger lineage 
and ward groupings, to the central kgotla of the morafe, which was presided over by the 
paramount Kgosi. The word is often used to identify the membership and location of a 
given kgotla. Kgotla may also refer to other collective organizations and institutions such 
as political parties, civic groups, social societies and even the National Assembly. The 
kgotla has continued to symbolize the epitome of Tswana democracy.   
Traditional legitimacy, according to Crowder, Parson and Parsons (1990) was a 
key principle of succession in pre-colonial Botswana. The BaNgwato dynasty emerged as 
a survivor of the Mfecane, a series of wars and forced migration instigated by the 
powerful Zulu warrior Shaka. The dynasty thus expanded its authority and subordinated 
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neighboring peoples of diverse cultures under its rule. Under the rule of Chief Sekgoma I, 
the Ngwato chiefdom achieved sovereignty as a kingdom over east-central Botswana. 
Succession in pre-colonial times was based on primogeniture, whereby the males of the 
royal family were ranked in order of their genealogical proximity to the incumbent ruler. 
The kgosi was succeeded by the eldest son of the senior wife, or if he had no son, by his 
immediate younger brother. This reflected the pattern of succession to more junior offices 
such as that of the headman as was the pattern of inheritance within each family. With the 
exception of matrilineal cultures like the Wayeyi (more in Chapter 5), women played 
only a supporting or advisory role in pre-colonial society. 
Crowder et al (1990) studied the succession rules in Tswana societies and 
interconnected them with the succession procedures in modern democratic Botswana and 
observed that instances of succession in Botswana politics significantly involved the 
principles of traditional and rational-legal authority (Crowder, Parson and Parsons, 
1990:2) The key succession principle was based on male primogeniture (ibid: 3). In 
addition, two systems of marriage, sororate and levirate, ensured there would always be 
an heir (Tlou, 1998). Sororate marriages involve a man’s conjugal rights being extended 
to his wife’s sister usually in the event of the wife’s death, whereas levirate marriages 
involve the brother of a deceased man being obliged to marry his brother's widow in 
order to perpetuate his legacy.  This ensured that the chief was inescapably male and 
hereditary.  
According to Mgadla (1998), paramount chiefs could not be nominated, elected or 
appointed. Instead, an old Setswana adage distinctly states– “kgosi ke kgosi ka a 
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tswetswe” meaning “a chief is a chief by right of birth” (Mgadla 1998:3).  To limit 
contestation for political office, a marriage system based on the “great wife” 
(mohumagadi) was established. According to this system, heirship was determined by 
virtue of the mother’s seniority as opposed to the son’s age or order of birth. Wifely 
seniority was not necessarily based on chronology of marriage either (Tlou, 1972). 
This analysis set the stage for what was Botswana’s political organization and the 
protocols that involved changes in power though rules of succession. It shows the 
embeddedness of the chieftaincy institution in Botswana’s culture and society with 
distinct rules on how leaders emerged. With the exception of assassination, secession or 
failure to produce a male heir, these rules persisted. However heirship was negotiated 
through extending eligibility to those who could produce heirs through sororate and 
levirate marriages. This shows some levels of negotiability in the set rules of Botswana’s 
pre-colonial institutions. However, generally, BaTswana were willing to follow clear 
protocol and rarely resorted to violence to stake a claim to chieftancy. However, early 
pre-colonial Botswana showed that the rule of chiefly succession offered very little 
legitimacy to commoners, foreigners and outsiders. The following section examines the 
later part of the pre-colonial period and how legitimacy was challenged then.  
 
Later Political Organization  
The 19th century heralded a period of great change to Tswana polities, providing 
for the first time major challenges to the views of BaTswana of legitimate authority. In 
1818, Shaka succeeded Dingiswayo as leader of the Zulus (a major tribe in contemporary 
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South Africa) making them a strong military force in the entire southern African region. 
The Zulus launched raids and caused havoc across the region, a situation known as the 
Mfecane, which further shaped the political organization of present day Botswana.  This 
event greatly reconfigured Tswana tribal and identity groupings, empowering some, e.g. 
BaKwena led by Sechele, while marginalizing others, e.g. BaKgadagadi (more detail will 
be given in Chapter 5). During the 1850s the Boers (the descents of Dutch settlers) 
attempted to extend their government over Botswana by excluding the British, and 
particularly the missionaries. In 1852, 400 Boers attacked Tswana Chief Sechele’s land 
and took women, children, and cattle. Sechele realized the ease with which the Boers 
could take over. The Transvaal Boers had a system of simple expansion and soon the 
Boer border moved steadily west along the Molopo River and south into the land of the 
Tlhaping, Rolong and Griquas (all in modern Botswana). The interference of the Boers 
was the first major challenge to chiefly autonomy and power for the Tswana chiefs.   
By 1870 the Tswana appealed to the British for support, who eventually agreed to 
arbitrate, but the Tswana regained little of their lost land. In 1875 Chief Gasenone of the 
Tlhaping agreed to cede his and other lands to the Transvaal Boers. The British annexed 
the Transvsaal in 1877. In 1878, the Tswana south of the Molopo River revolted: a 
situation which focused British attention on the situation and a representative, Sir Charles 
Warrant, was sent to hear the complaints and grievances of the Tswana. John Mackenzie, 
a missionary at Shoshong, also intervened and became a close friend and confidant of 
Khama III of the Ngwato.  In 1881 a compromise was reached with the British 
Commission and a line was drawn to include the Transvaal lands actually occupied by 
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Boers. It excluded that which they claimed but had not farmed. The Pretoria Convention, 
the peace treaty that ended the First Boer war, was signed in August of the same year, 
giving the Transvaal to the Boers. Sir Charles Warren went north with a strong force and 
the Boers were put off the land and order restored without a single shot being fired. In 
March of 1885, a protectorate was declared. The protectorate included the entire area 
north of the Cape Colony, west of the South African Republic, east of longitude 20o  and 
south of Latitude 22o . The area south of the Molopo River was declared a British Crown 
colony, named “Bechuanaland” and the north, excluding “Khama’s country” was 
declared a British protectorate. The colony was to be administered by Britain, but with 
the exception of the police, the Protectorate was not. The headquarters for the 
protectorate was located in Vryburg. In May 1892, an order-in-council said that 
administration could be introduced to the protectorate as long as native law and custom 
were respected. Thus what was called a protectorate became in fact a colony. On 15th 
November 1895, British Bechuanaland became part of the colony of the Cape of Good 
Hope and the area to the North remained a protectorate (Beaulier, 2003). 
The pre-colonial period illuminates the foundation of Tswana customs and 
practices deemed legitimate by the polity. However, the later period was a period of 
chaos causing much chagrin among Tswana communities as a challenge to the state of 
their autonomy. The first threat to institutional continuity was posed by the Boers in the 
Boer-Tswana invasion. However, the appeal by the Tswana chiefs for British protection, 
inadvertently saved BaTswana from a much greater threat to their institutions. The 
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following section details the character of colonial Bechuanaland within the context of 
institutional continuity.  
 
Colonial Bechuanaland 
The establishment of a German colony in Southwest Africa (modern day 
Namibia) and the Boer expansion led to the declaration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
(BP). As a result, the protectorate was declared mainly in response to the international 
situation as opposed to internal circumstances. The protectorate was of strategic 
importance within the context of its geostrategic positioning in southern Africa. In 
response to a Boer invasion, three chiefs Sechele (Kwena), Bathoen (Ngwaketse) and 
Khama (Ngwato) travelled to London to request for safeguard against the Boers and thus 
readily accepted the protectorate idea. At this time, no sub-soil minerals had yet been 
found and Botswana was mainly an agrarian society that was highly dependent on its 
cattle wealth. This lack of importance placed on Botswana enabled it to experience a type 
of colonialism that was not as harsh as in other parts of the continent and the British did 
not bother consolidating its own institutions in Botswana. 
In the British colonial system, a protectorate was a territory under the Crown that 
was regarded as not being strictly British territory or part of its dominions (i.e. used for 
white settlement, such as Canada and South Africa). In theory, a protectorate was created 
through a treaty with indigenous authorities. In the case of Botswana, it was established 
in the wake of the Warren Expedition, whereby the British army alleged it had gained the 
consent of diKgosi in southern Botswana for the establishment of Great Britain’s 
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authority over the territory north of the Molopo River. British authority over such 
territory was made official by the Foreign Jurisdictional Act of 1890 [Morton, Ramsay 
and Mgadla (2008)]. Morton et al (2008) argue that the advantage of the “protectorate” 
concept was that the British Crown could claim in Parliament that most of the 
administration of such a territory, and by extension its expense, remained the 
responsibility of indigenous authorities, whereas the territory belonged to the British 
sphere, thereby disallowing claims of rival European powers. Therefore, technically 
Bechuanaland remained a largely autonomous territory that was protected diplomatically 
or militarily against third parties by a stronger state or entity. This provided Botswana the 
best of both world: protection from external threats that could potentially disrupt its 
institutions, and survival of internal institutions.  
 After the Boer War (1899–1902), Britain intended Bechuanaland for 
incorporation into the Union of South Africa. Protectorate status provided no protection 
as such to Bechuanaland’s African inhabitants, who were taxed, systematically subjected 
to racially based exclusion, deprived of much of their arable land, and reduced to 
dependency for cash on labor migration. The economic basis of their status derived from 
the fact that Great Britain and the Union of South Africa regarded Bechuanaland as 
unsuitable for mining or ranching.  
Different scholars’ classification of the British colonialism in Bechuanaland vary 
from “light rule” (Acemoglu et al. 2001, p. 13) to “benign neglect” (Beaulier 2003:229). 
The British admitted to limited interest in the Bechuanaland Protectorate arguing that: 
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“We have no interest in the country to the north of the Molope [Bechuanaland], 
except as a road to the interior; we might therefore confine ourselves for the present to 
preventing that part of the Protectorate being occupied either by filibusters or foreign 
powers doing as little in the way of administration or settlement as possible.” (1885 
British Commissioner’s statement quoted in Acemoglu et al. 2001: 13) 
According to Seidler (2010: 16) British rule was characterized by a number of 
factors. Firstly, the colonial administration was nominal and characterized by a limited 
degree of interaction between the administration and the indigenous populations. The 
administration’s sphere of influence was thus restricted to the colonial capital, stationed 
physically outside the Protectorate. Furthermore, chiefs retained their judicial, legislative 
and executive powers, but worked with the colonial district commissioners as 
intermediaries between the administration and the local population. Thirdly, minority 
groups such as European and Asian populations had direct contact with colonial 
authorities while the Tswana population maintained their institutional settings. Finally, 
limited interest was shown in Botswana’s natural resources and inadequate investment in 
infrastructure resulted. A huge bulk of British spending was on administrative expenses 
and the army.   
With the imposition of British rule, Tswana rulers and their people struck a 
delicate balance between old and new forces. As the custodian of cherished local values 
and the ultimate expression of communal aspiration, chiefs emerged as the primary 
agents of governance and stability in Bechuanaland during the colonial period. This 
development was an important context for the imposition of colonial rule on Tswana 
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society. The interaction between the regional and the local contexts evolved the indirect 
rule system as Tswana society encountered rapid social change in the latter years of 
colonial rule. With the incorporation of Tswana society as a British protectorate in 1885, 
the institution of chiefship revolved around a three-tier colonial administrative system 
consisting of the high commissioner based in Cape Town South Africa, the resident 
commissioner stationed in Mafikeng South Africa, and the eight Tswana chiefs. As the 
European administrator on the ground, the resident commissioner served as the critical 
link between the chiefs and senior administrators in Cape Town. 
 In the immediate years following the establishment of colonial rule, chiefs, sub-
chiefs and headmen had primary responsibility for tax collection, for providing labor for 
colonial projects and for promoting British economic interests. As an incentive for 
aggressive tax collection, chiefs retained ten percent of the overall tax proceeds. British 
colonial authorities thus essentially, according to Olufemi (2003), administered 
Bechuanaland through a strategy of local administration that sought to control the eight 
Tswana subgroups and their immediate neighbors through the prevailing indigenous 
sociopolitical structures. However, the imposition of protectorate status over Tswana 
states led to a limited erosion of the institution of chieftainship and set in motion an 
increasingly centralized structure. While conceding a substantial autonomous space to the 
Tswana chiefs, colonial officers conferred them with important administrative 
obligations. The first decade of Bechuanaland incorporation saw British administrators 
performing minimal supervision over local administrators. This resulted in the traditional 
leaders preserving significant control over their local polities, adjudicating law and 
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maintaining order as had always been the case (Olufemi, 2003). Although there was the 
inevitable evolution in power structures occasioned by colonialism, this did not upset 
existing institutions, thus helping them endure colonialism.  
Before the end of the nineteenth century, most of the Tswana chiefs converted to 
monogamy and Christianity. Prior to this, polygyny had complicated succession via male 
primogeniture. The successor was the first born of the wife recognized by the morafe as 
the mohumagadi, a designation not necessarily a result of the chronology of the marriage. 
The mohumagadi could in fact be the second or third woman to be married by the kgosi, 
but in genealogical terms her house was the first house of the husband because of the 
prestige of her own paternal genealogy (Crowder, Parson and Parsons, 1990. However, 
once chiefs adopted Christianity as the state religion – as Khama III did in 1875 – the 
major dispute was eliminated because the rulers became monogamous. Crowder et al 
(1990) account for the 1925 claims to the Ngwato throne made by Gasethsware, son of 
Sekgoma II by Mary, the sister of the second wife Serero, which were rejected on the 
grounds that he was illegitimate in Christian and in traditional terms, Mary had not 
married Sekgoma, either in a Christian or in a traditional ceremony. Gasethsware’s claim, 
was rejected even in traditional terms on the grounds that, though a barren wife could 
bring in a sister to bear children on her husband’s behalf, as a seantlo (inherited wife), 
Mary had not been recognized in this capacity and therefore was no more than a 
concubine whose sons could never succeed. After Christianity there was little doubt as to 
the reigning monarch’s successor as there was with the European monarchies that 
practiced male primogeniture:  
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“Kgosi ke kgosi ka a tsetwe” (A chief is chief because he is born to it). Setswana 
proverb 
Even in pre-Christian times, when the polygyny practiced by the Tswana rulers 
could lead to claims and counter-claims as to the legitimate successor, the power struggle 
took place within the royal family. There were no instances of a commoner attempting to 
usurp the chieftaincy or claim the throne.  
Tswana institutions, according to Siedler (2012), were not directly challenged by 
colonial rule. It did not forcibly replace local institutions with colonial ones and as a 
result, there was no direct struggle between Tswana cultural norms and British formal 
institutions. However, they did have an important impact via the introduction of colonial 
taxation systems, the subsequent job migration to European and South African owned 
mining interests, the intense contact with missionaries, and the accumulation of wealth by 
Tswana elites. The institution of taxation, hut tax (1899) and native tax (1919) 
strengthened the political and economic power of chiefs, who received a 10 percent 
commission. It provided a structural change in Bechuanaland, as for the first time, it 
introduced a cash-based economy as opposed to a barter trade economy. Adult males 
found themselves in need to enter the job market in order to pay taxes, a situation which 
would later lead to a massive exodus to work in South African mines. The Tswana polity 
peacefully accepted the institution of taxation, unlike in Sierra Leone where Britain's 
imposition of the tax sparked off two rebellions in the hinterland (Killson, 1966). This 
was probably because pre-colonial institutions accepted the payment of tribute to chiefs, 
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so the payment of taxes was not an entirely foreign concept; it just altered the medium of 
exchange from cattle and other resources to money.  
One key aspect that could potentially affect historical precedent and legitimacy 
however, was the rules of chiefly succession. It is key to note however, that although in 
pre-colonial Botswana the rules of succession were set in stone, the practice of succession 
during the colonial period in Botswana was replete with anomalies. Tshekedi Khama 
became the BaNgwato regent in 1926, after his brother Sekgoma II died after serving 
only two years of chieftaincy. The heir to the throne, four-year-old Seretse Khama, was 
deemed not ready for the job of ruling the BaNgwato, and as a result, his 21-year-old 
uncle Tshekedi Khama became regent. This is but one instance of succession where male 
primogeniture was not exercised but still, the presiding chief overwhelmingly gained 
legitimacy from the population. The introduction of Christianity by missionaries made 
sororate and levirate marriages implausible, a change that was deemed legitimate 
overwhelmingly by BaTswana. These incidences demonstrate that in Botswana, as long 
as the change was voluntarily put in place without any external coercion, legitimacy was 
to some extent negotiable, a situation that helped facilitate the transition from colonial to 
post-colonial governance, which will be discussed in the ensuing section.   
In summary, as in most parts of Africa, within the context of continuity and 
legitimacy, the colonial government in Bechuanaland faced the task of obtaining the 
obedience of the people particularly as it presented a period of potentially intensive 
institutional transformation. In other parts of Africa, colonialism generally provided a 
“natural experiment” in which foreign institutions were imposed on existing and 
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predominantly informal institutions of the local population (Sielder, 2011:2). However, in 
Bechuanaland, through the exercise of indirect rule, chiefs retained their judicial, 
legislative and executive powers while working with the colonial district commissioners 
as intermediaries between the administration and the local population.  This situation was 
deemed more legitimate to the population. Although Botswana citizens generally viewed 
the colonial government as external and illegitimate, the colonial government’s benign 
neglect of Bechuanaland facilitated for the continuity of Tswana institutions.  The 
colonial government coopted traditional rulers through a system of indirect rule in order 
for its authority to gain acceptance, and legitimacy, a situation which inadvertently 
enabled the smooth adoption of British institutions in post-colonial Botswana. The 
following section will detail how Botswana managed to remain stable in the post-
independence period while adopting foreign institutions in a peaceful manner, all the 
while retaining institutional autonomy.  
 
Independence and Post-Colonial Botswana 
Background to Independence 
The Independence movement in Botswana revolved around the life of its central 
figure, Seretse Khama. The son of Sekgoma Khama II, the BaNgwato paramount ruler 
and grandson of Khama III (one of the three chiefs who negotiated the protectorate) 
Seretse was of royal blood. His name, which means “the clay that binds together,” was 
conferred to him in celebration of the reconciliation of his father and grandfather who had 
been estranged. This reconciliation assured his own ascension to the chieftaincy upon his 
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father’s death on 1925 (Mgadla, 2000). As mentioned above, Seretse became kgosi at age 
four, with his uncle Tshekedi Khama performing the role of his regent and guardian. He 
attended Fort Hare University in South Africa and later Balilol College of Oxford, and 
before returning to Bechuanaland, had married a white English clerk. His choice of bride 
proved controversial both to the conservative Tswana and to the South African apartheid 
regime, which in 1951 put in place an inquiry to remove his chieftaincy title. He would 
later renounce his chieftaincy title in 1956, return to Bechuanaland with his wife, and 
attempt a life as a cattle rancher before venturing into local and then national politics.  
In 1964, Britain accepted proposals for democratic self-government in Botswana 
and the seat of government was officially relocated from Mafikeng, South Africa to 
Gaborone. According to Middleton (1997) the flow of South African exiles into 
Bechuanaland provoked the formation of the Bechuanaland People’s Party (BPP) by 
Kgaleman Tumedisho Motsete, Phillip P. Goanwe Matante and Motsomai Mpho. 
Matante and Mpho had both worked in South Africa’s mining industry and had 
participated respectively in the Pan Africanist Congress and the African National 
Congress parties there. Under Matante and Mpho’s leadership, the BPP mobilized a 
newly urban migrant worker constituency along the north-south line of the rail and held 
demonstrations demanding immediate independence and a socialist transformation, an 
ideology inspired by their South African political counterparts. The BPP, however, split 
in 1962 when Mpho left to form the Botswana Independence Party (BIP) and again in 
1964 when Matante and Motsete led respective factions into the 1965 elections. 
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Perceiving the radical leftist threat in BPP, Seretse Khama joined together 
elements of the cattle-owning, rural-based, royalty-related leadership elite with a growing 
member of educated elites to form a political party. In 1961 Khama founded the 
nationalist Bechuanaland Democratic Party (later Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). 
The BDP mobilized a rural constituency whose households relied mainly on a 
combination of subsistence agriculture and remittances of wages from family employed 
in South African mines. Household subsistence depended heavily on access to the use of 
oxen. To a significant extent, since most households did not directly own oxen, access 
depended upon a relationship to those who did. The cattle owners tended to have 
inherited political position and to be leaders of the BDP, particular in places where its 
support was greatest. The BDP was therefore a relatively moderate, even conservative, 
movement desiring independence but not a radical transformation to existing labor 
relations (Middleton, 1997). As a result, BDP moderation appealed to the Tswana people 
as it provided an alternative with more legitimate continuity than would otherwise be 
availed by the opposition parties which had external sources of inspiration that the native 
BaTswana did not relate to.  
Botswana’s first multiparty elections were held in March 1965. The BDP won 28 
of 31 seats in the legislative assembly and 80.4 percent of the votes cast, a figure that 
greatly reflects the fact that the general population identified with the mandate of the 
party. Local government elections, won by the BDP, were held in 1966, by which time 
the political party that was to become the leading opposition, the Botswana National 
Front, founded by Kenneth Koma, had come into existence.  
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As Prime minister, Khama pursued the push for independence and was a key 
architect of the 1965 constitution that delineated a new government in Botswana. Upon 
independence in 1966, he was elected president. His first term was marred by dismal 
prospect of economic success as the arid country was among the world’s poorest. 
However, Seretse set out on an enthusiastic course to transform the economy into one 
that was export-based, built around beef, copper, and later diamonds, which were 
discovered in 1967. Between 1967 and 1980, Botswana maintained the highest rate of 
economic growth in the world, with much of the diamond revenue being reinvested into 
infrastructure, health and educational programs. Khama is credited as having put in place 
strong measures against corruption, lowering taxes, liberalizing trade and increasing 
personal freedoms. 
 
Institutional Continuity in Post-Colonial Botswana 
Decolonization represented another landmark in the transformation of Botswana 
traditional institutions of governance. African nationalist leaders pursued policies to 
Africanize the post-colonial bureaucracy without indigenizing the institutions of modern 
governance. What facilitated the survival of pre-colonial institutions in Botswana was, 
according to Gillett (1973), the demographics of the electors, who were largely illiterate 
peasants, holding the legitimacy of chieftaincy in high esteem. Thus the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP)’s hold on power since independence in 1966 has greatly 
depended on the passive approval of chiefs. In addition, the BDP were able to co-opt the 
support of industry leaders, cattle ranchers, academic elites and others to form a “grand 
coalition” (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009: 1).  The relatively high level of continuity 
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between pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial institutions is reflective of Botswana’s 
high level of vertical legitimacy (Englebert, 2000:158).  
According to Parson et al. (1990) the new national state had a degree of 
constitutional legitimacy, derived from internal sources, which were inherently greater 
than those of the colonial regime. The latter was essentially an arbitrary imposition from 
external sources of legitimacy. The introduction of the republican constitution at 
independence raised the question of acceptance of the new authority system by both the 
Tswana population at large, and office holders, both traditional and elected. The 
competing bases for popular loyalties raised questions about the ability of the national 
government to command the automatic obedience and support of the population. In the 
short run, this issue was clouded because Seretse Khama was not only the first president, 
but simultaneously was the traditionally legitimate chief, facilitating a smoother 
transition. The succession question was kept open until 1980. Whether a “commoner” 
constitutionally succeeding to the office of president could command the obedience of the 
population was problematic, and some thought the BDP would de facto have to rely on 
the chiefs or on coercion for the command of that obedience. However, upon 
independence constitutional changes in the direction of an independent Botswana never 
raised any serious doubt about the fact that the new national government would be one 
based on elective office holders organized via political parties. It was apparent early on 
that the authority of the post-colonial government would take precedence over royal 
authority.  
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At independence representative national and local governments based on liberal 
and democratic principles, were the only alternatives seriously considered by Tswana 
elites. A national assembly composed of single member districts of roughly equal 
population size and a universal adult franchise electing those members emerged as the 
rules for selection to hold national legislative office. Botswana’s democratic system 
echoes its status as a former protectorate of the British Empire while maintaining a strong 
element of traditional sources of authority.  The country espoused a Westminster 
Parliamentary system with a unicameral assembly responsible for the country’s 
legislation. It preserved traditional governance through establishing the House of Chiefs 
(Ntlo ya DiKgosi) which served an advisory role to the president and parliament (Parson 
1984).   
Botswana’s transition to a liberal legal tradition did not eliminate traditional and 
customary law. The country relied heavily on tradition, and the legitimacy of Botswana’s 
political system stems from its traditional sources.  Prior to British rule, Botswana 
developed a proto-democracy where chiefs held the position of first among equals. His 
power had checks and balances from the polity, and this tradition was carried out through 
Khama’s presidency, enhancing the legitimacy of the political system (ibid). The 
following section analyzes Botswana’s sources of institutional quality and legitimacy 
using the Weberian understanding of authority.  
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SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY IN BOTSWANA 
Three Sources of Legitimacy 
The central argument of this chapter follows the criteria provided by Weber and 
Englebert in determining Botswana’s relative levels of legitimacy as having explanatory 
value in accounting for Botswana’s institutional success in the face of diamond wealth. 
Three key historical aspects of the Botswana experience are seen as having the most 
effect of ascertaining the legitimacy of Botswana’s institutions.  These three are, 
institutional continuity, ethnic homogeneity, and post-colonial political leadership, all of 
which are historical, and all of which enabled it to create quality institutions. 
One major source of legitimacy was “legitimacy through institutional continuity”, 
through limited colonial engagement as was already been explained in great depth above. 
Unlike most other African countries which were crown colonies or settler colonies, 
Botswana was merely a protectorate of the British Empire. This enabled traditional 
authority in Botswana to thrive and as a result, contemporary Tswana society sees a high 
level of continuity between its pre and post-colonial institutions. 
A second source of Botswana’s legitimacy was “legitimacy through ethnic 
homogeneity and sense of homeland18.” Ethnic heterogeneity has long been seen as a 
reason why countries fail to build up the norms of trust that are needed to develop quality 
institutions. Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ethnic heterogeneity’s adverse effect 
on the political economy stems from “wars of attrition” that take place between ethnic 
groups. Ethnic groups are subject to competition as each ethnic group over-extracts from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ethnic homogeneity as a separate hypothesis will be addressed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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a common resource like commodity export rents. In addition, ethnic groups may have 
difficulty agreeing on the type of public goods, leading to less total spending on public 
goods. Ross (1999) attributes ethnic heterogeneity as providing the means in which 
grievance-based political rebellion is justified. In authoritarian states, ethnicity has been 
used as a mechanism for rulers to obtain patronage from their “own”. As will be detailed 
in Chapter 5, no such motives were present due to its relatively high level of ethnic 
homogeneity. As a result, resources were developed without the externalities that ethnic 
heterogeneity brought in other countries. 
As mentioned earlier, during colonialism, there was a high level of arbitrariness in 
the drawing of political boundaries around African states that resulted in low levels of 
vertical legitimacy. In the case of Botswana, however, the level of arbitrariness was low, 
enabling the state to establish horizontal legitimacy. Englebert (2000) defines horizontal 
legitimacy as the extent to which there is agreement to what constitutes the polity or the 
community that comprises the state. In other words, whereas vertical legitimacy may 
refer to the presence of a consensus on the content of the social contract, horizontal 
legitimacy implies an agreement about who participates on the contract negotiations. As a 
result, it establishes a link between the population and the territory of a state. 
Non-Tswana tribes gradually became subject to Tswana authority who presided 
over specific indigenous territories. It was the goal of the Tswana to integrate, absorb and 
assimilate other groups within their institutional structures. As a result, cultural 
dominance of the Tswana tribes and the diffusion of their rules and norms occurred.  
Botswana was fortunate to not have endured the divide-and-conquer strategies that 
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Belgium, Britain and France had pursued in other parts of Africa as a mechanism to 
secure control over their colonial territories. However, Botswana’s laws allow for 
discrimination on the basis of language, ethnicity and culture. In a bid to create a mono-
ethnic state, the goal of post-independence Tswana elites was to assimilate all identity 
groups into the Tswana culture. This assimilation policy was codified in the country’s 
laws, specifically:  
Sections 77 to 79 of the Botswana Constitution which gives chiefly powers only 
to the eight principle tribes of Botswana;  
Section 15 (4) (d) and 15 (9) of the Constitution, which while providing for the 
right to non-discrimination based on ethnicity, fails to protect the rights and freedoms of 
tribes as collective entities;  
Section 2 of the Chieftainship Act, which also defined the term tribe and confined 
it to mean the eight Tswana-speaking tribes to the exclusion of the other tribes 
represented in the country. It further defined the term chief to mean the chiefs of the eight 
Tswana-speaking tribes to the exclusion of the chiefs of other ethnic groups and; 
The Tribal Territories Act, which placed the custodianship of the land under the 
governance of the 8 Tswana tribes19.  
The third source of legitimacy I isolated was “legitimacy of initial political 
leadership” particularly at a pivotal point in resource development. In Botswana’s case, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 And as a side note, I know a lot of agitation has been expressed against these assimilation laws 
particularly where the Basarwa peoples are concerned, but that is outside the scope of my analysis at this 
point. This research addresses ethnicity and identity as a separate hypothesis to the greater question of the 
research in Chapter 5 
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this was the discovery of its diamond wealth. I argue that Khama gained legitimacy 
firstly from his biological link to the traditional governance structures if Botswana, which 
gave him credibility especially among his rural electorate. This organic link gave him 
credibility, as well as fostered a personal commitment, to the economic growth of his 
country facilitated by his inherent duty as chiefly custodian of resources and designator 
of responsibilities. These circumstances led to the preexisting Tswana hegemony within 
the new structures of post-colonial statehood.  
 
Succession and Challenges to Legitimacy in Botswana 
The legitimacy of a ruler faces many challenges. Usually these challenges are 
confronted at the point of change of power from one ruler to another. If the populace does 
not believe in the legitimacy of the ruler, succession may lead to coup d’état or civil war. 
However, if they believe the rule and mode of succession is legitimate, then democracy 
can be consolidated faster. This section will look at varying points of succession in 
Botswana and how they resulted in the perpetuation of authoritative legitimacy in 
Botswana.  
The point of succession is a critical event in the preservation and continuity of any 
political system. According to Parson et al (1990), it demonstrates the extent to which a 
population accepts the right of rulers to rule and therefore the degree to which automatic 
obedience directly follows. As a result, succession yields important insights into the 
sources of stable rule. Thus, every succession is in a sense a fundamental challenge to the 
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legitimacy of a system. The case of Botswana is surprisingly characterized by the 
relatively smooth succession of individuals in positions of authority (Parson et al 1990).  
As noted above, for Weber, legitimate authority derived from one of three ideal 
types: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational. Each type was based on the acceptance 
of one or another organizing principle: time honored descent in the case of traditional 
authority, a magnetizing or mesmerizing personality in the case of charismatic authority, 
or acceptance of a set of rulers in the case of legal-rational authority. The persistence of 
popular obedience to any person in authority stemmed from adherence to one or another 
of these organizing principles and as long as that principle prevailed, so too did the 
authority of the rulers over the ruled (Wallis and North, 2011).  
In pre-colonial Botswana traditional legitimacy based on male primogeniture was 
a key principle of succession. To a large extent, it was strengthened as a form of 
resistance to colonial rule. During the colonial period, the British had attempted to assert 
its overriding legal authority, ultimately based upon its command of coercive armed 
force. However as Parson et al (1990) contends, the acceptance of that authority 
continued to depend upon its cooption of traditional rulers in the system of colonial 
(indirect) rule. The tension between the pre-colonial and the colonial systems provided a 
particular texture, with obstinate chiefs refusing to relinquish their power to suit colonial 
officers. Candidates for chiefdom favored by the colonial administration could not be 
installed at will. As a result, chiefly non-compliance undermined colonial policy to a 
degree rare elsewhere in colonial Africa. 
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Sovereign Botswana was a state created on the basis of a legal rational set of 
constitutional rules, within political institutions, powers and procedures defined clearly in 
the constitution of the Republic. The constitution’s rules on succession were fixed but 
contradicted with the traditional rules of succession to high office. Generally the 
president would be elected by a majority of elected members of the national assembly 
and premised on the principle of representative government. As opposed to being 
naturally born heir, to become president in Botswana one had to be a citizen, at least 21 
years of age, a registered voter and succinctly fluent in English. The process of 
succession would occur in the form of election which would take place whenever the 
office was vacant or when parliament dissolved, a process that usually took five years. 
This new system directly contradicted the traditional system, as the principles based upon 
each system were mutually exclusive. So how did Botswana manage to transition from 
the traditional sources of legitimacy to legal-rational legitimacy based on constitutional 
rules?  
This dissertation argues that the new national state had a degree of constitutional 
legitimacy derived from internal sources. The population never internalized the colonial 
government as their own but they welcomed a fellow Motswana representing them, albeit 
in a foreign system. The introduction of the republican constitution raised questions of 
acceptance of the new authority system both by the population at large and by the office 
holders- traditional and elected. What helped facilitate the smooth transition was that 
unlike in monarchies like Swaziland and Lesotho, Botswana did not have a nominal 
paramount chief in its territory. A large portion of the land was now controlled by the 
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state and not by chiefs and none of the chiefs could lay claim of authority over another. 
Furthermore, none of the Tswana tribes were disproportionately important, whether 
numerically or strategically, as in other parts of Africa like Uganda with the king of 
Buganda or the Litunga of the Lozi in Zambia. There was thus no doubt that the authority 
of the government would be superior to traditional authority and that succession in 
Botswana of the highest office would be based on elective office-holders organized 
through political parties. This facilitated for the peaceful acceptance of a “commoner” as 
president in 1980.  
 
Explaining BDP’s Longevity as Legitimacy 
A key feature of the Tswana political landscape even till today has been the 
longevity of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in power, primarily as a result of the 
initial foundations of its authority’s legitimization. As explained earlier, due to the 
heirship as paramount chief of the first President Seretse Khama, there was a smooth 
transition from colonial indirect rule to independence. The current President of Botswana 
is Ian Khama Seretse Khama’s first son, who according to the pre-colonial rules of 
primogeniture is the rightful paramount chief and appraised heir to the top leadership 
position in the republic. The middle two presidents Masire and Mogae, in contrast, reflect 
constitutional legitimacy based on legal-rational authority. According to Parsons (1990), 
early voter apathy in Botswana (31percent to 51percent turnout averages between 1965 
and 1980), could be viewed as a proviso to the initial limited legitimacy of the legal-
rational framework. However, this dissertation argues that since no challenges led to 
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outright violence, this could be viewed as an endorsement of the system, albeit with 
limited participation.     
The Botswana opposition parties for the most part emanated from South African 
resistance movements, particularly the ANC. Their slogans “Kill the Boer,” and other 
such slogans inspired by the civil rights movements elsewhere in settler southern Africa 
failed to resonate with the predominantly rural Botswana citizens who had never 
experienced the injustices of apartheid. The people who launched most opposition parties 
in Botswana were mine workers who had spent most of their time in apartheid South 
Africa. Inspired by the liberation plight of black South Africans, they returned home with 
renewed vigor, attempting to gain political support among Botswana citizens. Their 
campaigns concentrated on singing liberation songs. However, most Botswana citizens 
had different priorities of conserving labor relations in Botswana particularly in the 
dominant cattle industry. They were different from black South Africans, who were 
fighting against apartheid. The BDP centered its efforts on development and education.   
The BDP derives its legitimacy from its inclusive patronage structures which 
incorporated urban elites, the middle class and the key rural elites – chiefs and cattle 
owners. Prior to the discovery of diamonds, cattle owners were the most important 
economic and political interest in Botswana. As a result the BDP is often characterized “a 
government of cattlemen”. This is of key importance, as it created an economic elite 
group prior to the discovery of diamonds that was based on a separate economic activity 
– the beef industry. The elite invested heavily in the Botswana Marketing Board (the 
BMC).  
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Another source of legitimacy of the BDP is that it faced constraints though the 
restriction of distortionary policies.  Political accountability of the BDP was enhanced by 
internal competition within the party manifested through primary elections. These result 
in a dynamic rotation of elected officials. Two factions emerged within the BDP, a 
situation which consolidated both accountability and political competition. One faction 
allied with older party cadres supports more statist policies and the allocation to civil 
servants in the government of power over resource allocation, while the other groups in 
supports local community projects providing a counterweight within the BDP.  
Furthermore the BDP allows for a high level of press freedom resulting in considerable 
criticism of policies and politicians. The BDP allows opposition parties to compete for 
and take control of local councils when successful, a situation increasingly occurring in 
urban areas. All of these factors led to institutionalized checks on both the government 
and the one-party dominated polity aiding the reduction of anti-developmental corruption 
often observed in mineral-abundant and centralized state-led economies (Di John, 2009).  
By the time diamonds were discovered in Botswana, the country had already 
developed broad-based political parties and efficient economic institutions of property 
rights. This assisted in avoiding destabilization caused by rent-seeking. Due to the broad 
and inclusive coalition of the BDP, incentives to challenge state authority were reduced.  
This enhanced the capacity of diamond rents to be circulated in the form of infrastructure 
and social service delivery. Furthermore, Seretse Khama’s decision to transfer the 
property rights over diamonds away from his own tribe, the BaNgwato, to the state, 
circumvented brewing conflict among Tswana groups over the regulation of diamond 
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revenues20. In addition, his decision to moderate the political power of tribal chiefs with 
respect to land allocation just after independence is also seen as having truncated tribal 
cleavages and conflicts (Di John, 2009). 
 
Insights on the Legitimacy of Authority in Botswana 
The preceding sections explained legitimacy from a historical viewpoint. This 
section will draw insight into the views of research respondents on their views of the 
legitimacy of Botswana’s economic and political institutions. The overwhelming 
response was bent towards an understanding of legitimacy through the efficient provision 
of goods and services by the BDP government using diamond revenues. Another key 
finding was that in Botswana, legitimacy of institutions was greatly tied to economic 
performance. On the surface, this may look as though Botswana citizens are deriving 
legitimacy from economic performance. However, this dissertation is of the view that 
since the distribution of resources during pre-colonial Botswana was under the custodian 
of the prevailing governance structures, this expectation of government still existed in 
Botswana in the post-independence era. As a result, most respondents tied economic 
success not to diamond discovery, but to the ability of the BDP led-government to 
distribute these resources.  
According to Batlang, a student of political science at the University of Botswana 
(UB), the majority of Botswana citizens are generally happy with the government 
because in his view, the government is legitimate and fairly elected. He argues that, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 More of this analysis of tribal allocations occurs in Chapter 5 
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although it has been the same government for the past 45 years of independence, the 
ballot has consistently shown its confidence in and endorsement of the BDP 
administration. The government has tailored development policies to the citizens. It has 
advanced its diamond revenue for the betterment of the people. Similarly, Molomo, a 
professor in the Political Science department at UB asserts that the Botswana government 
is viewed as legitimate due to its relative success in governance. The Mo Ibrahim Index 
currently ranks Botswana third on the continent, after Cape Verde and Mauritius. 
However, this legitimacy is slowly eroding. He insists that in order for a government to 
remain legitimate, it should be responsive to the needs and grievances of the people. The 
citizens recently took part in the greatest protest the Botswana Government has ever 
confronted, wanting salary increments.  
According to Molomo, the current BDP government gains its legitimacy from its 
past performance.  
“When you have lived in this country and looked at where we come from, I started 
my school in 1963 and I know the life that we had then in my home village of Mochudi 
there were only three vehicles donated by the Kwame Nkrumah Congress People’s party 
and as a young boy to see such a spectacle was amazing. That is just one example. Now 
there is also running water, tarred roads, [and] tarmac. The only tarmac when we went 
to school was only 1km. People were drawing water from rivers. Now when you’ve lived 
through this period, you’ve seen Botswana as a poor country through 1967 when 
diamonds were introduced, to now with the affluence that we have acquired, it does 
accord government a lot of legitimacy because in terms of service delivery and in terms 
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of bringing people from absolute poverty to where they are, it has done an amazing job. 
In addition, to create the institutions particularly a bureaucracy has been one of the most 
efficient civil services Africa has had. The phenomenon of development planning has 
been central to this process. The plans emerge from the rural development plans and 
integrated and consolidated into the greater national development plan.” 
Molomo goes on to assert that Botswana citizens promote diligence and 
steadfastness and are able to see developmental plans to their fruition, something their 
neighboring counterparts marvel at. 
According to Tsie, another professor of Political Science at the University of 
Botswana, although civil society is relatively weak, Botswana’s society in general has 
emphasized discipline and community service. He contends that the state-society nexus 
from pre-colonial times has been very strong because the society looked to the state for 
protection, particularly when the British came. They looked to the chief not only for 
security but for sustenance. For example, in times of droughts, grain saved at harvest in 
granaries was divided among the people. As a result of traditional institutions not being 
fully eroded during the 70 years of British colonial influence, Botswana managed to 
maintain this culture. This is unlike in most other countries where chieftaincy and other 
institutions were abolished and/or disrupted. When BDP came into power they did not 
abolish chieftainship but harnessed the influence and authority of the traditional 
leadership to support the administration. As a result, he argues that there is a high 
correlation and high legitimacy of the state and as a result, very few people challenge the 
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authority of the state. Tsie contends, however, that this culture of community has had the 
paradoxical result of creating a new culture of entitlement and dependency on the state.  
According to Marobha of the Independent Electoral Commission of Botswana, 
legitimacy derived from the fact that to start with the first two parties were led by chiefs 
and there was a lot of subject loyalty per identity group. And the first presidents’ tribal 
group happened to be the largest group, with other tribally based political parties such as 
the BNF splintering. The solidarity of the BDP, a BaNgwato stronghold was thus 
facilitated by the population of the BaNgwato, Botswana’s largest tribal group21. 
According to Gobotswang, a member of the opposition party Botswana Congress 
Party (BCP), the BDP has historical legitimacy because the party was formed and led by 
Seretse Khama, who had both traditional as well as charismatic authority. He was able to 
rally the support of the former colonial government and used his chieftaincy and public 
service to rally behind the BDP. Lack of political consciousness also helped the BDP 
during its formation years. Botswana managed to avoid the problems of its surrounding 
neighbors, and therefore political consciousness of issues of broader political economy 
was greatly lacking. However, the Botswana citizens understood and appreciated 
chieftaincy. They accepted that a chief had to lead. This gave them legitimacy. Realizing 
this, the BNF responded by grasping the Chief of the BaNgwaketse, thus creating a 
predominantly BNF base in Southern District, the district where BaNgwaketse reside. 
This popularity was, however, marred by the breakaway and formation of the Botswana 
Congress Party (BCP). Mismanagement of the party greatly eroded its influence and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Chapter 5 for a breakdown of Botswana’s tribal groups and populations.  
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serious conflicts broke out. As a result, after 1999 BDP was ruling by default, its only 
formidable challenge having broken apart. The latest election saw seats dividing 52-47 in 
favor of BDP. 
According to Mokhawa, a professor of International Relations at UB, Botswana is 
a very difficult country to figure out and that has to do a lot with its history in terms of 
after independence, finding it to be very poor. The commitment of the government then 
was to try to provide the basic services to people, something the populations viewed in 
terms of the pre-colonial chieftaincy’s traditional commitment to allocating resources. On 
that basis the citizens where looking to the state to provide goods and services. She 
asserts that one can say it is evident from the fact that the BDP keeps getting re-voted 
into power, the legitimacy of the BDP has consistently been underscored by the citizens 
to demonstrate their confidence in the BDP government and ultimately the state. 
She argues that the Botswana population is divided into segments that have a 
different understanding of legitimacy and the role the government should play. Figure 3.1 
shows the rural proportion of Botswana from 1967 to 2013: 
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of Rural Population 1967 to 201322 
The rural classes who have been consistently loyal to the BDP have greatly been 
influenced by BDP’s past successes and the historical roots of authoritative legitimacy. 
On the other hand, the new middle class in Gaborone and other urban centers are 
agitating for more change and are more critical of the role of the government and 
question more the democratic nature of the government. 
According to Bothlale, a professor of political science at UB, BDP’s longevity in 
power is reflected by really high numbers of popular vote, but their share has been 
declining, just above 50percent around 52percent. To him, Seretse Khama was royalty, 
thus giving him legitimacy. On the other hand, BPP was anti-colonial, anti-chiefs, 
something Botswana citizens did not relate to.  A lot of things can explain BDP’s 
success, e.g. there are a lot of advantages to incumbents. Bothlale argues that incumbency 
22	  http://www.tradingeconomics.com/botswana/rural-population-percent-of-total-population-wb-data.html	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also gives the ruling party an advantage in the form of a head start. “There is a lack of a 
viable opposition” he adds, “The opposition has been fractured. They split their votes but 
we have a weak fractured opposition”. They are forming a coalition and it is on the brink 
of collapse. First thing first, unseat the BDP first but they are now fighting for 
constituencies.  
Tsie argues that there are three factors that contribute to the longevity of the BDP. 
First, the founder of the BDP was highly respected. There is no other politician who is as 
popular as he was; he was the embodiment of the nation and the legacy he left behind; 
they remember him with nostalgia, and if they were to vote otherwise it would feel like a 
betrayal to him. His leadership was exemplary in many ways. He was committed 
republican, by birth a paramount chief. The second explanation is the kind of coalition he 
brought together. He was able to bring the white population within the fold. Khama 
travelled extensively, had white cabinet ministers, and was able to bring chiefs on his 
side. Furthermore, he allowed a business community mainly of Asian origin to thrive, 
unlike in Indo-phobic Uganda under Idi Amin. The opposition has not been able to 
penetrate this coalition decisively except maybe in urban areas like Jwaneng, Gaborone, 
but the alliance of interest has remained intact. Thirdly the development performance of 
the BDP, they have delivered. Early days there was only 12km of tarred rode. Now there 
is a whole road network, social services clinics schools, water is now widely available.  
Fourth, there is a weak opposition which is disjointed and vulnerable to defeat. Our 
society is now going through a transformation. This is the first generation which has faint 
recollection of Seretse Khama, and you see this shift in voting pattern. We foresee more 
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difficulty. I don’t ever see BDP ever winning Gaborone Central. They are likely to lose 
all five constituencies in this city.  
Gobotswang asserts that Botswana’s authoritative legitimacy is historical because 
BDP was formed and led by a royal person who was very charismatic and quite liberal. 
He used chieftainship and public service rallied behind the BDP. It is partly because of 
political consciousness. Botswana didn’t go through the problems of its surrounding 
neighbors, former settler colonies which experienced racial segregation and separate 
development. As a result political consciousness was limited because the stimuli that 
facilitated political participation were greatly. However, Botswana citizens understood 
and appreciated chieftaincy. They accepted that a chief had to lead and this gave the 
chiefly institution legitimacy. The BNF managed to grasp one of the chiefs and until 
today that area of Ngwaketse is predominantly a BNF base, yet another indication of 
loyalty along chiefly lines. Over the years BNF eroded the popularity of the BDP. After 
the 1994 elections observers were convinced that BNF would take power in 1999. 
However, these hopes were dashed sue to the spilt of the BNF to form BCP. BNF grew 
but it lagged behind organizationally and management-wise. Resultantly, after 1999, 
Gobotswang argues that BDP has been ruling by default.  
For others like Taolo however, the interpretation of Tswana leadership legitimacy 
is misinterpreted.  He alleges that Khama’s royalty before becoming president was no 
greater than any other chief. Instead, legitimacy of chieftaincy was used as a platform to 
garner support. The reason for Taolo’s skepticism stems from the fact that once in power, 
Khama took away all the power of chiefs in Botswana in favor of executive power. This 
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was done through the removal of land custodianship from chiefs, which greatly 
diminished the significance of the institution. Furthermore, modern judicial systems were 
introduced to the subordination of traditional ones. This, Taolo asserts was done with the 
support of the colonial masters and a section of white South Africa (not the apartheid 
regime, which at the time did not condone his marriage to a white woman). As a result, 
Taolo contends that the consolidation of Khama’s power directly marginalized other 
forms of authority, which he had based in candidacy upon. This research however 
disagrees with Taolo in that it believes Khama compromised on his role as chief to 
provide a more egalitarian role for the native Tswana population that would be equal and 
accessible for all. Him subordinating his chieftancy position to that of republican 
president, essentially removed the tribal/ethnic polarization that could have resulted 
under the new republic and paved way for the succession of new presidents like his 
successors Masire and Mogae, without the traditional rules of succession. The later 
election of his own son Ian Khama as the fourth president reflects both the enduring 
esteem of the chieftancy and the willingness to adopt new sources of legitimacy among 
Botswana citizens.  
According to Taolo, the success of the BDP does not lie in its historical 
legitimacy, but in the failure and weakness of a strong opposition. Due to Botswana’s 
diamond wealth and a process of transference the BDP has had considerable resources at 
its disposal that made it possible to run elections. The opposition has been cash strapped 
and their campaigns have concentrated in urban areas and that is where the opposition has 
recorded some success, with a few exceptions like Okavango. He alleges that bottom 
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line; the victory division is a matter of resources. Via a process of stealth, the BDP was 
able to get the resources from the diamond wealth. The fact that the economy was doing 
well, meant that the BDP could get election harvesting schemes that will only be 
operational in the months before an election and would thereafter eventually die down. 
There is also a perception that the opposition is weak. It was weak because it did not have 
resources at its disposal. Taolo cites BPP as one such party that was decimated due to the 
lack of resources. 
Taolo complains that the alternative view is stifled in that it does not find itself to 
the people who should listen to it. State-run television and domination of BDP on the air, 
in print and on the radio that deprives the people in the rural areas the information that 
would help them want to change government. People only hear one side of the story and 
have no access to an alternative view.  The conditions of economic deprivation and 
poverty and unemployment are relatively high given the state of economic growth over 
the years. We have talked about unprecedented growth in economic growth in Botswana 
but we cannot talk about poverty eradication at a rate that matches this statistic. There has 
been a reduction in the level of poverty but not at the same speed as the acceleration. 
Having people living below poverty line and not having sufficient information, which is a 
recipe for safeguarding the establishment. The press moves about giving people blankets 
the people appreciate these blankets more from him because they cannot afford it. And 
the video cameras capture him giving these blankets creating an image of a very generous 
president. These handouts are a way to tell the poor people that one day you may also get 
a blanket. However, the statistics do not back Taolo’s claim. Although not at the same 
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speed, there has been a gradual improvement in most human development indicators in 
Botswana. Literacy rates have increased from 69.8percent in 1995 to 84.5percent in 2010 
according to the CIA World Factbook.  
This section illuminates the views of respondents to interviews carried out in 
Botswana on the question of legitimacy. There seems to be an overwhelming view that 
the majority of the population voluntarily endorses the Botswana Democratic Party as 
legitimacy and this endorsement is repeatedly observed through the ballot box. It is also 
clear that they tie the agency of BDP to the country’s economic success, thus providing it 
with legitimacy. The following section analyzes Botswana in comparative perspective to 
other resource-rich African countries.  
LEGITIMACY AND CONTINUITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
The resource curse has imposed upon its victims a crisis of legitimacy, where 
states’ political landscapes are continually dominated by coercive ways to secure and 
maintain power. This is mainly through rentierism, which has led to either 
authoritarianism or violent conflict in resource-rich countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, this 
is all the more evident, as bases for securing the loyalty of citizens has been a challenge. 
The Botswana case illuminates a history where the contestation of legitimacy on the basis 
of ethnicity or governmental performance is greatly limited. This section provides an 
analysis of institutional continuity and legitimacy in comparative perspective to other 
African countries particularly two that suffer the resource curse: Nigeria and Angola.   
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Sub-Saharan Africa has been plagued by a crisis of legitimacy. Lipset (1960:78), 
perceived the legitimacy crisis as a crisis of change from tradition to modernity. He 
argues that loss of legitimacy occurs when a political system no longer has the capacity to 
provide for new social groups. Many, including Ake 1981 (cited by Ogundiya (2009), 
argue that the crisis of legitimacy in Africa is a direct legacy of colonialism. Others like 
Osaghae (1994:21) maintain that the root of the legitimacy deficit in Africa “lies in the 
fact that legitimacy was not vigorously pursued as part of statehood under colonial rule.”  
Furthermore, following Zartman (1995)’s [in Petithomme (2007)] assertion, African post-
colonial states are successors to colonial territories, which were themselves exogenous 
creations. As a result, these independent African states inherently lacked legitimacy at the 
point of creation, thus reinforcing an early skepticism as to their empirical viabilities 
(Petithomme, 2007). In contemporary Nigeria, Ogundiya (2009) argues, the legitimacy of 
government is heavily dependent on the mode of power acquisition, ethnic identity, and 
solidarity as well as on the performance and leadership capabilities. Within this context 
therefore, Nigeria’s crisis of legitimacy is a function of state incapacitation and policy 
failures. Nigeria provides a good comparison to Botswana because both experienced 
forms of indirect British colonial rule, which preserved traditional pre-colonial structures. 
It is also a country whose exports are highly dependent on one key non-renewable natural 
resource. 
Unlike in Botswana, British colonial rule of Nigeria was a highly fragmentary 
process and the colony was decentralized into various spheres of influence. The colonial 
administration divided the territory into a Muslim north and a Christian south and 
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installed a system of indirect rule. This system instituted by Frederick Lugard, Governor 
of Nigeria, would later exacerbate cultural differences within Nigeria that are still evident 
today. One result of British colonial rule in Nigeria was the remodeling of the colony into 
units of local self-government convenient to British colonial administration. Although 
traditional leaders continued to govern the native population, they were not independent 
like was the case of Botswana, but were agents of British colonial policy instead.  In 
colonial Nigeria, caliphate titles could be retained by emirs but these were ultimately 
under the final authority of British district officers. The British High Commissioners, 
where necessary, could overthrow emirs and other officials. This situation did not occur 
in Botswana.   
The arrangement put in place by Lugard at the unification of Nigeria, 
amalgamated the British government with the traditional administrative machinery. This 
created a hybrid system that linked British officials at the top of the executive, legislative 
and judiciary wings of government and native chiefs at lower rungs of authority. This had 
substantial structural and attitudinal repercussions for existing public and private 
organization as the colonial political domination of the society permeated government, 
trade, religion and the social life of Nigerian people. According to Kiggundu (1991), 
British colonial rule became an efficient tool for relegating and decimating the 
indigenous native institutions and management practices, as they were supplanted by 
western-style administrative structures that were invariably regarded as superior.  The 
evolution of governance structure in Nigeria had to operate within the ambits of the firm 
conditions of colonialism favored by the British colonial administration (ibid). This was 
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not the case in Botswana. In Botswana, indigenous governance structures were not 
coercively supplanted by colonial ones, they were voluntarily adopted as the fairest way 
to govern the population after independence (Duke, 2010).  
During colonialism under the British, southern Nigeria adopted and relied on 
exogenous western traditions of rules of law, in which those that were governed were 
expected to support and obey. The coercive nature of British colonial rule can be 
observed in Nigeria’s post-colonial era which is replete with instances where the military 
enforced its tentative, personalized authority utilizing aggressive approaches. Examples 
include the rules of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and General Sani Abacha 
(1993-1998) whose methods of power acquisition and rule alienated the citizens of their 
country from their government. Furthermore, the harsh colonialism instituted by the 
British has fostered and exacerbated distrust and skepticism of government has since 
extended even to Nigeria’s instances of civilian rule, even where democratic movements 
have been awash. This is in stark contrast to the Botswana case, whose internal and 
endogenous institutions were greatly left intact and sustained throughout its 80 years 
under British influence. In most cases in Botswana, the voluntary nature of power 
acquisition and succession along established laws facilitated the government’s perceived 
legitimacy. Botswana did not have a military for nearly 15 years after independence, 
opting instead to focus on poverty alleviation instead of defense. It was only when cross-
border incursions by Rhodesian and South African security forces in the mid-1970s 
threatened security in Botswana occurred that the government concluded that the country 
needed a military to protect its sovereignty. The Botswana Defense Force was thus 
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established in 1977. Its mission has mainly focused on anti-poaching activities, disaster-
preparedness, search and rescue response support to civil authorities and foreign 
peacekeeping. 
Similarly, a crisis of legitimacy occurs in Angola, a dominant oil country and 
Botswana’s diamond exporting counterpart in Southern Africa. Portuguese colonialism of 
Angola followed a principle of assimilation (assimilado). This was a direct form of rule 
that essentially disrupted indigenous Angolan institutions and altered them to fit the 
Portuguese model with the aim of all colonial subjects eventually achieving the full rights 
of Portuguese citizenship. However, the rhetoric of non-racialization was far removed 
from the reality of Portuguese colonial administration, which saw indigenous Africans 
viewed as inferior, making the achievement of assimilado elusive for most Africans.  
However, of importance to this dissertation is how Portuguese colonial administration 
affected institutional continuity and legitimacy in Angola. Essentially, by instituting a 
system of assimilation, Portuguese colonists essentially undermined traditional informal 
and formal institutions of native Angolans and replaced them completely with their own.  
In the Weberian sense, contemporary Angola has been deemed a “failed state” 
due to the fact that the Angolan government only has limited control over the Angolan 
territory, thus failing to have monopoly of control as is required for a state to be 
legitimate.  In Angola, unlike in Botswana, the government never enjoyed the legitimacy 
of the collective nation. The various factions were divided along ethnic and marginally 
ideological lines. According to Ostheimer (2000) [in Cillier and Dietrich (eds.) (2000)], 
there also exists a de-linkage of the Angolan political elite from Angolan society and an 
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erosion of the state’s service delivery performance including security, all which attribute 
to a loss of political legitimacy of the government.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The crux of the chapter’s argument has been to show that Botswana has to a great 
extent been both a more “legitimate state” and with more “legitimate institutions” than its 
average African and resource-rich counterparts. This legitimacy is reflected in the way 
institutions are endorsed by a noteworthy portion of society. The chapter has gone to 
show the historical foundations of state and political legitimacy in Botswana. This is a 
history of an imperfect form of “protectorate” colonization, with limited engagement with 
the colonial administration and minimal destruction of existing institutions particularly 
chieftaincy. This facilitated succession and transition into power to be smoother than in 
other African countries. Furthermore, the institution of presidency was neatly 
superimposed onto the institution of chieftaincy through two of the country’s four post-
independence presidents, father and son, Seretse Khama (1st president) and Ian Khama 
(fourth and current president) both of who were the rightful blood heirs to the majority 
BaNgwato tribe. This greatly cushioned the issue of transitioning types of legitimacy 
from traditional to legal-rational in the post-colonial period. Furthermore, the second and 
third presidents gained constitutional legitimacy which was never violently contested, but 
voluntarily accepted as the pragmatic way to move forward as an independent country. 
The election of Quett Masire (and subsequently his successor Festus Mogae) was the 
102 
	  
culmination of acceptance of legal-rational sources of legitimacy, as there exists 
competing bases of popular loyalty between traditional and elected authorities.  
The respect for the rules governing the political order was reinforced during the 
first Khama presidency by the material outcome of economic change. Botswana citizens 
had seen the system work, without having disrupted the chieftancy, the historical symbol 
of continuity and change. This was facilitated by the BDP being willing to support the 
continued existence of the authority of chiefs, and the fact that the chieftancy did not 
challenge the hegemony of the national state. Early voter apathy in Botswana (31percent 
to 51percent turnout averages between 1965 and 1980), could be viewed as a proviso to 
the initial limited legitimacy of the legal-rational framework. However, since no 
challenges led to outright violence, this could be viewed as an endorsement of the system, 
albeit with limited participation.     
This chapter has also provided understanding of the way people’s perceptions of 
what is right and their material interests interact; and also the way in which deeply 
embedded social and economic structures and “rules of the game” shape people’s 
perceptions of their interests. This was reflected though insights from key informant 
interviews conducted around Gaborone’s political and academic elite, of why the 
Botswana Democratic Party has continued its national stronghold. When a state is 
legitimate, it does not have to resort to coercion. Instead it relies on the constructive 
interaction between state and society limiting incentives for dissent. This study thus 
found legitimacy contributing greatly to Botswana’s institutional quality. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POLITICAL CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY IN BOTSWANA 
 
Introduction 
Explanations of Botswana’s developmental success have looked into the role of 
prudent economic planning and good governance in facilitating Botswana’s economic 
growth.  As noted in Chapter 2, the modal reason cited for Botswana has been the 
existence of sound institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) emphasize this 
by saying that good institutions particularly in the area of private property, the political 
leadership’s choice of sound policies and the elite’s motivation to reinforce strong 
institutions, have greatly shaped Botswana’s fortunes. When compared to other countries 
in southern Africa and around the world, Botswana fares well on indices that reflect a 
country’s sound institutions, including voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (Iimi 
2006:9.) In times of economic booms, the Botswana government has consistently been 
conservative in its spending, prudently saving surpluses in international reserves. In times 
of busts, the government has also for the most part, managed its reserves well to the point 
of never needing to resort to drastic structural adjustments or debt relief from 
international financial institutions (Sarraf, 2001).  
Despite all this, Botswana does not have a monopoly over the craftsmanship and 
authorship of good policies in the abstract. Nearly every resource exporting country has 
well written developmental plans and policies, aimed at creating efficiency within their 
economies. However, in the case of Botswana, unlike most other resource exporters, 
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these policies are followed through and successfully implemented. This begs the question 
as to why? 
This dissertation maintains that explanations of the Botswana success story go 
deeper than the existence of certain institutions and policies. It argues that it is not the 
institution or the resource per se that determines the fate of a resource-rich country. 
Instead, it is the setting in which those institutions and resources are embedded that 
determines how the resource will be managed. This setting requires particular forces and 
interactions between the institutions and the resource that provides the most efficient 
equilibrium for effective governance. Additionally, these interactions and patterns of 
orientation to an effective political economy are heavily embedded in this setting. These 
modal orientations towards particular policy directions are reflective of a country or 
community’s political culture. 
 Prior research on institutional quality that has employed “culture” as an 
explanatory variable for political outcomes assumes that political systems worldwide are 
heavily embedded in the distinct patterns of orientation to a narrow range of political 
actions.  As Hall (1986) asserts, the behavior of officials and of citizens is greatly 
influenced by the political culture in which they exist in, operate in, and have been 
socialized by. This chapter examines the hypothesis that Botswana’s unique peaceful 
political culture is what accounts for its institutional quality, making the country fare 
better than other resource exporting countries.   
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The Concept of Political Culture 
Political culture refers to the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that offer 
meaning to political processes. In this sense, political culture also provides the 
fundamental assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system (Pye, 
1968:218).  Political culture embraces the political ideals and operating norms of a 
polity or community and is the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological 
and subjective dimensions of politics (Geertz, 1973:93).  Political culture is a product 
of a political system’s collective history and life histories of members of the system. It 
is rooted in public events as well as private experience.   
Two main traditions of understanding political culture exist. The anthropological 
tradition focuses on the symbolic dimension of politics and the effect of social group 
membership on political behavior. The psychological tradition prioritizes the role of 
individual psychological factors, including personality, political values and morality, and 
core beliefs inculcated through socialization during the course of cognitive development 
(Wilson, 2000). This dissertation argues that Botswana’s political culture cannot be 
described within the limits of only one theoretical approach, and borrows influences from 
the various approaches at different points in time.  It understands political culture in 
evolutionary terms, as a population phenomenon that evolves through a process of 
selection and retention of variation of beliefs and the behavior they give rise to 
(Campbell, 1965). 
The Botswana case reflects the symbolic dimension of politics through the beliefs 
of myths and the practices of cultural rituals. This observation is inspired by the 
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Weberian preoccupation with the significance of social action and the phenomenological 
focus on the socially constructed character of knowledge and society. Wilson (2000) 
defines culture as “the collective meanings that groups create, share, and symbolically 
express”. As a result, political culture can be construed through engagement in local 
networks that revel in myths, symbols and rituals conveying the meaning and intensity of 
the norms that underwrite social solidarity. Why people select certain beliefs and are 
swayed by particular rituals is normally contingent upon social action and discourse.  
According to Inoguchi (2006)23 political culture is “the set of memories and 
identities, norms and values, beliefs and preferences, and practices and habits present in a 
certain community of people”. Thus defined, political culture is a patterned attitude 
towards political thought. Within this context, and following Lasswell (1990), Inoguchi 
(2006:9) defines politics as the authoritative allocation of values, expressing who gets 
what, when and how. It is this culture of politics that determines institutional quality. 
Similarly, for Verna (1965 p513) “the political culture of a society consists of the system 
of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defined the situation in which 
political action takes place”. This research adopts Pye’s (1965:7) assumption that “in any 
particular community there is a limited and distinct political culture which gives 
meaning, predictability and form to the political process.”  Similarly Carr (2007) 
maintains that political culture refers to “values that regulate governmental activities and 
direct a shared and public understanding of the proper operation of the public realm” 
(p.51). This definition reflects that political culture can determine how policies are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 http://cco.cambridge.org/extract?id=ccol9780521880473_CCOL9780521880473A010  
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received, evaluated and implemented. As a result, political culture is public shared 
meanings and is thus socially constructed (Spiro, 1984).   
Wilson (2000) argues that political culture can be viewed within a “psychological 
tradition” which emphasizes the role of individual psychological factors, including 
personality, political values and morality, and core beliefs inculcated through 
socialization during the course of cognitive development. The distinctive ways members 
of a group understand authority relations, are committed to specific religious and 
ideological opinions, fear social disorder and are markedly dependent, all reveal their 
political culture. Communities are characterized by modal and enduring personalities i.e. 
psychological constraints imparted from one generation to the next through the course of 
political socialization. This dissertation argues that Botswana’s contemporary political 
culture has been the result of centuries of political socialization particularly within the 
context of Tswana customs and traditions. It assumes that individual views on authority 
and the state greatly reflect the aggregate culture of the society.  
Max Weber’s “protestant ethic” can serve as an example of how political culture 
contributes to institutional quality. Weber inferred reformation having altered the belief 
system of those who adhered to the Lutheran or Calvinist creed. Neither Luther nor 
Calvin intended to promote capitalism, yet their doctrines spontaneously strengthened 
individual responsibility, inner worldliness, and sobriety were thought to have set in 
motion a process of development, which resulted in the spirit of capitalism. These new 
values were all requirements of their new creed. Similarly, the seminal work by Putnam 
shows how similar formal institutions within one country, Italy, functioned differently 
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and resulted in different outcomes in different regions of the country. The judicial system 
for example, which has been uniform for 150 years, operated differently in Northern and 
Southern Italy. This vast difference could only be accounted for by the beliefs and 
political culture of civil society which had emerged over centuries in the respective 
regions. This dissertation argues that similar to the protestant ethic and the northern 
regional political culture in Italy, political culture contributed to the creation of strong, 
responsive and effective representative institutions. 
Political culture in Geertz (1973)’s view is a property of a collective and varying 
levels of analyses, nations, regions, classes, ethnic communities, formal organizations 
and political parties, can have distinctive political cultures. As a result there exist as a 
distinction between mass political cultures and elite political cultures.  Elites in this 
context are what Putnam described as “those who in any society rank toward the top of 
the (presumably closely inter-correlated) dimensions of interest, involvement, and 
influence in politics”.  There is a general assumption within this research that a nation’s 
political culture is largely integrated and that most people within the system have similar 
or compatible political culture orientations which are congenial to the political 
institutions (and/or to the ruling elites) within which they are subject to. This research 
focuses in on the political culture of Botswana citizens as a whole and makes few 
distinctions of political culture based on ethnicity, gender, rural/urban divide, age etc. 
Instead, the research aims to establish the political culture of the citizens of Botswana as 
an entity.  
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Rosenbaum (1975) identifies three components of political culture: orientation 
towards governmental structures; orientation towards other political systems and 
orientation of one towards his or her own political activity. Utilizing data from 
Afrobarometer, this research attempted to evaluate these different components of political 
culture.  
The first component reflects how an individual evaluates and responds to the 
basic governmental institutions in his society its symbols, official and norms collectively, 
the ‘regime”. An evaluation by a citizen of governmental inputs and outputs i.e., how 
individuals feel and respond toward various demands for public policy (inputs) and 
policy decisions made by government (outputs) is at the heart of a citizen’s participation 
in politics. These inputs and outputs include inventory of a person’s knowledge 
concerning how state processes operate, what demands he may make upon government 
and how effective he believes government policy to be. The second component of 
political culture is the orientation towards other political systems. Political identification, 
political trust and the rules of the game are the different conceptions of an individual’s 
subjective preferences. Political identification includes the political units (nation, state, 
town, and region), geographic areas, and groups to which one feels he belongs, that are in 
some significant subjective sense a part of his own social identity. This identification 
encompasses those units and groups to which he feels a strong loyalty, obligation or duty. 
Political trust in Rosenbaum (1975)’s view refers to the extent to which one feels an 
open, cooperative or tolerant attitude in working with others in civic life. Essentially, 
political trust expresses the intensity of a person’s conviction that other individuals or 
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groups mean him well or ill in political life. The “Rules of the Games” are an individual’s 
conception of what rules should be followed in civic life. In Rosenbaum’s view, these 
subjective preferences do not necessary need to be consistent with prevailing law and 
other norms supposed to govern civic conduct and are completely at the individual’s 
discretion. The third component of political culture identified by Rosenbaum (1975) is 
the orientation of one towards his or her own political activity. The first aspect of this is 
political competence i.e., how often and in what manner a person participates in civic life, 
the frequency with which he uses the political resources available to him aim civic 
affairs. It may also include some evaluation of his knowledge of his political resources. A 
second aspect is political efficacy. This is the feeling that individual political action does 
have, or can have an impact on the political process. Political efficacy includes a belief 
that political change is possible and that one can accomplish change through civic action. 
In measuring political efficacy, individuals are customarily ranked on a scale according 
to whether their sense of political efficacy is high or low (Rosenbaum, 1975).  This 
dissertation adopts the criteria delineated by Rosenbaum (1975) of determining aspects of 
political culture.     
Political culture is of course the result of historical development and experience.  
Some factors that contribute to the formation of a particular political culture include 
historical experiences, collective values, founding principles, religious traditions, 
geographic location, strategic environment, economic capacity, educational levels, 
demographics, and existence central figures in the community (Kim, 2009:15-26).   
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) show definitively that political culture defined as values is 
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systematically impacted by economic development over time.  One critique of politico- 
cultural approaches, however, is that they suggest that the personal choice and free will of 
individuals is limited by the cultural and social settings in which they are immersed. The 
implication that political decisions and behavior are predetermined by culture is a key 
weakness of this theory (Ramsay, 2008).   
Moreover, as Inglehart (1990) argued, there is evidence of significant changes in 
political values within societies across the generations. Hence, it goes without saying that 
political culture is very dynamic and should never be treated as a static phenomenon 
(Hannerz, 1969).  Culture evolves over time in response to changes in people's lives.  
Furthermore, as political culture often occurs within cultural clusters, diffusion between 
identity groups allows for the synthesis and/or the erosion of cultures over long periods of 
time.  
While acknowledging the dynamic character of political culture, this dissertation 
focusses on the dominant political cultures that were exhibited in Botswana at critical 
points in its economic and political history.  The quality of Botswana culture, at times 
under review, sheds light on the high levels of institutional quality observed in the 
country in the past 45 years. It makes no assumption; however, that Botswana culture is 
not changing or will not change over time. 
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POLITICAL CULTURE IN BOTSWANA 
The Traditional Foundations of Political Culture in Botswana 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the British ruled Bechuanaland through 
means similar to the “indirect rule” prototype exercised in West Africa.  Here, the subject 
was governed by his or her chief, sub-chief, or headman (the latter at the ward level). The 
colonial district commissioner worked in conjunction with the chief.  According to Lewis 
(2006), the chief directed the kgotla, a traditional village gathering place with judicial, 
administrative and advisory roles. The kgotla endures as the central informal institution 
in Tswana governance and culture. Subsequent to consulting the kgotla, the chief 
arbitrated disputes and dispensed justice, allotted land for arable farming, grazing, home 
sites, and commercial ventures and distributed stray cattle at his pleasure. Chiefly 
decisions were also made on educational policy and public works projects. He scheduled 
the best times for agricultural activity and managed the general lives of his followers.   
In the kgotla, the men discussed matters of economic and or political importance 
to the community. As described in the previous chapter, the morafe was divided into 
segments known as wards, which were representative of major ethnic and family 
divisions.  Each ward arranged its houses around a central animal corral (kraal, lesaka) 
situated in front of the most senior kgotla, that of the kgosi. The kgotla, symbolized by a 
semicircular fence of stout, upright logs, sometimes topped by skulls of cattle or rhino (in 
the case of Shoshong) was located next to the central animal kraal.  
Denbow and Thebe (2006) assert that certain traditional beliefs surrounded the 
institution of the kgotla. A fire was always situated at the entrance of the council place in 
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order to prevent dangerous or harmful actions from entering. These could range from 
natural disasters such as lightning strikes, or from people with personal jealousies or 
grudges (baloi), from entering and interfering the kgotla’s s deliberations. The kgotla was 
the avenue through which the chiefs communicated directly to their subjects, representing 
a quasi-democratic institution that permitted free speech, albeit within its limits, while at 
the same time allowing the kgosi to examine public reception of matters already 
discussed in private with counselors and advisors. There was an underlying expectation 
by the people that the chief be a modest, compassionate, and diligent man, while showing 
reverence for tribal customs and practices in his daily life. The Tswana proverb “kgosi ke 
kgosi ka batho” (the chief is a chief by the grace of the people) reflects this notion 
clearly, and demonstrates that even in pre-colonial Botswana, the people exercised 
buffering power over the chief. Chiefs commonly consulted with the community prior to 
decision making on matters of significance.  While they did not necessarily accord the 
consensus of opinion in the kgotla, the tradition of consultation and seeking consensus in 
itself was deeply embedded in Tswana culture and society. In fact, according to Lewis in 
Harrison and Berger (2006)), the kgosi would seldom venture an opinion in the kgotla 
until all who sought to opine had done so. 
The main tenets of democracy are reflected in this practice. The etymology of the 
term democracy demos “common people” and kratos “rule, strength” meaning that at the 
rudimentary level, Tswana customs reflected democratic ideals and the extent to which 
power belonged to the people. This to a large degree reveals pre-colonial Botswana’s 
political culture, and the foundations of modern democracy in Botswana. According to 
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Denbow and Thebe (2006) the kgotla was open to all members of the community with 
the exception of recently arrived immigrants and some lower-status commoners. Order of 
seating was hierarchical and followed the order of status and seniority. One major 
exclusion was the political participation of women, however, who were deemed as 
“incompletely socialized beings” and referred to as Makope or “yellow locusts” (Denbow 
and Thebe, 2006: 22). This was to later be a problem during colonial periods as women 
often headed households where migrant mine workers were based in South Africa and 
these households would go for prolonged periods of time without representation within 
the kgotla. Proverbs such as “ga di nke di etelelwa je manamagadi pele” (households and 
nations cannot be headed by women) greatly reinforced the disenfranchisement of 
women within pre-colonial Tswana society.  Nonetheless, in exceptional circumstances, 
Tswana populations have been led by regent queens. This was the case of Queen 
Ntebogang Gaseitsiwe, who stood in as acting chief for Kgosi Bathoen II of the 
Ngwaketse between 1924 and 1928.  
Although Molutsi (2004) contends that historically Tswana society was 
thoroughly authoritarian and strongly dominated by the male elders, Botswana’s 
contemporary kgotla has been adapted to modern democratic systems and practices. This 
has been achieved first, by making sure that not only men can be chiefs, by appointing 
and inaugurating females to chiefly roles and second, by extending the system beyond its 
traditional rural ethnic base into urban areas. The institution is still biased towards elderly 
male representation, although in principle anybody, young and old, is eligible for 
chieftaincy.  
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According to Denbow and Thebe (2006) what set the stage for Botswana’s later 
success with democracy was that even in the pre-colonial times, considerable freedom 
was allowed for individuals to discuss and criticize community affairs within the kgotla, a 
salient element of Tswana cultural practice that existed for centuries.  They cite 
Campbell’s observation that: 
“Such is the freedom of speech at those public meetings, that some of the captains 
[headmen] have said of the King, the he…..is not fit to rule over them.” 
This observation was the basis of Maundeni (2004)’s argument on Botswana’s 
political culture, even in contemporary times. Maundeni (2004) contends that the main 
reason cited to account for Botswana’s weak civil society has been that historically it has 
staged very few violent clashes with the government with the intention of reversing 
governmental policy24, which is the hallmark of strong Western civil society. He argues 
that this Eurocentric yardstick for measuring civil societal strength is inappropriate for 
the study of Botswana’s politics. Botswana is characterized by lengthy debates and civil 
confrontations and rarely resorts to violent confrontation. Instead Maundeni (2004) says 
Botswana citizens resort more to “mutual criticism”. Following Durham (1999)'s 
emphasis on 'civility' – i.e., the local cultural emphasis on the moral nature of political 
action and the political aspects of a person's agency, Maundeni (2004) concedes that in 
Botswana, the criticism of chiefs has long been a central feature of public debate. He 
agrees with Schapera (1965)’s assertion that it has been entrenched in the gaudy imagery 
of courtly praise poetry since ancient times:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Civil society activism need not be hostile to the state; it might just be suggestive of good ideas, or 
promoting of good legislation, etc. 
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'In general, we may say, the poems deal mainly with events in which the chief was 
personally involved, or failing all else, with what is expected of him ... The contents 
always include eulogies of the chief himself, though sometimes also ... direct or implied 
criticism of his conduct or disposition.'  
Maundeni (2004) argues that what should be emphasized is that public criticism 
of chiefs occurred in their presence and in public meetings, and that all matters of public 
policy were settled at an assembly open to all men of the tribe, and variously dubbed 
pitso, lebatla, or phutego. These were smaller, localized varieties of the kgotla, with the 
former being held mainly at the tribal level.  Such gatherings occur frequently, early in 
the morning in a tribal council-place near the chief’s residence. Customarily only the men 
present in the capital would attend, the business discussed and decisions reached being 
communicated to the inhabitants of remote villages through their headmen. However, on 
special occasions the men from outside are also beckoned.   
Maundeni (2004) argues that the prevailing Tswana political culture stresses open 
discussions to violent engagement. In fact, violent behavior is peripheral to Tswana 
culture and has never enjoyed moral support as demonstrated by the Tswana language’s 
emphasis on “ntwak golok e a molomo” (conflicts are best solved through discussion). He 
laughingly recalls a 1989 incident when two Herero men began fighting in a ward kgotla 
(chief’s court) in Mahalapye. This became the subject of general ridicule for days. When 
men in the Mahalapye kgotla became openly hostile to persons or to the general debate, 
they would be compelled to leave and their comments dismissed (Maundeni (2004).  
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Instead, Tswana culture warrants that criticism be done within the confines of the 
kgotlas. In the early 1980’s,  an old man in the kgotla in Mochudi was broadcast over the 
radio when Vice President Sir Ketumile Masire became president at the death of Seretse 
Khama, requesting  that President Masire come to a kgotla meeting. During the meeting, 
an old man accused him of being a mmina phiri (one who dances the hyena) meaning that 
he has a hyena as a totem and so by implication if from a junior morafe or origin and thus 
not a high enough social rank or caste to settle the dispute of an Ngwaketse king 
(Maundeni interview). Another example is the well-publicized incident when the 
Minister of Local Government and Lands suspended Kgosi Seepapitso IV of the 
Ngwaketse for “insubordination” done within the confines of the kgotla. A traditional 
right to freedom of expression was respected in all cases, a right reflected in two Tswana 
proverbs:  
“Mmualebe o a be a bua la gagwe” (“Everyone has the right to say what he likes 
in the kgotla) and  
“Mafoko a kgosing a mantle otlhe” (“Words spoken in the kgotla are the most 
beautiful”).  
In all these cases, freedom of expression was respected and there was no 
punishment for criticizing the highest official. Another saying encapsulates this tolerance 
of opposing views: “Ntwa kgolo key a molomo” (“the highest form of war is dialogue”). 
The deep cultural embededness of such sayings helps explain why Botswana takes care to 
be one of the most democratic countries in sub Saharan Africa. According to Maundeni, 
when airing out a grievance in pre-colonial Botswana, the subjects usually resorted to 
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public poetry at the kgotla. Everybody, including the chief was open to criticism, but 
instead of mouthing off e.g. through cursing or causing a scene in public, they utilized the 
kgotla forum.  
Culturally the kgotla was not open to women and minorities. Nevertheless, the 
chief’s mother was regarded as the steward of the chieftainship and ruled on behalf of an 
heir who was not yet of age. Participation also excluded some minority ethnic groups 
such as the BaKgalagadi, and BaSarwa and favored the dominant Tswana ethnic groups. 
These minority groups therefore historically have had no representative voice within the 
kgotla institutions. According to Bock and Johnson (2013) these small nomadic groups 
moved sporadically in response to the local migration of game. Their organization was 
focused on extended family relationships and little evidence of central authority existed. 
Other groups like the Wayeyi people lived in semi-permanent, patrilocal, extended family 
settlements with a hereditary headman as the political focal point. Inheritance following 
Wayeyi tradition was matrilineal, therefore giving women a level of esteem not usually 
experienced under Tswana practice. Beginning in the late 1700s, the chief of the 
BaTawana, a Tswana tribe, began incorporating communities of the Okavango Delta into 
his traditional political structures and exerting political influence over them. This greatly 
undermined the matrilineal orientation of property rights customs in these communities 
as they were gradually replaced by patrilineal Tswana customs. This was further 
exacerbated by colonial administrators whose political control integrated the traditional 
Tswana institutions into government based ones.  Today headmen are primarily 
government employees, assisted in their duties by police, the courts, and civilian 
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committees. The Tswana kgotla style of government has been adopted locally, however, 
with restricted political and social socialization to members of other ethnic groups.  
Although through a system of assimilation to the dominant Tswana culture, the 
peaceful political culture did extend to other minority ethnic groups in Botswana 
particularly how they have always reverted to peaceful means when airing out 
grievances. In the following chapter, I will go into more detail on the intricacies of 
Botswana’s ethnic relations but it is key to note that ethnic relations in Botswana have 
rarely ever escalated into war, even with the existence of disgruntled minorities. When 
asked why minorities groups have remained dormant for such a long time without 
resorting to violence, as evidenced by a history of peaceful coexistence among ethnic 
groups in Botswana political science graduate student Lawrence attributes this to history. 
He compared the Tswana kingdom to the warrior and crusader Zulu and Ndebele states, 
which were forever on the warpath. Botswana’s pre-colonial history as well as colonial 
history was peaceful, but the history of warfare was not long drawn. He argues that the 
various identity groups opted to splinter away and break up before resorting to violence. 
The Tswana kingdom broke up when three brothers Ngwato, Ngwaketse and Tawana 
mutually agreed to form different tribes. However, he acknowledges that the Tswana 
kingdom was not as highly centralized as the Zulu and Ndebele states, and therefore 
never fully constituted a huge empire.  This made it easier for groups to coexist.  
Pre-colonial Botswana consisted of small states that coexisted relatively peaceful 
with each other, rarely resorting to violence when disputes emerged. This was unlike the 
neighboring Zulu and Ndebele states whose militaristic political culture was very 
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confrontational and polarizing.  Botswana did not endure rapacious colonial rule and thus 
had a cordial relationship with its colonizers. As a result, the fundamental nature of 
Botswana’s pre-colonial political culture was kept in place. Pre-colonial political culture 
can best be summarized as one that promoted dialogue and consultation over warfare 
when addressing grievances. This dialogue has been facilitated by the perpetuation and 
centrality of the kgotla institution. Traditional Tswana political culture was thus more 
compatible with the ideals of democracy that would be the foundation of the state left by 
the colonists. Tswana political culture reflected most of the key principles of democracy. 
It emphasized citizen participation through opening up the kgotla to royalty and subjects 
alike. The kgotla institution also kept chiefs and traditional leaders in check, providing 
for accountability and transparency of the system. Disputes were resolved amiably and 
subjects of the kgotla accepted the results of the rulings. Traditional Tswana political 
culture also esteemed mutual criticism, leading to compromise a key tenet of democracy. 
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Botswana’s Elite Political Culture  
At independence Botswana had two sets of elites: the chiefs, who represented 
traditional world views, and new elite, who reflects Christian liberal values and a leaning 
towards democracy (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009). The traditional elite were primarily 
of Tswana stock, thus possessing a common socio-cultural background. Botswana’s new 
elite was highly educated, with most members having studied aboard thus developing a 
common political and social value system.  The differences of the two groups of elites 
were reconciled on three separate occasions. First,  the coalitions formed at Constitutional 
Talks of 1963 in Lobatse town; second,  the formation of political parties with chiefs 
having a secondary role; and third the establishment of local democratic government 
institutions, immediately following independence, reducing the influence of the chiefs 
while incorporating them into the new system. 
The Lobatse talks were a key moment defining Botswana’s elite political culture. 
They defined the type of state that would exist post-colonial and whether or not the 
Chiefs would be the key inheritors of the new national state. Although present at the talks 
were the radical ANC-inspired Bechuanaland People’s Party, white settlers who wanted 
to keep land and chiefs who wanted to inherit the new state according to traditional law, 
the result was the emergence of a coalition of new and old elite, of multi-ethnic and 
multi-racial background, and of moderate political character.  
The second thing that defined elite political culture was the formation of a grand 
coalition of political parties. The three key political parties that have dominated 
Botswana politics for the past 45 years are the Botswana People’s Party (BPP), The 
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Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the Botswana National Front (BNF). Although 
inspired by varying and at times polar political ideologies, the main political parties of 
Botswana handled political challenges and disagreements through various means. At 
various points in Botswana’s history, consultative commissions hand conferences have 
been held to negotiate matters of importance to all political parties. One example is the 
consultative commission under President Festus Mogae which saw the negotiation of the 
perceived discrimination and under-representation of minority tribes in the House of 
Chiefs. Although not completely resolved, the commission set up a platform to do so. 
The commission also used the kgotla, to debate matters of national interest. Similarly, in 
the late 1990’s an All Party Consultative Conference was held to discuss issues relating 
to electoral reform, the voting age and postal voting from outside the country among the 
political parties. 
The third key aspect of Botswana’s elite political culture has been the 
incorporation of traditional leadership into modern local government institutions. The 
institutions of chieftaincy and of the kgotla (traditional assembly place and court) which 
were political, judicial and social pillars of the traditional Tswana society still exist as 
integral aspects of the contemporary Botswana. The House of Chiefs (Ntlo ya Dikgosi), 
for example, has an advisory role in parliament, and thus are a crucial aspect of the 
country’s legislature. They are also an essential part of the judicial and administrative 
systems at district and national levels (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009). 
These three aspects greatly characterize the elite of Botswana as having kept the 
main principles of dialogue and consultation that characterized traditional Tswana 
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political culture while adopting new forms of governance through political parties. 
Legitimate forums like the kgotla are also utilized by the elite to manage disputes that 
exist among themselves as well as the population at large. This to a great extent increases 
institutional quality in Botswana as it neutralizes threats.  
The Tswana political culture is very conservative, according to Professor of 
Political Science at the University of Botswana, Osei-Hwedie. When asked to 
characterize Botswana’s political culture, she was quick to state that Botswana elites do 
not condone radicalism. Their political culture is characterized by a refusal to adopt 
radical and extreme views and tends to be middle of the road ideologically. The country’s 
elite have not resorted to the levels of corruption characteristic of most states with natural 
resource exports. Osei-Hwedie cites Botswana’s championing of liberal property rights 
regimes and deliberately forgoing socialism or the one-party state unlike Zambia and 
Tanzania. Botswana remained largely free-market in its economic orientation and its 
pragmatic elite who were not excited about splashing money on luxuries, like their other 
African counterparts. They deliberately assessed what was needed in the country and 
decided to have more reserves than spending the money.  
Osei-Hwedie argues that there was a material aspect to the Tswana political 
culture. Here the elite a great number of Botswana’s elite both old and new belonged to a 
class of were cattle owners who revered cattle more than money.   They have more faith 
in cattle investments than putting money in the bank. This provided a structural class 
based on wealth that required work, cultivation and cattle, unlike diamond wealth, which 
is highly lootable (Lujala, 2005). This is unlike the practice in countries like Nigeria, 
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whose elite have contracts and tenders primarily within the oil sector of the economy. 
Osei-Hwedie compared Botswana to Zambia. The Zambians were not cattle owners and 
most got money put in overseas bank accounts. The Tswana on the other hand, tended to 
invest on cattle, which in turn backed up the burgeoning beef industry. So as a result, the 
Tswana elite invest more in the primary sector of the economy, the beef industry, and not 
the diamond industry. They have pragmatically left that industry to the management of 
Debswana and other private institutions to efficiently manage the resource. 
The elite political culture in contemporary Botswana borrows a number of 
insights from both pre-colonial tradition and the liberal world viewpoint. Botswana’s 
political elite comprises of a grand coalition of traditional elite and modern elite, local 
people and foreigners, cattle owners and former migrant workers, conservatives and 
radicals, all who were willing to compromise for the greater good of the country. 
According to Leonard Sesa, lecturer of political science at the University of Botswana, 
this has facilitated in the lowering of unpredictability and instability in the country.  
 
Political Culture in Botswana: Traditional vs. Secular 
The Botswana case is interesting in that it does not neatly follow Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005)’s designation of creating a democracy due to the adoption of secular-
rational values. Secular-rational values are those based solely on logic, reason or moral 
intuition, and not derivative of the ostensible supernatural revelations or guidance 
generally associated with religious ethics and values.  According to Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005), societies that highly value secular-rational and self-expression values, tend to be 
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more democratic that those that reflect traditional and survival values. They also link 
these cultural values to the levels of socio-economic development, arguing that 
modernization or the changes brought about by socioeconomic development, brought 
with them societal, cultural, and political changes resulting in rich countries highly 
valuing secular-rational and self-expression values while low-income nations tended to 
cluster on the opposite end of the spectrum. 
This assertion goes counter to the observation of Botswana which generally 
reflects that, Botswana’s democracy has historical pre-colonial roots and is not a result of 
modernization and industrialization, which came after independence as Inglehart’s neo-
modernization theory would argue. Botswana’s foundation of democracy predates the 
introduction of machinery for economic growth.   
According to Tsie, there are regional variations in the adoption of traditional and 
secular value systems in Botswana. For example, the central district, where Khama 
comes from, traditional values are very strong and salient features. In Kgatleng, which 
borders South Africa however, secular values are becoming more prominent.  In Palape 
and Shoshong and Mahalape the opposition has won recent elections. Basically, 
constituencies which tend to vote for the opposition are deemed to be more secular than 
constituencies which vote for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Constituents in 
Tlokweng and Kgatleng regions, which Tsie deems to lean towards secularism, tend to 
flip-flop on party allegiance. The paramount chief left his chieftaincy to pursue a political 
career in 1960. As Tsie puts it “voting by instinct is fast fading away in Tlokweng”.  Tsie 
126 
	  
argues however that as education levels rise, people are tending to embrace more secular-
rational values.  
 
Mass Political Culture in Botswana 
Systematic study of mass political culture has always been challenging 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa due to its heterogeneity and diversity. This section will 
however attempt to evaluate how mass political culture in Botswana provides explanation 
to its high level of institutional quality and its resultant escape from the resource curse. 
The first part of the analysis will look at how key informants characterized Botswana’s 
national character and mass political culture, and how these can be used to explain 
Botswana’s institutional quality. Second, the section will utilize Afrobarometer data to 
find empirical evidence of Botswana’s mass political culture. Both sets of data reflect a 
society with a high positive orientation towards the state reflecting the ideals of 
democratic political culture. 
 
Botswana’s Mass Political Culture described 
The majority of Botswana citizens are happy with the way things are done in their 
country and the way the economy was being managed by the government. When asked 
how Botswana citizens evaluated their state, respondents such as Lawrence, a private 
citizen and former student at University of Botswana, stated that generally the citizens are 
content with the state. He attributes the interaction between government and the people, 
facilitated by the kgotla forum where government and citizens engage, as the reason 
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behind this public endorsement of the state. As a result, according to Leonard Sesa, 
lecturer of political science at the University of Botswana, Botswana’s mass political 
culture is very predictable, alleging “You can write the election report months before the 
elections even come.”  
Due to Botswana’s economic performance, the country’s political culture is 
characterized by apathy and passiveness. The voter turnouts at the 1999, 2004 and 2009 
elections were only 41.98percent, 44.00 and 62.20percent of eligible voters respectively 
(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2013)25. This has been 
characteristic of the country since independence and only recently has there been 
sustained criticism of government reflecting more political engagement. Gladys 
Mokhawa argues that the issues that preoccupy Botswana citizens politically are usually 
very superficial and alleges that Botswana citizens are misusing the forums due to lack of 
issue priority.  
“Botswana citizens do not tend to make grievances about the budget or the 
economy, but when the alcohol tax was increased there was great disgruntlement 
particularly among the urbanites” – Dr Gladys Mokhawa.   
According to Pitso and Obot (2009) controversy erupted in 2008 over the 
proposal by President Khama to impose a 70percent levy on alcohol products. The 
industry responded by threatening to go to court and as a result the levy was reduced to 
30percent. When citing issues of importance to Botswana citizens, the issue of the 
alcohol tax kept on coming up in interviews conducted, reflecting the possibility that 
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Botswana citizens are so jaded that their only worries are alcohol taxes. Generally, issues 
of high politics or high relevance to the process of democratization are argued among 
Botswana citizens, argues Mokhawa, and neither are socio-economic issues such as the 
diamond sector or education.   Botswana citizens, she contends, are generally insular 
people, inward looking into Botswana, but they fail to be cognizant of the fact that there 
is a lot of competition within the region in terms of trade, investment and aid. This she 
says further consolidated the passivity of Botswana citizens.  
According to Lawrence, a growing segment of the population is becoming 
disillusioned. This segment mainly comprises of the urbanites whose needs go beyond 
social services like road networks and hospitals. These are people who are saying as 
much as they have had development, they believe that any government should do these as 
basic role. They expect an extension of provision of social services from the state.  
Material-wise, the consensus is that the state is capable, with the exception of the global 
economic or localized upsets.  One recent upset has been the 2011 government strike 
over salaries, one of a few in the country’s history. Close to a 100,000 public servants, 
including about 1,500 considered essential workers, stayed away from their posts while 
government and unions disputed over salaries. This according to Mokhawa could be the 
heralding of a new, more active and participant mass political culture in Botswana.  
 
Afrobarometer Reflections of Mass Political Culture in Botswana 
When investigating the political culture of any society, it is important to 
concentrate upon common political culture orientations, as these are assumed to be most 
likely to influence the political process, as they affect the behavior of large masses. In 
129 
	  
order to get a glimpse of broader political culture in Botswana, this research thus utilized 
data obtained from studies conducted by Afrobarometer to gather evidence that ascertains 
contemporary Botswana’s public perceptions towards its political system. Afrobarometer 
is an independent research project that measures public attitudes on political, economic, 
and social matters in African countries. Afrobarometer results are based on face-to-face 
interviews of individuals and are considered reliable and generalizable.  National 
representative samples are selected across all participating countries, with major 
variations (i.e.  ethnic linguistic differences, captured by stratifying by region and 
province, as well as urban rural). Currently four rounds of Afrobarometer surveys have 
been undertaken in sub-Saharan Africa, with Botswana having participated in all four 
rounds. Countries that participated in Round 1 included Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda 
Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
The second round included all countries of Round 1 plus Cape Verde, Kenya, 
Mozambique and Senegal. Round 3 included Round 2 plus Madagascar and Benin. The 
project is coordinated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the Centre 
for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and Michigan State University. The latter 
largely acts as a technical partner. 
Afrobarometer utilizes a standardized instrument to obtain its data. The same 
questionnaire questions are administered, adjusted only for local countries’ conditions. 
The field work is conducted by the natural partners’ research teams with Afrobarometer 
supervising to ensure that the same questions are asked so as to be able to make 
reasonable cross-country comparisons.  
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Afrobarometer data on public perceptions helps map out the political philosophy 
and culture of Botswana i.e., ideas on the ideal organization and existence of 
governmental, political and economic life. This dissertation used Afrobarometer to obtain 
public opinion measures to gauge political culture from a variety of viewpoints, by 
surveying people on their views of the general authority and legitimacy of the democratic 
political system. Furthermore it measures popular outlooks on democracy and measures 
the degree of confidence and trust citizens place on the political system.  The data was 
used to appraise the understanding of democracy, the support for democracy and the 
denunciation of alternatives in Botswana, the views on democratic institutions in 
Botswana as well as the level of trust and confidence in the government.  
 
The Meaning of Democracy in Botswana  
When asked “what if anything does democracy mean to you?” the modal response 
reflected a desire for civil liberties and personal freedoms (27 percent of respondents in 
1999 and 32 percent in 2005). The table below shows the distribution of all substantive 
responses offered.  
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Figure 4.1: The Meaning of Democracy in Botswana 
 
As is shown in Figure 4.1 above, Botswana citizens have no consensus over the 
meaning of democracy. However, over a third of respondents revere aspects of 
democracy such as civil liberties and personal freedoms. This reflects that democracy 
within Botswana society is conceptualized within the liberal paradigm in terms of civil 
and political rights. This is an interesting finding as it reflects a reshaping of cultural 
norms from its roots in Botswana, which historically were compatible with democratic 
ideals. The introduction of Christianity into Botswana’s society mainly affected this 
reconfiguration.  Botswana type democracy in common with Christian conservatism 
emphasizes traditional moral values such as on marriage and abortion. It also holds a 
view of the evolutionary development of society, as opposed to a revolutionary stance 
and emphasizes on law and order. It also advocates for the rejection of communism and 
emphasizes a support for market economy. This would greatly reflect the right-wing 
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politics of the Botswana Democratic Party which has gained popularity and legitimacy 
since independence.  
According to Rose et al (1998) democracy exists within two main paradigms: the 
intrinsic, where people view democracy as political and civic rights, and instrumental, 
where they view in terms of democracy’s substantive economic and developmental 
outcomes.  The Botswana case reflects equilibrium between the historical roots of 
democracy and the adoption the liberal paradigm as well as equilibrium between the 
intrinsic and the instrumental paradigms of democracy. This has enabled a smooth 
transition from pre- to post-colonial institutions, while keeping the core values of both 
intact, and essentially strengthening institutional quality in the process.  
 
The Support for Democracy and Rejection of Alternatives in Botswana  
When Botswana citizens were asked: Which of these statements is closest to your 
opinion? 
A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 
B. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 
C. For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have. 
As is depicted in the Figure 4.2 below, an overwhelming majority selected democracy 
as preferable to other forms of government (85percent in 1999, 66percent in 2003, 
69percent in 2005 and 85percent in 2008). Respondents were further asked whether they 
approved or disapproved with the following scenarios: 
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Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve 
of the following alternatives: The army comes in to govern the country? 
Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve 
of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and 
hold office? 
Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve 
of the following alternatives: Elections and Parliament/National Assembly are abolished 
so that the President/Prime Minister can decide everything? 
As is reflected in the Figure 4.2 below, Botswana citizens overwhelmingly reject 
military rule (85% in 1999, 79% in 2003, 80% in 2005 and 89% in 2008); reject one-
party rule (78% in 1999, 68% in 2003, 82% in 2005 and 80% in 2008) and reject one-
man rule (88% in 1999, 85% in 2003, 89% in 2005 and 93% in 2008.) 
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Figure 4.2: The Support of Democracy in Botswana 
 
As is reflected in Figure 4.2 the vast majority of Botswana citizens feel that there 
is no place for an unelected leader within political office, even under difficult 
circumstances. Democracy remains the overwhelming popular choice. Over the years, of 
Afrobarometer surveys, Botswana citizens have consistently rejected military rule, one-
party rule as well as one man-rule. These responses reflect that democratic institutions are 
firmly entrenched within Botswana’s political culture.  
 
Views on Democratic Institutions in Botswana  
When asked: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? 
Statement A or Statement B: 
A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest 
elections. 
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B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for 
choosing this country’s leaders.  
Figure 4.3 Views of Democratic Institutions in Botswana 
 
As shown in the Figure 4.3 above, over time, more Botswana citizens were 
agreeing with the need for regular, open and honest elections as the best way to select 
leaders with 76percent in 2003, 85percent in 2005 and 88percent of respondents in 2008 
endorsing this form of leadership selection.  This overwhelming result greatly reflects a 
democratic political culture which emphasizes free and fair competition when selecting 
representatives for holding official posts.  
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Figure 4.4 Freedom of Political Participation 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows that Botswana citizens feel overwhelmingly free to participate in 
political activities and to air out their views without fear from the government or any 
other forces threatening them. This reflects an endorsement of democratic institutions 
within Botswana as the most popular definition of democracy cited earlier in the section 
was the reverence to civil and political liberties.  
When citizens of a country greatly endorse the politics of their country, this 
enhances institutional quality and makes policy implementation more efficient. The 
endorsement and support given to the state by Botswana citizens through the evaluation 
of their politics as free and fair, enhances the democratic process and brings about 
disincentives for dissent and repressive behavior that undermines institutional quality. 
Afrobarometer data reflects that Botswana citizens greatly endorse liberal democratic 
values such as equal rights for women, free speech, and the rule of law. 72 percent agreed 
that "The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are 
wrong"; only 23percent agreed that "Since the President was elected to lead the country, 
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he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong" (Bennett, 
2005). This reflects Botswana citizens’ desire to check the powers of the president and to 
provide accountability to the residency institution. Seventy-three percent of Botswana 
respondents classified the country as “a full democracy” or “a democracy with minor 
problems” and only 3percent of citizens did not view the country as a democracy26.  This 
great endorsement of Botswana provides for its institutional quality.  
The following section views Botswana’s political culture in comparative 
perspectives.  
 
Botswana Political Culture in Comparative Perspective 
African exceptionalism has been used to analyze Africa’s divergent trajectory 
when it comes to variables such as democratization and development, both politically and 
economically. Truly, Africa is distinctive, with a dissimilar history and matchless 
experiences to other continents and world regions. For instance, no other continent has 
been disrupted by the dynamics of slavery and colonialism to the extent Africa has. And 
as a result, its political culture has reflected some of these peculiarities. One key feature 
is the prevalence of one-party states or de facto one-party states on the continent. 
Africanists have argued that the one-party model is most compatible with African culture 
and has long established a basis of rule across the continent (Nigeria Open University, 
2009). Pre-colonial Africa was characterized by community consensus within politics as 
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opposed to the competition basis of political parties and their opposition. Along similar 
lines Smith (2003) argues that one-party government in Africa was a reflection of 
autocratic form of government inherited from Africa’s traditional past and colonial 
history. Traditional African society had its own forms of democratic decision- making.  
In Smith’s words, “pluralism and multi-party democracy are not inherited from the past, 
multi-party democracy was too alien an importation for it to survive in the local political 
culture, traditions and history” (NOU, 2009: 143).  
This is also evident when comparing Botswana with other non-renewable natural 
resource exporters in Africa. One useful point of comparison is Nigeria.  Historic 
traditions have wrought an intricate modern political culture in Nigeria. This political 
culture is one characterized by ethnic conflict, corruption, and a politically active 
military, political practices that to a large extent are absent in Botswana. One persistent 
accolade conferred on Nigeria, according to Salisu (2002) is that it is one of, if not, the 
most corrupt country in the world. This branding of Nigeria is reflective of its recurrent 
succession of despotic regimes, disregard of human rights, political volatility and 
economic maladministration all which have contributed to cast Nigeria in opprobrium 
worldwide. These factors have also destabilized Nigeria's economic growth and 
development capacity, as well as compromising human development. 
When compared to Botswana, it is clear that most aspects that account for 
Nigeria’s volatile political culture are largely absent. Botswana is generally more 
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“ethnically homogenous27” than Nigeria empirically. In addition, the influence of Islam, 
although growing, is very minimal at best. Furthermore, Botswana is unified by a 
common political culture, that of BaTswana (as will be discussed in Chapter 5) whereas 
Nigeria has a mosaic of many ethnic and religious cultures, with no unifying force.  
Trust is an important component of political culture. Below is a comparison of the 
views of trust in Nigeria versus in Botswana of the institution of presidency. When asked 
“How much do you trust each of the following or haven’t you heard enough about them 
to say: The President?” 
Figure 4:5 Trust in the Institution of the Presidency: Nigeria vs. Botswana 
 
Figure 4.5 shows a great difference in the levels of trust that Botswana citizens 
and Nigerian citizens have towards their respective states. Whereas over 55percent of 
Botswana citizens trust their presidency a lot, more than 80percent of Nigerians trust 
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theirs somewhat, a little or not at all. Trust can also be extended to public servants and 
government officials and vice versa. When I was in Botswana, I went to the National 
Archives and had to pay P70 ($10) but had a P100 note. The lady did not have any 
change and told me that it was ok, I could pay the money the next time I come to the 
National Archives.  It wasn’t a lot of money, but she could have lost her job if records 
showed money was missing for a service provided. It just shows how much trust exists in 
Botswana between citizens and government officials. Another measure of trust is the 
prevalence and existence of corruption.  
When asked: “In the past year, how often, if ever, have you had to pay a bribe, 
give a gift, or do a favor to government officials in order to: Get a document or a 
permit?” the respondents from Nigeria and Botswana greatly differed. Figure 4:6 shows 
the percentage of respondents who paid bribes to government officials for documentation 
and permits. 
Figure 4:6 Percentage of Respondents who paid bribes to government 
officials
 
Source: Own, adopted from Afrobarometer, 2012 
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Figure 4:6 reflects an overwhelmingly corrupt political culture in Nigeria, with 
almost half of the respondents from the country admitting to paying bribes in order to get 
access to documents and permits.  This shows the propagation of informal patronage 
networks that exist in Nigeria which are not as prominent in Botswana. 
As Woods (2012) notes, the serious dilemmas that Nigeria faces today are a result 
of values established in the pre-colonial era which conflict with those established during 
colonialism. Political culture in Nigeria is characterized by clientelism, specifically 
neopatrimonialism (Kaiser, 2005). According to Kaiser (2005) neopatrimonialism is a 
term used for patrons using state resources as a mechanism of guaranteeing the allegiance 
of clients in the population. The “patron” grants favors to his “clients” otherwise denied 
to others, in order to buy their loyalty.   Such informal patron-client relationships can 
then penetrate various levels of state structures. In oil-exporting countries, a president 
may grant his clients privileged access to oil contracts and tenders, in exchange for their 
support. Similarly, as reflects in Figure 4.6, in exchange for basic social services, citizens 
have to pay officials bribes. This practice summons corruption, and it usually results in 
the larger society being deprived because the favors benefit a select few (Salisu, 2002).  
An added layer to neopatrimonialism in Nigeria is that patrons are generally 
linked to clients by ethnicity and religion. The difficulty with neopatrimonialism is that it 
may weaken or supplant the bureaucratic structure of the state. This is because only those 
with connections have the real power, not necessarily those who hold higher positions. 
Neopatrimonialism as a result undercuts political institutions and the rule of law. 
Nigeria’s undeveloped civil society guarantees that the state maintains control over 
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economic pursuits, individual actions, religious activities and political participation of 
Nigerians. According to Wood28, this characteristic reinforces clientelism and restricts the 
viability of democratic reform. 
In Nigeria there exists a tension between modernity and tradition. However, 
instead of emerging as a strong modern nation, Nigeria circumscribed its capability to 
reach that goal.  This was due to the subservience of its economic position as a colony 
albeit being a major producer of oil. Upon independence, modernity was thwarted by 
ethnic-based military conflicts and personalized, corrupt leadership practices.  The 
independence movement was a tension between reestablishing pre-colonial roots that 
emphasized communal accountability and creating a new state with proactive liberal 
ideals.  
  Yet another conflict characteristic which fashions Nigeria’s peculiar political 
culture is religious conflict. According to Lapidus (2002) Nigeria’s encounter with Islam 
dates back to the 9th century, where the religion began to influence northern Nigeria, at 
first coexisting with native religions, and finally supplanting them.  Christianity arrived 
much later, spreading rapidly and efficiently via European missionaries. Religion has had 
a polarizing effect in Nigeria, which has convoluted the country’s political development 
and democratic aspirations. One instance is the Muslim’s general endorsement of sharia, 
or religious law, as a valid part of political authority, to the dismay of Christians.  This is 
an ongoing debate and has isolated incidence of religious conflict and terrorist attacks. 
Religious conflict in Nigeria is exacerbated by geographical influences, with the north of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 http://phs.prs.k12.nj.us/ewood/sources.html  Accessed September 13, 2012 
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the country dominated by the largely Muslim Hausa/Fulani and the Kanuri, and the 
southwest and southeast dominated by the Yoruba and the Igbo respectively (Wood, 
2012).  The south also consists of a variety of small minority groupings particularly in the 
Niger Delta region. Unlike the north, the south is largely Christian. This demographic 
configuration creates a fragile fault-line, the Middle Belt, an area characterized by a mix 
of both Muslims and Christians and a volatile hotspot for religious conflict (Murdock, 
2012)29.  
The main differences between Botswana and Nigeria’s economic and political 
development can therefore be attributed to variations in political cultures. Botswana’s are 
based on trust, dialogue and consensus, while Nigeria’s political culture is characterized 
by are the informal institutions that lack of trust, corruption and violence.  This analysis 
of political culture can also be extended to other cases in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter aimed to show that there are cultural reasons for Botswana’s 
experience with political development that account for its economic success and 
institutional quality.  It understood Botswana’s political culture in evolutionary terms, as 
a population phenomenon that evolved through a process of selection and retention of 
variation of beliefs and the behavior they give rise to.  It argued that Botswana’s 
contemporary political culture has been the result of centuries of political socialization 
particularly within the context of Tswana customs and traditions. This is reflected in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/nigeria/120515/nigeria-jos-sectarian-violence  
144 
	  
country’s cultural foundations within institutions like the kgotla in pre-colonial times that 
were perpetuated into the post-colonial state due to a limited engagement with the 
colonial administration during the time of British occupation. Botswana’s political 
culture is one that is equilibrium between traditional roots that esteemed mutual criticism 
and dialogue over violence, as well as a ready embrace of the liberal paradigm that 
reveres civil liberties. Botswana’s cultures thus a mixture of the old and the new creating 
a balance. 
Botswana’s traditional political culture provided the foundation for a democratic 
culture post-independence. The country’s elite political culture has three tiers: 
pragmatism, dialogue and mutual criticism as well as consensus. Pragmatism allowed the 
elite to make the best decisions based on the resources and context at hand, and reflected 
the foundations of modern rational-legal authority.  Its culture of dialogue and mutual 
criticism reflected a desire to use words and diplomatic channels as opposed to resorting 
to arms when settling disputes. It also provided for participation, accountability and 
transparency among various stakeholders. Lastly, its political culture of consensus 
reflects its egalitarian principles, extending equal rights and opportunities to its elements.  
This research viewed individual views on authority and the state as greatly 
reflective the aggregate culture of the society. This constituted the country’s mass 
political culture. In general, Botswana citizens reflect a great deal of apathy towards the 
politics of their country. However, those that do participate in the political process greatly 
reflect a tremendous endorsement of the state. According to Afrobarometer data, 
Botswana citizens greatly esteem civil liberties and personal freedoms as key constituents 
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of democracy. Furthermore, they greatly show support for democracy, reject the one-
party state system, military rule and dictatorships. However, this research views mass 
political culture more as a facilitator of institutional quality rather that a key source. This 
is mainly it did not observe significant difference in the variation in mass political 
cultures across Africa.  A non-scientific survey of Afrobarometer data shows that they 
define democracy in more of less the same way as other African countries. For example, 
nearly 70percent of Nigerians endorsed democracy as preferable to other forms of rule, 
thus also reflecting a high preference towards democracy. This is therefore not a cultural 
attribute of Botswana citizens alone. It however facilitates elite political culture, which it 
deems as a more real source of institutional quality.   
In conclusion, the elite political culture of Botswana, coupled with the support of 
the masses, provided the foundation for good governance in Botswana thus contributing 
to its institutional quality. The following chapter will interrogate the role of ethnicity and 
identity management in Botswana’s institutional quality.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AS A SOURCE OF 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY IN BOTSWANA 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the third and final endogenous source of institutional 
quality in Botswana – ethnicity and identity management. One key reason cited for the 
relative instability and inability of African countries developing economically is the 
colonial legacy that left most states ethnically heterogeneous. In their seminal study, 
Easterly & Levine (1997) revealed that the growth rate of GDP per capita is inversely 
related to the degree of ethnic fractionalization in a society. They demonstrated that 
ethnic diversity accounts for the limited and negative economic performance that African 
countries have faced since independence. Their point of departure was the relative 
optimism that was characteristic of the 1960s in Africa, the decade when most African 
nations gained independence. Although African countries were expected to surpass the 
growth rates of their East Asian and Latin American counterparts, one key factor 
impeded this goal: their levels of ethnic diversity.  
African political boundaries were determined via a series of tragicomic 
negotiations in Berlin in 1884 among European powers, following an extensive 
“scramble for Africa”. The result was the division of some ethnic groups, the lumping 
together of many others, and the exacerbation of pre-existing levels of ethno-linguistic 
diversity in Africa. In addition, colonization forged many new large ethnic clusters from 
previously smaller identity groups. Botswana’s escape of the resource curse provides an 
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anomaly to the African trend of low economic growth and political instability which is 
explained as having resulted from ethnic heterogeneity. As a result, it is not far-fetched to 
assume that a counter-truth exists in Botswana, primarily because at face value, Botswana 
has the markings of an ethnically homogenous state. Over 78percent of the population 
speaks Setswana and nationally the citizens are known as Batswana, a noun derived from 
the Tswana ethnic group. This hints at the possibility of high levels of ethnic 
homogeneity. However, upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that Botswana is 
actually a result of a social experiment by early Tswana elite, implemented to 
pragmatically manage the perils of ethnic diversity and heterogeneity such as ethnic 
conflict and tribalism. This elaborate scheme was an assimilation policy that transformed 
Tswana identities and activated new norms within Tswana society.  
This chapter addresses how identities in Botswana were transformed and managed 
i.e. “constructed,” through the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period, in such a 
way that today they provide an example of peaceful coexistence. The Botswana case has 
been cited as an anomaly because not only has it escaped the economic resource curse, 
but also because it avoided the autocratic resource curse and the curse of violent conflict 
that most developing resource-rich countries have faced. As a result, Botswana exhibits 
three key indicators of institutional quality: economic development, democracy, and 
peace and stability. On the surface, Botswana seems like a discernibly ethnically 
homogenous society. Over 80percent of the population speaks Setswana at home, and 
with the exception of the BaSarwa identity group, access to resources brought about by 
the country’s diamond wealth have been accessible universally to Botswana citizens, 
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regardless of ethno-linguistic background (Andersson and Janson, 1997). However, upon 
deeper analysis, it is clear that this assumption is misguided, as the Botswana case 
illustrates a peculiar case of identity assimilation. Paradoxically, this assimilation 
accounts for peaceful coexistence in Botswana albeit at the expense of “minority”30 
cultures. The extent to which the country is “homogenous”, linguistically at least, is a 
reality created by colonial and post-colonial authorities. It is a classic case of how social 
construction of ethnic categories emerged from an interaction between fluid identity 
groups with their rulers. Hence, this chapter identifies mostly with the constructivist 
theory of ethnic and identity formation. 
 Blagojevic (2009) maintains that ethnic conflict occur as a result of the 
convergence of specific sets of factors and conditions. These situations could include 
structural crises, presence of historical recollections of inter-ethnic grievances, 
institutional factors that promote ethnic prejudice, and manipulation of historical 
memories by political entrepreneurs to evoke fear, resentment and hate toward the 
“other” and an inter-ethnic competition over resources and rights. This dissertation finds 
this model particularly convincing, and also agrees with the counter-argument that when 
such factors and conditions are absent, the non-occurrence of ethnic conflict can be 
observed.  
The goal of this chapter is to determine the role of ethnic dynamics in Botswana 
in institution building and subsequently in assisting its escape from the resource curse. It 
will attempt to uncover why Botswana has not been susceptible to the negative effects of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The word “minority” in this instance bears no numerical significance as is described later.   
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ethnic dynamics that are prevalent across sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter is divided as 
follows. First, it will outline some of the key conceptual frameworks of the identity 
management with a focus on constructivism.  Through a close longitudinal examination 
of Botswana’s pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial ethnic history, the research found 
that although Botswana is as ethnically diverse like any other country, the state 
“managed” the identity of the country in a way to mitigate the negative impacts otherwise 
associated with ethnic heterogeneity. This in turn made the country more stable than 
would be otherwise expected. 
The chapter will first provide a review of literature on the impact of ethnic 
dynamics on development, democracy and peace and stability. It will then look at the 
ethnic make-up of Botswana, paying close attention to how Botswana differs from other 
African states and resource exporting countries.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF ARGUMENT 
Ethnicity and Identity: Definitions and Perspectives 
Ethnicity has been one of the most contentious terms to characterize and define 
with varying perspectives accounting for the strength of ethnic identity.  A myriad of 
definitions and theories of how ethnicity can be understood have emerged over the last 
decades. According to Hutchinson and Smith (1996), the term “ethnicity” has its English 
origins connected to the term “ethnic,” used to reference collectives of social 
organization such as bands, tribes, races or peoples. However, during colonial times, the 
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term evolved into a dichotomy of “Us” and “Them” with the former being viewed as the 
majority non-ethnics and the “Them” viewed as “ethnic.” Concepts related to the term 
have developed along with the analysis of ethnicity, including ethnic identity, ethnic 
origin, ethnocentrism, and ethnicism (Hutchinson and Smith 1996:4–5). 
Early accounts of ethnic identity or origin used it as a reference point to an 
individual’s ancestral heritage. As Berreman (1972) argues, ethnicity is but one level of 
social stratification that is distinct from race or class. Ascribed from birth, ethnicity 
however normally defines its cultural characteristics itself. However, ethnic 
classifications are usually defined by outside groups to stereotype and oversimplify 
cultural processes.  
This dissertation adopts Chandra (2012)’s rendering of ethnic groups as subsets of 
categories in which descent-based attributed are necessary for membership. According to 
Hutchinson and Smith (1996:6–7) {in Baumann, 2004:1} the six main attributes of an 
ethnic group are:  
“….a common proper name, to identify and express the “essence” of the 
community; a myth of common ancestry that includes the idea of common origin in time 
and place and that gives an ethnie a sense of fictive kinship; shared historical memories, 
or better, shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and their 
commemoration; one or more elements of common culture, which need not be specified 
but normally include religion, customs, and language; a link with a homeland, not 
necessarily its physical occupation by the ethnie, only its symbolic attachment to the 
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ancestral land, as with diaspora peoples; and a sense of solidarity on the part of at least 
some sections of the ethnie’s population.”  
This list is adopted throughout this chapter as a reference for distinguishing 
between one ethnic or sub-ethnic group from another and gives each group individual 
characteristics.  
Three theoretical perspectives have dominated the literature on ethnicity: 
primordial, instrumental and constructivist (Chandra, 2012). The primordial theory of 
ethnic identity argues that there is a biological link between members of the same ethnic 
group and assumes that this identity is hard to remove from. The instrumental identity 
theory places an emphasis on the role of ethnic entrepreneurs who heighten the 
importance of identities in order to lay claim to government resources, gain a greater 
number of recruits to a particular identity and increase their personal power. The 
constructivist perspective proposes that ethnic identities are in a constant process of 
construction and redefinition and as such are highly dependent on a variety of factors. It 
contends that ethnic identities arise from a “dense web of social interactions.” 
Constructivists opine identities as products of historical occurrences, often recent, even 
when they are presented as old (O’Neil, 2013). Among the criticisms leveled at the 
constructivist perspective of ethnic identity are that the claims associated with this theory 
tend to be both vague and applicable to only a single, specific setting. Although a lot 
about the Botswana case can be viewed through the lens of the primodialist perspectives, 
whereby there are organic links and bloodlines shared within the varying identity groups, 
as well as through the instrumentalist perspectives, as a result of grand political strategy, 
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this dissertation is of the persuasion that it is best understood by viewing ethnicity as a 
product of human agency. As will be illustrated in this chapter, in Botswana, 
commonalities such as language, cultural practices and political organization became 
woven into the consciousness of shared identity through an elaborate post-colonial 
assimilation policy thus greatly reflects the constructivist understanding.  
 
Ethnic Heterogeneity and Development 
Various indications of how ethnic diversity affects economic growth have been 
posited including low public goods provision (Habyarimana et al, 2007);  inferior 
government performance (La Porta,1999);   low school attainment and  higher market 
distortions captured by the black market premium (Goren, 2013). Montalvo and Reynol-
Querol (2005) argue that ethnically diverse societies have a higher probability of ethnic 
conflicts and civil war which in turn negatively impact investment. They maintain that 
ethnic diversity generates high levels of corruption and deters the diffusion of 
technological innovations. Ethnic heterogeneity’s effects are also exacerbated by the 
existence of non-renewable resources leading to the promulgation of patron-client 
relationships as well as violent conflict over resources along ethnic lines (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2000; Ross 2004). 
Ethnic diversity and heterogeneity has been linked to a plethora of effects ranging 
from conﬂicts of preferences, racism, prejudices which often lead to suboptimal policies 
as we as to the oppression of minorities with the possibility of descent into political 
instability or civil war (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004). Habyarimana et al (2007) identify 
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a number of mechanisms in which ethnic heterogeneity leads to the impediment of both 
human and economic development stemming from an undermining of the provision of 
public goods. They argue that different ethnic groups have varying preferences for 
different types of public goods as a result of geographic concentration, linguistic and 
cultural differences. These inclinations range from the aspiration to have certain 
languages of instruction in schools to the ability to observe cultural and religious 
holidays. This variance of tastes among ethnic groups may facilitate for the under-
provision of broader public goods.  Furthermore, they argue that the effective delivery of 
public goods is expedited by sets of strategies for encouraging collective action that are 
available to co-ethnics to the exclusion of non-co-ethnics. On the one hand, this is due to 
efficacy. Homogenous communities usually draw on the commonality of culture, 
language giving them an advantage in public goods production. They share 
understandings about modes of interaction that facilitate for communal cooperation. This 
collective cultural material advances prospects for effective collective action e.g. ability 
to communicate strategies, that heterogeneous groups lack. On the other hand, this may 
be due to shared membership in a social network which the authors argue enables co-
ethnics to identify and thus punish non-cooperators. 
Lastly, Habyarimana et at (2007) identify a strategy selection mechanism and 
posit that individuals’ cooperative behaviors are contingent on the ethnicity of the people 
with whom they are interacting.  By employing a game theoretic framework, they 
illustrate a game in which contributing to a public good is a preferred strategy if and only 
if one believes that others will contribute. They argue that when individuals assume co-
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ethnics will cooperate and non-ethnics will not, these expectations will be self-fulfilling 
under the Nash equilibrium solution conception. Public goods production is reliant on 
expectations for reciprocal cooperation where shirking is reprimanded. Sanctioning 
produced norms and social institutions of cooperation and defector punishment thus 
creating a cooperative equilibrium. Such norms are assumed to exist exclusively within 
ethnic groups but not across them. An underlying assumption is that co-ethnic 
cooperation will be reciprocated under threat of sanctioning while cooperation with non-
co-ethnics will not. As a result the provision of public goods will be advanced in 
homogeneous communities, where the norm/social institution applies to everyone, than in 
heterogeneous communities, where potential cooperating partners are sometimes 
excluded.  This dissertation reflects some of Habyarimana (2007)’s logic on mechanisms 
of impeding development and argues that using this knowledge Botswana elites 
pragmatically paved a path to better ethnic management in order to confront the 
anticipated perils of ethnic heterogeneity. By promoting the concept of Tswanadom, they 
created and managed a fluid identity that would help them escape the perils of ethnic 
heterogeneity.  
 
Ethnicity and Resource Conflict 
The study of ethnic conflict follows a long tradition, coming to prominence in the 
post-World War II era. In a study, Fearon and Laitin (2003) identified no less than 59 
ethnic wars between 1945 and 1999, consisting of a majority of the total number of civil 
wars. The study has since drawn analytic consideration in the aftermath of the Cold War, 
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particularly following the Yugoslav Wars.  These events were characterized by ethnic 
conflicts that escalated into violence and civil war, leading to academics including 
Huntington and Kaplan to predict a proliferation of wars driven by civilizational 
upheavals, tribalism, resource scarcity and overpopulation. However, ethnic conflict is by 
neither universal, nor constant over time. Instead, for the greater part, ethnically 
heterogeneous societies, in many countries coexist peacefully and those which engage in 
conflict experience long periods of fairly harmonious ethnic relations before and after 
periods of conflict (Caselli and Coleman, 2011). That has been the case in Botswana.  
As recounted in detail in Chapter 2, ethnic cleavages are even more pronounced in 
cases where non-renewable natural resources constitute a significant portion of a 
country’s national product.  According to Klare (1999) the geography of conflict is 
currently skewed towards countries with large oil and gas reserves. Similarly, natural 
resources have been motives for violent secessionist movements as in Cabinda, Angola, 
Aceh, Indonesia and Biafra, Nigeria. As Esman (1994) contends, this comes about due to 
the assumption that when a constituent of a specific ethnic group seized control of the 
state, essential economic assets are soon transferred to the supporters of that community. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) debated on whether it was greed or grievance that 
provided for a motive for violent conflict over the control of profitable geologic 
resources. The first of the two scenarios is one motivated by rebel greed and the potential 
for economic benefits. Combatants are roused by a material calculation of advantage, 
performing cost-benefit analyses to examine the benefits of joining a rebellion. However, 
in the grievance approach, rebellion is over issues of identity, such as religion, ethnicity 
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and social class, as opposed to economics. This study assumes Keen (2012)’s assertion 
that both greed and grievance influence development of a conflict. 
 Blagojevic (2009) argues that ethnic conflict requires a smorgasbord of 
converging factors and conditions. These conditions could include significant structural 
crises, existence of historical memories of inter-ethnic grievances, institutional influences 
that stimulate ethnic intolerance, and manipulation of historical recollections by political 
entrepreneurs to evoke sentiments such as fear, resentment and hate toward the “other”. 
In addition, inter-ethnic competition over resources and rights may exacerbate conflict. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates Blagojevic’s claim.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Causes of Ethnic Conflict (Source: Adopted from Blagojevic) 
 
The history of Botswana has very few instances of violent conflict among ethnic 
or identity groups. Within the context of Figure 5.1, Botswana’s history as observed in 
Chapter 3 experienced only minor structural change as a colony. In addition, its history is 
not a history of tribal and ethnic grievance.  Most instances of violence have been 
instigated by agents external to the state as was the case in the Battle of Dimawe, which 
was an attack from the Boers, The first Matabele War, which was an attack from the 
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Ndebeles and the Jameson Raid, a botched attack on the Transvaal Republic by 
Rhodesian and Bechuanaland police led by colonial statesman Leander Starr Jameson. 
However, this is not to say that some identity clusters have not been marginalized. 
Figure 5.2 Causes of Ethnic Conflict: Theoretical Elements 
As depicted in Figure 5.2, Blagojevic (2009) argues that the primodialist approach 
accounts for the role of emotions and the conflict potential of ethnicity. She states that the 
existence of ancient hatred among ethnic and cultural groups and the urge to define “fear” 
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and reject the “other” is natural and primal, dating back to human’s remotest ancestors 
and their animal predecessors. According to this view, human beings are conditioned 
towards exhibiting xenophobic tendencies and intolerance, even to a greater degree than 
they are to be influences by liberal politics of interest. She illustrates the “institutional”; 
“political entrepreneur” and “competition over resources” approaches as interfaces of 
institutional and political factors with ethnic sentiments that result in ethnification, ethnic 
intolerance, competition and ultimately violent conflict. For the instrumental approach 
Blagojevic (2009) cites Crawford who argues that the functionality of state institutions 
affects the fate of identity politics which inspire violent conflict. She claims that states 
are capable of guiding identity politics into diplomatic political competition provided that 
credible assurances are made to shape and uphold agreements made among culturally 
demarcated actors. Conversely, political mobilization along ethnic lines is stimulated 
where the state’s administrative institutions and legal structures allocate resources on the 
basis of ethnicity. Under the political entrepreneurial conceptual framework, Blagojevic 
maintains that	  a “perfect” condition in which political entrepreneurs can manipulate 
ethnic emotions for the purpose of mobilizing groups for their own political purposes, 
occurs when instability and uncertainty arise from major structural changes. This is 
because the resultant institutions are inept to regulate inter-ethnic relations. Ethnic 
differences are thus exploited by politicians as they draw upon historical memories of 
grievances and embolden hatred in order to reinforce their authority. The dynamic that 
results between political entrepreneurs and their followers creates an inter-ethnic security 
dilemma. Finally, Blagojevic presents the “competition over resources” element. In this 
approach, resource scarcity allows the capitalization on the conflict potential of ethnicity 
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by political entrepreneurs.  Blagojevic tries to integrate these approaches to 
understanding ethnic conflict. In the case of Botswana however, the opposite can be said 
to be true. Instead of exploiting ethnic differences, Botswana’s governing elite decided to 
use ethnic similarities as a unifying force in order to create a national identity based off of 
existing realities and histories. As a result, understanding of the Botswana case borrows 
from various inspirations and adaptations.  
Caselli and Coleman (2011) adopted the UNDP measure of “ethnic distance” in 
ascertaining some factors that could lead to conflict from those who do not. According to 
UNDP (2005), “ethnic distances” describes the degree of understanding and intimacy 
between members of different identity groups, which is manifested in readiness to 
establish more or less close social relationships with members of this group, or lack 
thereof. Caselli and Coleman (2011) view natural resources as providing an incentive for 
subsets of agents to form groups to wrest control of these assets from the rest of the 
population. They argue that the victorious group allocates resources to ensure the 
exclusion of non-members because infiltration would result in less dividends being 
shared among the original group. The authors’ key idea is that when groups are 
formulated along ethnic lines, ethnic identity becomes a marker to recognize potential 
infiltrators. They argue that ethnicity provides a technology for group membership and 
exclusion, which is used to avoid indiscriminate access to the spoils of conflict. 
Caselli and Coleman (2011) define ethnic distance as the costs to be borne by a 
member of one group to successfully pass him or herself as a member of another group. 
Hence, the assumption is that ethnic distance is greater when there are differences in skin 
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color and other physical characteristics that make passing for a member of a specific 
group all but impossible. They argue that in instances of religious diversity, ethnic 
distance is relatively high. They however view language as a weak source of distance as 
potential infiltrators can easily learn to speak the other’s language. Therefore, , ethnic 
cleavages marked by a shared sense of identity or history, unsubstantiated by differences 
of race, religion or language, are usually associated with the lower  levels of ethnic 
distance. Their ethnic distance theory helps explain the persistent disadvantage of 
African-Americans in the United States and apartheid in South Africa based on 
pigmentation and the genocide in Rwanda based on complexion and body size. However, 
according to their theory religious conflicts as exemplified by and language barriers as 
exemplified by the massacre of Haitians who failed to pronounce the word “perejil” 
correctly in the Dominican Republic, lead to less levels of conflict as these are easier for 
people to “pass.”  
Caselli and Coleman’s argument is of particular relevance to this chapter as it argues 
that Botswana elite implemented an assimilationist policy in order to artificially reduce 
the “ethnic distance” in Botswana society. This had the impact of creating peace, albeit 
artificially, with the policy being successful for removing discernible ethnic differences 
such as language difference. This created a society reminiscent of a homogenous state. 
The main strategy was to create artificial “co-ethnics” in order to ameliorate the perils of 
ethnic diversity that would otherwise lead to conflict and the undermining of goods and 
service provision. The following sections will describe Botswana’s primordial ethnic 
groupings and how they evolved assimilated into a new constructed identity category.  
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ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA 
Ethnicity and Identity Groups in Botswana: Description 
The ethnic composition of Botswana is highly subjective and mostly a reflection 
of who is asked and how they determine what an ethnic group is and what is not. 
According to Nyati-Ramahobo (1991), there are about 50 distinct indigenous groups in 
Botswana speaking about 26 languages. The Khoisan are classified into eleven main 
ethnic groups and speak about 23 languages and dialects. The rest of the languages and 
ethnic groups are Bantu, with eight of them speaking Setswana as their mother tongue. 
Currently the only comprehensive list of identity groups in Botswana is provided by the 
Reteng 2005 as is depicted in Tables 5:1; 5:2 and 5:3: 
Table 5.1 Tswana Tribes Bantu (The recognized tribes) 
 Tribe  Population (2001 census) 
Bakgatla 108000 
Bakwena  60 000 
Bamalete  20 000 
Bangwaketse 40 000 
Bangwato 18 000 
Barolong  47 000 
Batawana   2 000 
Batlokwa  10 000 
Total 305, 000 (17.9 %).  
Source: Reteng 2005 
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Table 5.2: Marginalized Bantu Identity Groups 
Tribe Population 
1.       Babirwa 69 000 
2.       Baboloungwe*  40 000 
3.       Bagciriku 5 000 
4.       Bahurutshe  9 000 
5.       Bakaa 18000 
6.       Bakalanga  276000 
7.       Bakgothu  19 000 
8.       Bakgwatheng*  12 000 
9.       Bakhurutshe 18 000 
10.    Bakwangali 2 000 
11.    Banabjwa 9 000 
12.    Bangologa * 7 000 
13.    Baphaleng * 14 000 
14.    Barotsi  4000 
15.    Bashaga * 189 000 
16.    Batalaote  5 000 
17.    Batlhware 23 000 
18.    Batshweneng 8 000 
19.    Batswapong  58 000 
20.    Vekuhane  19 000 
21.    Hambukushu   49 000 
22.    Ndebele  2 000 
23.    ovaHerero  29 000 
24.    ovaMbanderu  30 000 
25.    Wayeyi   65 000 
Total  Bantu 974 000  
Source: Reteng 2005 
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Table 5.3 Marginalized Khoisan (BaSarwa) 
Tribe Population 
||Gana 8 000 
|Gwi 5 000 
≠Ηυα  3000 
Ju|’hoan 5 000 
Shua 7 000 
Khwedam 8 000 
Naro 10 000 
≠Κξ?αυ | |ειν  4 000 
Tsowa 5000 
!Xóo 850 
Kua 600 
Nama 1500 
Total  57 500  
*  = Bakgalagadi = Total is 272 000  
 
Total Marginalized  1,  030  000 (unrecognized population (60%)    
Source: Reteng 2005 
 
According to these Tables 5:1, 5:2 and 5:3, when grouped together, BaTswana are 
the largest ethnic group in Botswana. However BaKalanga are the largest tribal group. 
However, they do not form a majority ethnic group, as they only account for 17.9percent 
of the total population.  In this dissertation, the term “tribe” will be used to describe a 
social group that existed before the development of the post-colonial state and is largely 
based on kinship and descent. Hence, BaTlokwa and BaKwena would be described as 
different tribes, but as one ethnic group, BaTswana. The term “ethnic group” will be 
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defined along ethno-linguistic lines. Therefore groups that speak the same language as a 
first language will be considered “co-ethnics”. With this designation, the term BaTswana 
would be used to describe all “tribes” who speak Setswana as a first language, as is done 
in Botswana. As ethnic groups in Botswana are delineated along linguistic fault lines, the 
rest of the identity groups listed in Tables 5.2 and 5:3 are interchangeably considered 
both tribes and ethnic groups.  
It is important to note that although BaKwena, BamaLete, BaNgwaketse, 
BaTawana and other tribal groups that speak Setswana as their primary language are 
significantly less in numbers than BaKalanga, it is BaKalanga who are considered as a 
minority ethnic group in Botswana and not the Tswana groups. This is because in 
Botswana, the term minority has very little numerical value but bears considerable 
political significance. As Nyati-Ramahobo (1991) argues, from an ethnic and linguistic 
viewpoint, it is inaccurate to speak of majority and minority groups, but rather of 
marginalized versus non-marginalized linguistic and ethnic groups in Botswana. This 
study simply distinguishes between those who speak Setswana as mother tongue from 
those who speak it as a second language. Each of the 8 indigenous groups whose mother 
tongue is Setswana, are thus considered BaTswana, a majority group. As a result, 
BaKalanga, which is numerically the largest single identity group in Botswana, will be 
considered a “minority group” due to its suboptimal political influence and due to the fact 
that its constituents speak Setswana as a second language. The tribes which speak 
Setswana as a first language are listed alphabetically in Table 5.1 as  BaKgatla, 
BaKwena, BamaLete, BaNgwaketse, BaNgwato, BaRolong, BaTawana and BaTlokwa.  
165 
	  
In Botswana, in terms of national identity, both first-language Setswana speakers 
and second language Setswana speakers embrace the Tswana culture as their national 
heritage in accordance with the assimilationist model, which will be described in greater 
detail later in this chapter, and consider themselves “BaTswana31”.  In this dissertation 
however, I will describe the national identity as “Botswana citizenship” and its 
constituents as “Botswana citizens” to avoid confusion. 
The following sections will discuss the evolution of identities in Botswana from 
pre-colonial, through colonial and to post-colonial periods.  
 
Historical Ethnic Relations in Botswana: Pre-Colonial 
 
The Khoisan (BaSarwa) are commonly considered to have been the earliest 
inhabitants of territorial Botswana, with Bantu speaking populations arriving later. 
According to archeological evidence, the latter’s settlement dates back to the era of the 
Bantu migration. Schapera (1953) argues that they the Tswana separated from the core 
body of Bantu-speaking peoples somewhere in the vicinity of the Great Lakes of East 
Africa in three series of migrations. The first series is represented today by the people 
collectively known as BaKgalagadi, who settled in the eastern, more fertile part of 
Botswana. The second migration was the ancestors of the BaRolong and BaTlhaping who 
settled south and west of Botswana. These two groups absorbed some BaSarwa 
(Khoisan) and BaKgalagadi predecessors, most of who later retreated before them into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In most texts on the country, the term BaTswana refers to anyone who holds Botswana citizenship 
regardless of ethnicity, race, religion, tribe, language.  
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the arid zones of the Kalahari Desert. The third and greatest migration brought the 
ancestors of all the other Sotho tribes. In his ethnographical study, Ian Schapera (1953:3) 
states that the Tswana are one of three major divisions into which ethnologists and 
linguists usually classify as the Sotho group of Bantu- speaking people of central 
Southern Africa. The other two are distinguished as the “Southern Sotho” of modern day 
Lesotho, and the “Northern, Eastern or Transvaal Sotho” of modern day Transvaal, South 
Africa. The Tswana correspondingly are sometimes termed “Western Sotho”.  
The main Tswana ruling groups are thought to have established themselves in 
Botswana in the 18th century. These included the BaKwena, BaNgwaketse and 
BaNgwato. According to Bennet (2002) these dominant Tswana groups displaced, 
absorbed, or subjugated the rest of the ethnic groups when they first established 
themselves in the territory. By this view, the BaSarwa who were seen as having been pre-
agricultural hunter-gatherers since time immemorial began losing out steadily to more 
advanced groups, first the BaKgalagadi and then BaTswana. 
The period of 1815 to 1840 was a period of widespread chaos and warfare among 
indigenous ethnic communities in southern Africa. Historically this period is referred to 
as the Mfecane32 (Zulu) or Difaqane (Sesotho). As King Shaka transformed the 
militaristic Zulu Kingdom, his forces caused a wave of warfare and disruption to sweep 
to other peoples and territories, north of the Zulu Kingdom which is modern day 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Series of Zulu and other Nguni wars and forced migrations in the early 19th century that changed the 
demographic, social, and political configuration of southern and central Africa. Set in motion by the rise of 
the Zulu military kingdom under Shaka, it took place in the context of drought, social unrest, and 
competition for trade. Ethnic group was set against ethnic group in an ever-increasing radius, resulting in 
the creation of large refugee populations as well as the establishment of new kingdoms under the Basuto, 
Gaza, Ndebele, and Swazi peoples. 
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Botswana. This greatly altered the configuration of power among Tswana and non-
Tswana populations in that the Tswana chiefdoms were quick to recover and were 
successful in rapidly incorporating new groups within their society in a process of 
snowball growth. The non-Tswana groups were not so lucky. The BaSarwa whose main 
livelihoods were hunting and gathering were relegated to the periphery of Tswana merafe 
(populace) and forced to rely on foraging..   
As discussed in Chapter 3, pre-colonial Botswana was made up of a constellation 
of Tswana-ruled kingdoms and proto-states referred to as merafe (singular morafe). In 
most cases, merafe were multi-ethnic clusters, with the larger, the Ngwato and the 
Tawana states being more heterogeneous than the others. A complex system of hierarchy 
existed in the various groups and the status of those considered non-Tswana, varied. The 
main categories were commoners such as the BaKalanga, “foreigners” such as the 
BaHerero, and serfs such as the BaSarwa and many BaKgalagadi. In order to exercise 
rights, one had to be a member of an organized ward as opposed to a subject of any given 
morafe. This designation greatly excluded a majority of BaSarwa.  
BaKalanga are currently Botswana’s largest tribal group in numerical terms, 
however, they are generally considered Botswana’s largest minority group in political 
terms as a result of Tswana subjugation. Historically, the BaKalanga are considered 
“western Shona” corresponding to the Shona people of Zimbabwe with whom they share 
common ancestry from the Shona states of Mapungubwe, Great Zimbabwe, Torwa and 
Rozvi states. According to Tlou and Campbell, as these states lost power, gradual 
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migration occurred of the BaKalanga westward toward Khami. They argue that they 
settled permanently in the area that is now a part of eastern Botswana.   
Zibani Maundeni argues that an alternative explanation of how primordial identity 
groups in Botswana emerged comes from the notion of totems. Totemism is a central 
concept in southern African culture and religion and is one of the longest lasting cultural 
traditions. A totem is defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “a being, object, or 
symbol representing an animal or plant that serves as an emblem of a group of people, 
such as a family, clan, group, lineage, or tribe, reminding them of their ancestry (or 
mythic past)33.” Totems exist in almost every culture in southern Africa. In most cultures 
a person may not eat the meat or any food derivative of their totem. Secondly, they are 
not to marry any person of the same totem. Thirdly, they associate their totem with good 
luck and fortune and usually a person thanks via the reciting of poetry about the person’s 
particular totem. According to Schapera (1953), totemism is patrilineal but non-
exogamous. There are certain myths as to how each totem came about. People could not 
kill or eat their totem, nor touch its skin; and should they inadvertently do so, they were 
to undergo a purification ceremony to avoid illness or other misfortune. It is also 
considered polite to address or greet a person by the name of his totem. Apart from these 
usages, and the belief in common origin, there is no special bond among members of a 
totem group. In many cultures, in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, totems are still 
highly revered. What makes totemism peculiar is that people adhere to their totems 
regardless of ethnic-linguistic or tribal membership. Whether a person is Shona from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/totem  
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Zimbabwe, Kalanga from eastern Botswana, from Lesotho or from South Africa, they 
have a totem attached to their family name and lineage.  
Table 5.4 illustrates the totems of the Sotho-Tswana clans. 
Table 5.4: Botswana Tribes and Totems  
Tribe Name Language Country Totem Split from 
BaBirwa Setswana Botswana Nare (Buffalo)  
BaFokeng Sesotho, 
Setswana 
Lesotho, South Africa 
(North West, Free State) 
Mmutla, Kwena 
(Rabbit/Crocodile) 
 
BaFula Sesotho Lesotho, South Africa (Free 
State) 
Kolobe (Wild Hog)  
BaGananwa Sesotho sa 
Lebowa 
South Africa Limpopo Tshwene Baboon) BaHurutshe 
BaHlakwana Sesotho Lesotho, South Africa (Free 
State) 
Tlou (Elephant)  
BaHurutshe Setswana Botswana, South Africa 
(North West) 
Tshwene (Baboon)  
BaKgaga Sesotho sa 
Lebowa 
South Africa (Limpopo) Kwena (Crocodile) BaKwena 
BaKgalagadi Setswana Botswana   
BaKgalagadi 
BaBoalongwe 
Setswana Botswana   
BaKgalagadi – 
BaNgologa 
Setswana Botswana, Namibia   
BaKgalagadi – 
BaPhaleng 
Setswana Botswana   
BaKgalagadi – 
BaShaga 
Setswana Botswana   
BaKgatla Sesotho, 
Setswana 
Lesotho, Botswana, South 
Africa 
Kgabo, (Eagle; 
Monkey) 
BaHurutshe 
BaKhurutshe Setswana Botswana Tshwene/Phofu 
(Baboon/Elands) 
BaHurutshe 
BaKone Sesotho ba 
Lebowa 
South Africa (Limpopo) Scaly feathered 
finch 
 
BaKubung Setswana  Kubu 
(Hippopotamus) 
BaRolong 
BaKwena Sesotho, 
Setswana, 
Sesotho sa 
Lebowa 
 Kwena (Crocodile)  
BamaLete Setswana Botswana Nare (Buffalo)  
BaNareng Sesotho, 
Setswana 
 Nare (Buffalo)  
BaNgwaketse Setswana Botswana Kwena (Crocodile) BaKwena 
BaNgwato Setswana Botswana Phuti (Duiker)  
BaPai Sesotho ba South Africa (Limpopo)   
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Lebowa 
BaPedi Sesotho sa 
Lebowa 
 Noko (Porcupine) BaKgatla 
BaPhalane Sesotho  Kwena (Crocodile) BaKwena 
BaPhiri Setswana  Phiri (Hyena)  
BaPhuting Sesotho  Duiker  
BaPo Setswana  Kwena (Crocodile) BaKwena 
BaRokologadi Setswana  Noko (Porcupine)  
BaRolong Setswana  Tholo (Wildebeest)  
BaSia Sesotho  katse (Wild Cat) BaKgatla 
BaTau Sesotho ba 
Lebowa 
South Africa (Limpopo) Tau (Lion)  
BaTaung Sesotho, 
Setswana, 
Sesotho sa 
Lebowa 
South Africa Tau (Lion) BaHurutshe 
BaTawana Batswana Botswana Tholo (Kudu) BaNgwato 
BaTlhako Setswana South Africa Tlou (Elephant)  
BaTlhaping Setswana South Africa, Namibia Tholo ba nina 
Tlhapi (Kudu/Fish) 
BaRolong 
BaTlharo Setswana  Tshwene (Baboon)  
BaTlhware Setswana  Tshwene (Baboon)  
BaTlokwa Sesotho, 
Setswana, 
Sesotho sa 
Lebowa 
 Noko, Nkwe, 
Thakadu (Wild 
Cat) 
BaKgatla 
BaTloung Setswana  Tlou (Elephant)  
BaTsatsing   Letsatsi (Sun)  
BaTshweneng Sesotho, 
Setswana, 
Sesotho sa 
Lebowa 
 Tshwene (Baboon) BaHurutshe 
BaTtswapong Setswana Botswana hare or kgope  
Makgolokwe Sesotho  phuthi (small buck)  
Makgwakgwa Sesotho    
Makololo  Zambia Kwena (Crocodile) BaFokeng 
Mapulana Sesotho ba 
Lebowa 
South Africa (Limpopo) Tau (Lion)  
BaKopa Sesotho ba 
Lebowa 
South Africa (Limpopo)   
BaKutswe Sesotho ba 
Lebowa 
South Africa (Limpopo)   
BaRoka Sesotho ba 
Lebowa 
 Tau (Lion)  
BaKwena Ba 
MaThebe(AKA 
BaNtwane) 
Setswana South Africa Kwena (Crocodile) 
Tholo & Kgabo 
BaNgwato, 
BaRolong & 
BaKgatla 
Source: Racionzer, 2013 page 3-4 
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Maundeni’s main argument against the notion of ethnicity in Botswana is that at 
some point in time all bearers of the same totem had the same origin. So if a person’s 
totem in Zimbabwe is a lion, and another in Lesotho or Botswana is a lion, then he argues 
that at some point they originated from the same ancestor and hence constitute a blood tie 
that does not correspond with the current delineation of ethnic groups. In practice, in 
southern Africa, despite the perceived tribal/ethno-linguistic orientation, the same rules of 
totemism still apply, particularly those that surrounds issues of marriage. Despite a 
person being a Tswana, Sotho, Zulu, Shona, Kalanga or Ndebele, if their totem is the 
lion, they cannot marry each other. This research is of the view that the fluidity of 
totemism in southern Africa provided a structural basis for peaceful coexistence among 
otherwise diverse ethnic groups. 
Pre-colonial Botswana set the stage for some of the identity undercurrents that 
would later characterize contemporary Botswana. BaKalanga became a minority because 
they were viewed as “foreigners” as their ancestry was external to the land that is now 
modern Botswana. BaSarwa and BaKgalagadi subjugation in Tswana society predated 
the creation of the Botswana state and hence were not products of any colonial enterprise. 
However, as will be seen in the following section, colonialism did further subjugate 
minority ethnic groups in Botswana further exacerbating Tswana hegemony.  
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The Transformation of Botswana Ethnic Identities and Attitudes during 
Colonialism  
The colonial period in Botswana was a period of transformation particularly in 
terms of consolidation of societal hierarchy among the various identity groups in the 
country. In most other parts of Africa, British colonial administrators employed ‘divide 
and conquer’ tactics in relation to ethnic groups, a situation blamed for contemporary 
ethnic violence and political unrest. This was not the case in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate, where colonialists preferred to maintain the power of the chiefs as the most 
convenient form of government, thus maintaining the status quo. As they were larger, the 
colonialists opted to engage primarily with the Tswana groups and their efforts and 
interests were highly skewed thus.  
The colonial period saw the consolidation of the Tswana identity and institutions 
as the dominant ones that would emerge in post-colonial Botswana. Attempts by 
minorities to resist Tswana power were actively swatted down, with the colonial 
government backing the Tswana chief, for the most part. The colonial administration 
generally viewed non-Tswana areas as outposts of South African and Rhodesian settler 
states (Bennet, 1999). Chiefs of relatively small merafe only on occasion managed 
however to achieve paramount status by accidents of geography, luck as well as careful 
diplomacy, which was the case of BaTlokwa and BaLete. The colonial administration 
relied heavily on the chiefs of Tswana tribes to administer their colony. This resulted in 
the inadvertent colonial practice of marginalizing smaller identity groups, albeit in a non-
violent manner.  The colonial office deemed unacceptable the deliberate oppression or 
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maltreatment of one ethnic group by another, an intolerance that could explain the peace 
and stability of Botswana today. However, nothing much was done to prevent such 
incidents were they to occur. For the greater part in practice colonial administrators shied 
away from becoming embroiled in internal inter-ethnic issues of ethnic subordination but 
accepted inhabitants rights to vary according to ethnic categories. This colonial practice 
thus further consolidated Tswana domination of smaller ethnic groups and further 
amalgamation of their minority status that had emerged during the Mfecane.  
The colonial offices although they had their own prejudices, favored BaTswana 
groups for the strategic purpose of running the administration smoothly. However, certain 
commissioners did favor some minority groups such as BaKalanga. For instance, Rey 
described them in his private journals as “hard workers, wealthy and much better men in 
every way” when comparing them to BaNgwato, a Tswana tribe. Rey as a result provided 
funding for a Tati Training Institute in the area under the custodianship of K.T Motsete 
who had been seen by Ngwato Chief Tshekedi as a Kalanga separatist. However, the 
resident commissioner succeeding Rey, Arden-Clarke, did not share his views on the 
development of the protectorate and was anxious to restore good relations with the 
Tswana chiefs. The administration thus stopped support the Tati Training Institute’s 
appeals for renewed American aid money, on which it was dependent, and it was forced 
to close in 1942.  
The impact of colonialism can be viewed in the way certain spellings and 
pronunciations of words were adopted. For example, earliest European visitors tended to 
record words in forms which seem more like modern SeKgalagari (the language of the 
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Kgalagadi) than modern Setswana. In particular, the famous Kalahari Desert’s name is 
spelt in SeKgalagari. However, most official documents in Botswana today promote the 
Setswana forms as “more correct” (Parson, 1999). This promotion of Setswana forms is 
one ways in which BaKgalagadi have been continuously marginalized within Botswana 
society. Early journal entries of various Bechuanaland commissioners reflected some of 
the stereotypes of minorities that currently exist today in Botswana. Particularly, Arden-
Clarke is known to use the term “culturally degenerate Tswana” in reference to  
BaKgadagadi as well as the stereotype of BaKalanga being more educated and smarter 
than BaTswana. These attitudes still permeate Botswana society today. 
The BaSarwa remain the most marginalized group in Botswana, a situation that 
emerged prior to colonialism. In fact, in 1887, the Colonial Office expressed considerable 
disquiet at the treatment of the BaSarwa, using the term ‘slavery’. After the First World 
War, the League of Nations enquiry into slavery put the colonial administration on the 
defensive and it was tacitly agreed that whatever the status of the BaSarwa, it must be 
shown not to be slavery. In the 1930’s the colonial office’s actions pertaining to BaSarwa 
were at best ambivalent and can best be described within the context of the relationship 
between Charles Rey, Resident Commissioner from 1930 to 1937 and Chief Tshekedi 
Khama, the BaNgwato regent with whom he had many conflicts. Rey was not favorable 
to ethnic minorities but did pick up the issue of the status of BaSarwa serfs and hereditary 
servants as a strategic maneuver to undermine Tshekedi Khama and other chiefs. The 
administration, while denying that slavery existed, made a public declaration on the rights 
of the BaSarwa. Schapera (1955) noted that this declaration made no immediate practical 
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difference to the position of the BaSarwa, though there was evidence of some genuine 
effort by at least some officials to prosecute the worst case of ill-treatment. In 1930 
Tshekedi requested an official enquiry to clear up what he saw as misconceptions 
resulting in the ‘Tagart report’ which criticized Tshekedi and made some suggestions for 
how the position of the BaSarwa could be improved. 
Rey’s attitude to the BaSarwa was at best ambivalent. His public outburst about 
the uselessness of ‘preserving a decadent and dying race, which is perfectly useless from 
any point of view”, has widely been quoted to reflect this equivocality. Rey had no 
respect for the cultures of the BaSarwa, but he generally thought that individual BaSarwa 
should have the chance to escape servitude and become ‘civilized’ at the very least; he 
disapproved of their being actively ill-treated. Although rhetorically, Rey proclaimed 
strong action towards the plight of the BaSarwa, on the ground he was more preoccupied 
with more dramatic issues such as the flogging of Phinehas McIntosh at the behest of 
Tshekedi. This seemingly isolated incident of a white wagon builder with a reputation of 
philandering and public intoxication and charged in an African native court, caused much 
controversy leading to the  deployment of British naval forces to the Kalahari desert and 
a colonial inquiry into Tshekedi’s alleged misconduct and resulting in a three week 
chiefly suspension (Milton 1991). However, as Crowder (1977) alleges, a degree of 
genuine sympathy in individual cases did resonate in his private journal entries.   
Overall, the impact of colonialism on Botswana’s ethnic identity has been one 
that further consolidated existing hierarchies in society. Unlike other parts of Africa, 
colonialism in Botswana did not create new identity groups. However, colonialism in 
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Botswana did establish BaTswana as the dominant group at the expense of minority 
groups.  However, it would be the postcolonial elites who would have the most dramatic 
impact on ethnic relations and identity management through an assimilationist 
experiment, rhetorically aimed at mitigating the evils of ethnic diversity and ethnic 
competition.   
Assimilation and Identity Management in Post-Colonial Botswana 
Conceptual Framework of Assimilation 
The traditional assumption of ethnicity is that human beings belong to natural 
groups which share common language, culture and sense of homeland. These groups 
have come to be understood as ethnic groups, and although not in and of themselves 
political entities, many believe that they are the ideal basis for political organization. In 
nineteenth century Europe, that natural group was referred to as “nation” and came to be 
regarded as the model of the modern state (Ottaway, 1999: 300). Ethnicity, although in 
itself an innocent phenomenon, can and has been used as a form of bonding to achieve 
certain societal and political goals. It has been discovered to be a powerful source of 
group cohesion that can drive forces and direct its energies and powers into either a 
positive or a negative course.  
As Ottaway (1999) argues, at independence a significant number of African 
leaders began to reject the legitimacy of ethnic identities, even while relying upon them 
to bolster their power. This is because the existence of tribalism in Africa became one of 
the continent’s greatest stereotypes and especially European countries viewed African 
ethnic relations as primitive, rather  than accepting them as part of the same phenomena 
177 
	  
as nationalism, which existed in their own countries. The new African elite differed from 
the traditional elite in that they were usually foreign educated in Western countries and 
thus were quicker to reject the notion of ethnic difference, albeit not because of its link to 
conflict but because it was European practice and desire to do so.  
Botswana had also learnt from its neighbors the evils of racialization and 
tribalism. As a result, in 1966 the Khama administration embarked on a series of policy 
interventions that would reduce cleavages in society in order to build a unified society: a 
modernist assimilationist policy of social development. Cultural assimilation is defined as 
the process whereby a minority group gradually adapts to the customs and attitudes of the 
prevailing culture and customs. In the case of Botswana, the desire was to create a 
homogenous but political state through a series of assimilation policies highly skewed 
towards the favor of the culture and language of the eight Tswana identity groups.  
 
Features of Assimilation in Botswana 
The primary feature of Botswana’s assimilation policies is what historian Neil 
Parsons has referred to as the promotion of “Tswanadom”. Parsons argues that the 
concept of Tswanadom as both philosophical and territorial is what has led many to this 
day to believe that post-colonial Botswana was a mono-ethnic state, a gross 
misrepresentation. The declaration of Setswana as the national language, as well as the 
promotion of Tswana culture in all social, political and cultural realms of Botswana, have 
been pivotal to the consolidation of Tswanadom. To this day education, the media and 
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activities in all social domains in Botswana such as the kgotla (chapter 4) can only be 
conducted in English and Setswana.  
Central to the Botswana assimilation policy is the issue of chieftaincy recognition. 
Botswana’s House of Chiefs (Ntlo ya Dikgosi) is part of the legislative branch of 
government. Although mainly symbolic, it is highly revered as chiefs are deemed the 
custodians of culture. The House of Chiefs currently has thirty five members. Eight are 
hereditary and referred to as paramount chiefs, with each paramount chief presiding over 
one of the eight Setswana speaking tribes. The Chieftaincy Act of 1966 defines “tribe” to 
mean “the BaNgwato Tribe, the BaTawana tribe, the BaKgatla tribe, the BaKwena tribe, 
the BaNgwaketse tribe, the BaLete tribe, the BaRolong tribe and the BaTlokwa tribe”. 
All other ethnic groups and sub-ethnic groups are assumed to have been absorbed into 
these 8 principal identity groupings. The Tribal Territories Acts 1966 reifies this by 
defining tribal territory only with respect to the Tswana ethnic group and land can only 
be distributed under the jurisdiction of the territories of these groups. 
Another twenty two members of the House of Chiefs are indirectly elected and 
serve five-year terms. Of these, four are chosen from sub-chiefs in the districts of North-
East, Chobe, Ghanzi, and Kgalagadi, the remaining five members being appointed by the 
president. They must be at least 21 years of age, adept at English and have not 
participated in active politics in the past five years.  
Botswana is divided into 8 regions: Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, Kweneng, Central, 
Ngwaketse, Kgatleng, Ngamiland (Northwest), and South-East Districts. In those districts 
in which Tswana speaking groups dominated, the name of the district is directly 
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derivative of the principle tribe. For instance, Kgatleng District Council has its capital in 
Mochudi village where the BaKgatla tribe resides and the respective land governing body 
is the Kgatleng Landboard. The others include the  Ngwato Landboard, Tawana 
Landboard, Ngwaketse Landboard and Kweneng Land Board. The BaLete and BaTlokwa 
tribe reside in the South-East District, which is given a geographic rather than tribal name 
designation. The designation of groups rights in Botswana is not sensitive to numerical 
measures or first-come first served. Instead, the only thing that matters is the primacy of 
the spoken language. Those tribes in the Northwest (Ngamiland), including the 
BaHambukushu, OvaHerero, BaSubia, WaYeyi, BaCiriku  and BaSarwa,  are represented 
by the BaTawana and are officially regarded and referred to as such. Tribes, whose first 
language is not Setswana are not represented by their hereditary chiefs.  
While the Botswana government’s official position is that assimilation helps 
foster peaceful coexistence, Reteng, a minority lobby group, views the sets of policies as 
tools for marginalization and disenfranchisement. Reteng is a multi-cultural coalition of 
organizations devoted to the promotion  and preservation of the linguistic and cultural 
diversity of Botswana’s heritage, and as a body, is one of the most critical platforms to 
Botswana’s assimilation policy. Reteng argues that since becoming a republic in 1966 
Botswana laws have permitted discrimination based on ethnicity, language and culture. 
Making reference to Sections 77 to 79 of the Botswana constitution, Sections 15 (4)m (d), 
15 (9) of the constitution; Section 2 of the Chieftainship Act and c) the Tribal Territories 
Act., one finds the following rights being denied to non-Tswana groups: 
a) The right to recognition as a tribe with a distinct language and culture 
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b) Group rights to land 
c) Representation in the House of Chiefs (Ntlo ya Dikgosi) 
d) The right to educate their children in their languages 
e) The right to educate their children about their histories, customs, values and 
culture 
f) The right to access information and enjoy their languages and cultures on national 
radio and television 
g) Access to certain jobs especially those pertaining to management of land such as 
Land Board Secretaries.  
In 2005, a constitutional amendment failed to address the issue of discrimination of 
non-Tswana groups from permanent membership to the House of Chiefs. The three 
unequal categories of membership remained. No efforts have been made legislation that 
contains derogations which permit non-prohibition of discrimination and give group 
rights to land to the Tswana tribes as sovereigns of the districts respectively. As a result, 
in contemporary Botswana, all non-Tswana children are taught in and about Setswana 
cultures at the expense of their own, and as a result they develop low self-esteem and 
under achieve in schools (Reteng 2008). The 8 Tswana tribes numerically account for 
18percent of the population, while the non-Tswana make up 60percent. This the policies 
of forced assimilation if not curbed will see the disappearance of over 60percent of the 
nation’s cultures.  
To date Botswana’s executives have all expressed reluctance to concede to 
minority group pressures to change assimilationist practices in Botswana. First president 
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Seretse Khama campaigned that he stood for the gradual evolution of a nation state in 
which tribal groups while in existence, would take a secondary place to national identity. 
Khama stated:   
“When I say the greatest enemy of independent Africa is trbalism….it becomes 
dangerous when it leads people to think in exclusively tribal terms. It becomes a threat to 
the stability and security if our state when it is carried out to the point when a man in a 
responsible position thinks of himself as a tribesman before he thinks of himself as a 
Motswana”  
(Khama quoted in Nyati-Ramahobo 1991:201). 
Similarly, his successor President Quett Masire reiterated the orientation towards 
Setswana to the exclusion of other languages by warning Botswana citizens to stop 
fighting for the right to have ethnic languages being taught in school as this would break 
up the nation. President Festus Mogae when asked to mediate a dispute between the 
BaNgwato and the BaKalanga he urged the BaKalanga to consider themselves 
BaNgwato.  President Ian Khama in 1999 reified this statement to the BaKalanga in 
Nkange, thus justifying Ngwato hegemony over tribes like the BaSarwa, BaKalanga, 
BaBirwa, BaTswapong and others considered as minority groups. Furthermore, on March 
25th, 2000, Ian Khama  stressed to Etsha, an area dominated by marginalized groups such 
as Hambukushu, Wayeyi and BaSarwa, and informed them that for as long as they are 
members of the ruling party, they should not support organizations that are formed along 
tribal lines as they are tribalistic and divisive (Radio Botswana News Bulletin, March 
25th, 2000). This was an attempt to highlight political over ethnic loyalty. He was aware 
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that his audience was ignorant of his loyalty to his own ethnic group ( He is a supporter 
of  the Serowe Development Trust, an NGO that belongs to and is run by the BaNgwato 
tribe). At the policy level, there exists an illusion of achievement of the actualization of 
Tswanadom through the assimilationist model. The Tswana have groups rights to land, 
use of language and the privilege to live their culture. The  success of Tswanadom has led 
many to believe that Botswana is a mono-ethnic state. (Parsons, 1985:27) 
 
Impact of Assimilation in Botswana  
One major impact of the assimilation policy in Botswana surrounds the 
institutions of property rights particularly within the context of land and resource rights. 
The 1968 Tribal Land Act (amended in 1993) established specific guidelines on the 
acquisition, transfer and use of customary land. Additionally, tribal Land Boards were 
created in 1970 regulate issues pertaining to customary land.  Traditionally, such 
activities were the responsibility of the chief. However here they were performed by an 
array of ‘authorities’ with chiefly connections (Poku 2002). However, since only the 
chiefs of the eight principle Tswana tribes are recognized by the constitution, only 
through assimilation to one of the 8 Tswana tribes, can a non-Tswana person gain access 
to land. Only under this provision is there no discrimination to access to land.   
In terms of access to diamond revenues, during early negotiations, President 
Khama’s tribe, the BaNgwato, stood to benefit the most from mining revenues. By 
making such revenues a tribal right, Khama could have heavily skewed the benefits of 
diamond mining towards his own tribe, BaNgwato, a situation that would have probably 
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resulted in national conflict. Understanding this tradeoff, Khama and the BDP decided to 
address the revenue issue in the BDP election manifesto of 1965, stating that  
“ …leaving mineral rights vested in tribal authorities and private companies must 
necessarily result in uneven growth of the country’s economy, as well as deprive the 
Central Government of an important source of revenue for developing the country…It 
will be the policy of the BDP Government to negotiate with all parties concerning the 
takeover of the country’s mineral rights by the Central Government, and subsequently 
expand the present mining operations and step up prospecting activities throughout the 
territory”.  
Khama’s decision to foster greater centralization of mining activity assisted in 
laying firm the political foundations for Botswana’s subsequent development by 
facilitating the equitable distribution of mineral wealth. In terms of mineral wealth 
distribution, his careful political maneuvering and ability to balance different interest 
group pressures helped Botswana develop economically, a legacy that has been 
maintained over thirty years after his death. Khama’s most important contribution was to 
coordinate the interests of Botswana’s eight major tribes.  Immediately following 
independence, he made the critical decision that diamond revenues be placed in a national 
saving fund, as opposed to being allocated to individual tribes.  As a result, diamond 
revenue would be evenly spread out throughout the state in the form of investment, 
instead of exclusively privileging specific regions of identity groups. Although in the 
short term, this decision was not popular among the BaNgwato, Khama’s tribe, the 
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sustained result of Khama’s national savings plan achieved  greater legitimacy and 
resulted in minimal tribal conflict. 
Professor Balefi Tsie, who identified himself as MoTswana, argues that as a result 
of assimilation Botswana, although not an ethnically homogenous society, extends 
citizenship and citizenship benefits to everybody equally.  
“Seretse Khama left a legacy where in the employment of civil servants, only 
merit counts”. - Professor B. Tsie 
He emphatically states there is no ethnic discrimination, but acknowledges that 
there are groups such as the BaSarwa, and BaKgalagadi who have legitimate concerns 
and little representation in parliament.  He argues that minorities are catered for 
materially. There exists very little evidence to the contrary, except when considering 
BaSarwa and BaKgadlagadi. The only marginalization mentioned in the interviews was 
that of cultural marginalization, not material marginalization.  Professor Mokhawa argues 
that in addition to having food, and water, a person needs their culture.  Cultural 
autonomy and artifacts have not been given to minorities in Botswana them as much as 
the dominant Tswana. Both professors view the language introduction exercises from a 
pragmatic viewpoint, arguing that the introduction of new languages in schools is a very 
expensive endeavor. Tsie emphasized that minorities have organizations like SPIL and 
are also awarded airtime after midnight on broadcast media. However, Mokhawa views 
the minorities pursuit for autonomy as “democracy being tested” as the national Tswana 
culture is being challenged via the expression of people’s tribal identities.  
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When asked about the receptiveness to assimilation in Botswana, Dr Zibani 
Maundeni argued that he believes the policy had a cohesive factor in Botswana. Dr 
Maundeni, a professor of Political Science at University of Botswana, identifies himself 
primarily as MoKalanga.  
“I come from the north, now according to the people; everybody who comes from the 
north is a MoNgwato.”- Professor Z. Maundeni 
Being of the optimistic persuasion, he argues that Tswana language and culture 
have been “accepted” by larger groups and not necessarily repressed. When asked about 
his view of the imperialist assimilation project in Botswana, he argues that the as a 
minority himself, he welcomes it as it allows him to “belong” to a larger group. He 
claims than many are accepting of this greater Tswana identity and Tswana ideology. He 
goes on to say that people adherence to a greater identity or a greater ideology actually 
fosters democracy and unity. He argues that Botswana identity groups have an inclusive 
orientation. 
“They don’t undermine other people. I am Kalanga for instance. They don’t try to 
discriminate me because I am a Kalanga. Instead they try to incorporate me into that 
larger group. And that way they make you feel at home. They don’t look at the small 
groups which are usually marginalized; they look at the larger group. That way they are 
able to relate with you on a positive note. Of course many of us face the problem of 
denying that we do not belong to that particular group. They have some kind of an 
imperialist ideology of assuming that all small groups should identify with a larger 
group.” - Professor Z. Maundeni 
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He goes on to add: “You cannot go to war because you are being included in some large 
group. You go to war because you feel excluded.” 
The only caveat however, was that minorities had to subordinate themselves into 
one of the principal Tswana tribes in order to access this mineral wealth. This came at the 
expense of the right to cultural expression of minority groups in Botswana as the process 
of ethnic assimilation in Botswana has been the sacrifice of cultural heritage and custom 
of marginalized groups in Botswana, sometimes brutally. Lydia Nyati-Saleshando (also 
cited in this dissertation by her former name Lydia Nyati-Ramahobo) is more critical of 
the ethnic configurations of Botswana and identifies herself as MoYeyi, a member of the 
Wayeyi ethnic group. She criticizes the assimilationist model and the promotion of 
Setswana and English languages. She argues that prior to independence languages like 
SeKalanga were being taught, but after 1966 the pursuit of a cohesive Tswana national 
identity led to the banning of this language and all other minority languages from 
classroom instruction. She argues that although the people generally accepted the 
assimilationist model, they were unaware of its ramifications. The minority ethnic groups 
were accepting of the British model initially as a way to ensure safety and security. If you 
are in the Ngwaketse district, they were under the safety of the BaNgweketse.  
Saleshando argues that as a result of assimilation, the villages where the non-
Tswana people live are the least developed for example BaKgalagadi and BaSarwa. She 
recalled a 2003 proposal for a university to be built in the Kgalagadi region, but the 
president decided to move it to his own area.  
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“If they want to bring people out of poverty they should be giving them access to 
those things that help them to develop”. - Professor L. Nyati-Saleshando 
Overwhelmingly, the eight Tswana tribes centered around eight large villages’ 
urban centers where development is concentrated with access to identification services 
and healthcare, whereas minority ethnic groups have access only to poor roads and 
unmanaged clinics. The 8 tribes belong to 8 big villages where development is centered. 
Marginalized minority groups are the most vulnerable and in their areas poverty is 
rampant and distant from basic social services.   
She acknowledges that fortunately minorities in Botswana have not escalated 
towards violence that other minorities in other African countries have. 
Politically, Saleshando argues that ethnic origin is not usually an issue.  
“We are used to people coming from one region and representing another region. 
But certain political parties have rooted themselves in certain regions. Like the ruling 
party, even if it is losing traction in the northern parts of the country, in Serowe, it’s still 
very strong. The BNF has been strong in Kanye. Other parties Ngamiland and Chobe 
districts they voted for BCP. It’s dependent on the strength of the organizers in the 
region.” - Professor L. Nyati-Saleshando 
One point of contention for Saleshando was the lack of representation in the 
House of Chiefs of the hereditary chiefs of minority ethnic groups and tribes.  
“For minorities, even if you designate your chief like the Wayeyi have, they are 
not recognized in the house of chiefs because the constitution of Botswana does not 
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recognize the Wayeyi as a tribe. In the region, a headman attends the House of chiefs to 
represent the minority groups, but they come under the paramount chiefdom that rules 
the region. The head man is not elected by the people and represents nobody. They report 
to the paramount chief”. - Professor L. Nyati-Saleshando 
Nyati-Ramahobo argues that BaKalanga were systematically harassed by 
BaNgwato to speak Setswana. Similarly, the Wayeyi were severely punished for 
speaking Shiyeyi resulting in it now being one of the world’s endangered languages 
(Reteng, 2005) Assimilation has had a cultural impact too, whereas BaTswana are 
culturally patrilineal, Wayeyi are matrilineal in inheritance. They have now abandoned 
their heritage and adopted the patrilineal patterns of ownership and inheritance observed 
under Tswana custom, and marry according to Tswana customary norms. There are 
however features of cultural amalgamation as is evidenced by the birth rites in the North 
West district which combine both Tswana and Wayeyi culture.  
Group grievances by minority groups get very little attention in Botswana.  A 
petition by the Kamanakao Association, non-governmental organization with the basic 
objective of maintaining and developing the remnants of the language and culture of the 
Wayeyi people of northern Botswana, was rejected in May 2000. Proponents of structural 
assimilation believe that group rights restrict individual rights to some extent, and they 
regard assimilation and amalgamation as anti-pluralist. In Botswana group rights are 
tolerated through registered organizations. However, such organizations such as the 
Society for the Promotion of Ikalanga Language (SPIL) and the Kamanakao Association, 
which are working on the development and promotion of the Ikalanga and Shiyeyi 
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languages respectively, have met Government resistance, with some Government 
officials labeling them as tribalistic (Radio Botswana News Bulletin, 2000).  This 
indicated intolerance of minority group demands. 
Opposition member Gobotswang characterizes the plight of minorities in 
Botswana as the “brutal suppression of the expression of culture” and “suppression of 
dissent. He employs the term “brutal” in the sense of the brainwashing and installation of 
the belief that speaking Setswana would bring one united national government 
propagated that in people’s minds.  He critiques the Botswana assimilationist project in 
comparison to South Africa. There, citizens have a basic understanding of each other’s 
language but tend to co-exist peacefully, while expressing their cultural heritages. He, 
however, praises the Botswana government for not allocating resources according to 
ethnicity, thus resulting in very little agitation where resources allocation is concerned. 
The only agitation emerges from the desire to express culture and langue freely, and for 
that he says Botswana still has a long way to go. He argues that “cultural groups are not 
political in nature they just want their languages to be taught”.  
The assimilationist policy in Botswana has managed to limit the evils associated 
with ethnic diversity by creating an inclusive ethnic identity and promoting it as 
Tswanadom. Having observed the negative impact in of “othering” and tribalism in 
apartheid South Africa, and other African counterparts, the Botswana elite decided to 
approach the issue from a pragmatic viewpoint, constructing an inclusive identity that 
would become prior to individual tribal identities. This national identity, branded 
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Tswanadom, would mitigate the ills of ethnic diversity by creating a sense of 
togetherness that does not exist anywhere else on the continent.  
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Botswana’s assimilation policy was extended to nearly all identity groups in the 
county.  The Botswana government pursued the principles of non-racialization, tolerance 
as well as equal opportunity reflective of their pre-colonial assimilationist tendencies to 
incorporate smaller groups into the larger Tswana merafe. BaTswana were 
overwhelmingly tolerant of a Caucasian first lady, showing that their tolerance went 
beyond tribal and ethnic differences, but also transcended racial and religious lines as 
well, with Gaborone hosting one of southern Africa (a predominantly Christian region)’s 
largest mosques. 
The case of Botswana clearly demonstrates that different ethnically diverse societies 
have varying degrees of conflict potential. Ethnic conflict potential emanates either from 
a history of violent relations among identity groups within a state, the existence of 
historical grievances, or the creation of new grievances. The Botswana government upon 
independence acknowledged this and instead of allowing ethnicity to be an impediment 
to economic and social development, put in place a meticulous set of policies aimed at 
transforming identity politics in the country. The Botswana government thus 
institutionalized an identity fashioned to parallel to the European concept of nationhood 
that would be prior to any other identity based on ethnicity, culture or language. In a bid 
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to reduce ethnic distance among the various identity groups in the country, the 
government institutionalized the Setswana language in education and media and adopted 
Tswana customs and traditions of conflict resolution such as the kgotla.  
The Botswana case reflects an institutional approach to fostering an artificial ethnic 
unity. States are capable of channeling identity politics into peaceful political competition 
provided credible commitments are made to shape and uphold agreements made among 
culturally defined political actors. However, when the state’s administrative structures 
and legal institutions distribute resources on the basis of ethnicity, it encourages political 
mobilization and conflict along ethnic lines. Botswana’s assimilation policies thus placed 
constraints on societal behavior and provided incentives for cooperation and compliance 
of rules and procedures for allocation, participation, representation and accountability. 
Cheeseman and Ford (2007) argues that Botswana has been at least “partially 
representative” in its politics with substantial political representation of both women and 
minority populations. Those who were willing to assimilate to larger ethno-linguistic 
clusters of Tswanadom benefitted more than those who rejected assimilation, such as the 
BaSarwa. The BaSarwa debate in Botswana is contextualized in the debate of 
development versus cultural preservation. There exists tension between the Government 
of Botswana which claims to want to get the BaSarwa out of a “primitive” lifestyle into a 
modern lifestyle through assimilation, and activists such as Survival International who 
advocate for the preservation of BaSarwa cultural and heritage rights by advocating non-
assimilation. Unfortunately, voluntary non-assimilation on the BaSarwa’s part has left 
them outside of the Botswana miracle.  
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A common recurring theme I noticed while in Botswana is that most Botswana 
citizens of all ethnic backgrounds are proud of their country and their political identity as 
a people of the same republic. They are gratified with the economic progress and the 
general international acclaim that their country has achieved globally. The only grievance 
held by most minorities however, was the failure of the government to acknowledge that 
it is not only access to economic and political resources that make an identity group 
content and instead, these resources also encompass cultural and language resources, 
which for the most part the Botswana government has taken away from the minority 
ethnic groups, particularly the BaSarwa, through forced assimilation. However, when 
measuring Botswana’s potential for ethnic conflict over resources or institutional failure 
due to ethnicity, this dissertation found very little evidence of that. According to Nyati-
Ramahobo (1991), since independence the government of Botswana has worked 
tirelessly to achieve the ideal goal of a homogenous nation-state in which ethnic identities 
would lose significance. Assimilation has been pursued in the designation of landboards 
and respective land rights along Tswana tribal lines. Access of minorities to land is only 
through their allegiance to one of the eight constitutionally recognized tribes. An example 
is BaTawana who are a numerical minority in their district, but have control of the land. 
All residents of their district, including the Wayeyi are officially referred to as 
MoTawana tribesman, a political rather than cultural naming. Minorities like the Wayeyi 
who are an ethnic minority in the North west district are both politically and culturally 
defined as a MoTawana, as he or she is expected to sing to a MoTawana Chiefs in 
Tswana and not in Shiyeyi.  
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The Botswana government implemented the assimilation policy in a bid to reduce the 
ethnic distance between the various identity groups. Caselli and Coleman (2011) argued 
that ethnic cleavages that are only marked by a shared sense of identity or history, yet not 
convoluted by observable differences such as color, religion or language, are normally 
associated with a low level of ethnic distance. This perhaps illuminates why Botswana 
may have not experienced ethnic conflict, based on diamonds or anything else. First, as 
Lawrence argues, Tswana kingdoms were historically not crusader states and identity 
groups in the country coexisted peacefully for centuries prior to colonialism. 
Furthermore, they shared a lot of common histories, a sense of homeland, culture, and 
customs. Second,  the assimilation policy implemented by the Botswana Government 
institutionally “reduced” the ethnic distance among Botswana’s identity groups giving 
them a common language, albeit compulsorily, and institutionalizing the Setswana 
language in all social domains. The government privileged the culture of eight tribes 
whose first language was Setswana, ordaining their hereditary chiefs as paramount and 
making all other identity groups subservient to these eight chiefdoms. Today, nearly all 
Botswana citizens with the exception of the BaSarwa ethnic group and the expatriate 
communities speak Setswana as either a first or a second language. Third, Botswana’s 
cultural assimilation was facilitated by some primordial similarities among ethnic and 
tribal groups in the country. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, totemism provided an 
added layer to identity in Botswana The fact that totemism provided a legitimate cohesive 
element to tribal relations may have facilitated the voluntary ascription of minority ethnic 
and tribal groups in Botswana. Totemism provided the basis of common ancestry, 
blurring the lines of ethnic difference, thus reducing ethnic distance among the Botswana 
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population. Fourth, Botswana’s history is absent of what the factors cited by Blagojevic 
(2009)  such as structural crises, historical recollections of inter-ethnic grievances, 
institutional factors promoting ethnic prejudice, and manipulation of historical memories 
by political entrepreneurs to evoke sentiments such as fear, resentment and hate toward 
the “other” as well as an inter-ethnic competition over resources and rights. Instead, the 
goal of assimilation in Botswana was to circumvent these factors.  
The positive effect of assimilation in Botswana was the fostering of a national 
identity, albeit artificial, as suggested by the concept of “Tswanadom”. The phenomenon 
of Tswanadom has created a social cohesion in Botswana not found in most other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and has thus been critical to nation-building. In its 
rhetoric, the government continues to justify the promotion of Tswanadom as a cultivator 
of nationhood and unity. This national unity is seen to have limited the threats and perils 
associated with ethnic heterogeneity, albeit at the cost of minority cultural rights in 
Botswana. It did provide for institutional quality. However, ethnic homogeneity is not a 
primordial truth in Botswana, but a socially constructed phenomenon and therefore does 
not completely reflect the assumption of this chapter’s hypothesis fully.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE EXOGENOUS SOURCES OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY IN 
BOTSWANA 
Exogenous Sources of Institutional Quality: An Introduction 
External agents have played a role in facilitating and/or disrupting political, 
social, and economic institutions in Africa. These influences originate from both state 
actors and non-state actors. With the adoption of the liberal type of economic 
development, non-state actors, particularly multinational corporations investing in Africa, 
have shaped the institutional setting affecting economic and political development. This 
dissertation examines the role that external factors played in shaping and influencing 
institutional development in Botswana. In particular, it isolates three relationships which 
bore the most influence on Botswana: its relationship with its colonial master Britain, its 
relationship with regional hegemon South Africa, and its relationship and dependence on 
the most powerful non-actor in its economy, De Beers. The conceptual framework of the 
dynamics of these relationships will be the focus of this section. Later, a comprehensive 
analysis of how these relationships manifested in the Botswana case will be done.  
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Asymmetric State Relations: Colonialism 
The key external legacy that steered the formation and shaping of modern states 
and institutions was that of colonialism. It is cited as the main source of the relative 
weakness of African states, in the aftermath of centuries of transcontinental slave trade.  
Variants of colonialism shaped the continent, with the French pursing colonial policies of 
assimilation where subjugation and civilization of the “heathen” was the primary 
foundation for structural integration and dependence in its colonies. Most African 
countries’ institutional development and institutional choice have been shaped and 
influenced by an asymmetric relationship with an external actor, whether through of 
colonialism, or through the actions or diplomacy of international or regional hegemons. 
Of interest to this dissertation, particularly, is the asymmetric relationship between 
Britain and Botswana, as well as that between South Africa and Botswana. In Chapter 3, 
an in-depth analysis was made to discuss the role colonialism played/or failed to play in 
Botswana.  However, as this chapter will illustrate, Botswana’s colonial past is best 
understood in comparative perspective to the colonial experiences of other countries’ 
experiences.  
La Porta (1998) and Acemoglu & Robinson (2003) identified various factors that 
determine the extent of the colonizer’s influence. First they argue that the colonizer’s 
identity had an impact on the development path of the ex-colonies through the nature of 
the legal system imported in the colonies. Thus, former French colonies and former 
British colonies exhibit differences in the way their institutions were shaped. According 
to Lee and Schultz (2011), generally former British colonies fared better in terms of 
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growth and poverty alleviation after independence than former French colonies.  Second, 
the European settlement played a huge role in infrastructural development. Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2000), show that the type of colonialism had a profound impact 
on the contemporary development of former colonies, through the quality of the 
institutions. They distinguish between extraction and settlement colonialism, and argue 
that the more Europeans settled in a colony, the better the quality of the institutions 
became, and the more the colony developed. This is because settlers had a long-term 
vision of living on the land and therefore established functional institutions aimed at 
long-term development. This distinction greatly explains the disparity in development 
between South Africa and the rest of the continent. Third, the administrative organization 
i.e., whether the type of colonialism was direct or indirect, influenced development 
outcomes in post-colonial Africa.   Banerjee & Iyer (2002) studied the impact of the type 
colonial rule (indirect rule versus direct rule) on the development of Indian districts and 
provided evidence that the districts that were under the direct rule, that is to say directly 
administrated by the British themselves, now have better economic performances than the 
districts that were indirectly administrated through Indian landlords’ intermediaries. In 
the case of Botswana, the choice of formal political institutions was greatly influenced by 
the British as at independence. The country adopted the British Westminster model of 
government and operates as a parliamentary republic.  
Asymmetrical state relations, particularly those colonial in nature were the focal 
point of Atul Kohli’s analysis on state directed development.  Kohli (2004) argues that 
the ability of states to create developmental capacity to a great extent results from 
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exogenous factors which shaped the process of state construction. Thus, he distinguishes 
between three archetypes of states in the global periphery, each a product of colonialism. 
These archetypes are the cohesive-capitalist state, the fragmented multiclass state, and the 
neopatrimonial state.  The cohesive capitalist state and the neopatrimonial state according 
to Kohli (2004), exist at the two extremes of the political effectiveness continuum, with 
the cohesive-capitalist states being the most developmental. 
Kohli (2004) cites South Korea as one key example of a cohesive capitalist state. 
He determines that state construction emerged from Japanese colonial rule which differed 
in many important respects from the colonialism of the European powers. The Japanese 
were late developers and enjoyed the geographic proximity to their colonies, unlike their 
European counterparts. This enabled Japan to make extensive use of state power for its 
own economic development, and then use the same state power to pry open and 
transform Korea within a relatively short period of time. The Japanese colonial impact 
was intense, brutal, and deeply architectonic, eventually leading to the origination of 
South Korea’s cohesive-capitalist, growth-promoting state. The colonial period in Korea 
realized a relatively corrupt and ineffective agrarian bureaucracy being transformed into a 
highly dictatorial and penetrating political organization. In addition, the state established 
close and working production-oriented alliances with the dominant classes; and a well-
developed system of state control of the lower classes was created (Kohli, 2004:18). 
Eventually, these structures were battered by numerous new forces eventually providing 
South Korea with a framework for the evolution of a high-growth political economy. 
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Before the advent of the Japanese colonial system, Korea had an agrarian past, 
and a centralized and ostensibly strong bureaucracy, but was a relatively weak state. 
Much of the institutionalism in Korea was guided by antiquated traditions, and officials 
were inept at the successful application of finance and administration, which would have 
allowed them to transition easily into the modern systems of formal education, financial 
systems, and advanced military. The Japanese thus implemented a modern and efficient 
bureaucracy albeit inherently more “Japanese” than “Korean.” The Japanese model of 
colonialism thus substituted the factionalized and conflict-prone institutions of 
aristocracy with a modern, highly centralized, and extremely capable state apparatus, one 
which was used to reshape Korean society. However, the Japanese did this strategically 
in order to maximize the quality, effectiveness, and usefulness of their colonies in Korea 
thus reshaping Korea’s political economy to match their own experiences. As a result, the 
36-year occupation of Korea by Japan had a tremendous influence on the development of 
the modern Korean management system.  
In contrast to the Korean colonial experience, British colonialism in Nigeria 
created a highly distorted state that readily evolved into a neopatrimonial and ineffective 
set of political organizations. Britain ruled Nigeria on a tight budget and expended little 
energy in maintaining this colony. British colonialism in Nigeria followed an ideology of 
indirect rule in which the British essentially utilized various “traditional” rulers to impose 
order. In Nigeria, colonialism gave political significance to identity divisions in the 
country. The country had already been diverse prior to colonization, but the instigation of 
indirect rule consolidated the ethno-linguistic, geographic and religious fault line in 
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Nigeria. In 1914 it was the British who brought together the north and south, and coined 
the name “Nigeria,” giving common governance to an area previously governed by 
diverse traditional authorities. This division worked to the benefit of the British partly to 
remove the threat of a unified opposition nationalist movement. Hence a divided state 
was safer for the minority British administrators than would be the unified one that 
existed after independence. The British actively prevented interaction between 
northerners and southerners, both culturally and economically. For example, they 
constructed no transportation network between the north and the south.  This is in sharp 
contrast to the cultural unity present in Korea. The cultural divide of Nigeria  worked 
well for administering a colony, but was detrimental in preparing a state for 
independence. In the north, the British implemented indirect rule relying on strong 
Islamic leaders to govern in their interests. In the south, they imposed direct British rule. 
In the north the British had less impact on customs and culture, while in the south it 
pursued more westernization in education and culture (Middleton, 1997). 
At its core, colonialism in Nigeria reinforced a form of patrimonial and 
personalistic rule that failed to centralize authority and to develop an effective 
bureaucracy and civil service. It also failed to develop even such minimal political 
capacities as the ability to collect direct taxes. After the Second World War, the colonial 
state’s access to resources grew and the state became more and more involved in the 
economy. The distorted beginnings of the state were further accentuated, as the state 
became further enmeshed in particularistic and personalistic networks. The political elite 
of sovereign Nigeria were never able to overcome the original deficiencies of state 
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construction through colonialism. As a result, post-independent Nigeria has been 
characterized by crisis after crisis, both controlling and wasting the society’s scarce 
developmental resources. 
As mentioned already in the previous chapters, British colonialism in 
Bechuanaland varied between what Acemoglu (2001) describes as “light rule” and what 
Beaulier (2003) characterizes as “benign neglect”. This was the archetypal “indirect rule” 
that Nigeria experienced in the north. British interest in Botswana was limited, except in 
its strategic importance as a pathway to the continent’s interior from the south and as a 
way to prevent occupation of the territory by foreign powers particularly the Boers in the 
South and the Germans in the west.  The characteristic of Britain’s occupation in 
Botswana is best characterized by Seidler (2011) as “miniscule,” with little interaction 
between the British and the colonial population; as imposing of forms of taxation; as 
permissive of the preservation of chiefly institutional powers and autonomy over judicial, 
legislative and executive functions; and as one that did not invest in much infrastructure, 
with 75 percent of British colonial spending being used for administrative purposes 
alone. As a result, the British did not engage in any form of nation-building in colonial 
Bechuanaland. The contrasting fortunes of Botswana and Nigeria’s experiences with 
indirect rule calls into question the impact of colonialism on explaining institutional 
quality in Botswana. The main impact of the colonial enterprise that drastically changed 
Tswana institutions is that of taxation, which introduced a cash-based economy replacing 
the pre-colonial barter trade system. Taxation enhanced the clout of Tswana chiefs who 
received a 10 percent commission of what they amassed (Good 1999: 188). Moreover, it 
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generated a demand for cash based income among BaTswana, and resultantly facilitated 
for a mass departure to work in South African mines. Britain, although not active in the 
provision of public goods in post-independence Botswana, did meaningfully change the 
political and legal institutional setting of colonial Bechuanaland. Botswana adopted a 
Westminster style parliamentary system and a British common law legal code. To that 
extent, British played an essential role in influencing Botswana’s institutions, an analysis 
of which already been covered in chapter 3. However, whether as this dissertation argues, 
it was not the choice of institution that mattered as much as the setting into which the 
institution was inserted, and whether the choice of British institutions was the key reason 
for success of Botswana does not necessarily follow the adoption of British institutions. 
Had an alternative institutional framework been implemented in Botswana, the country 
may have still obtained its level of institutional quality.  
 
South Africa and Botswana  
Regional Hegemony’s Impact on Institutional Development 
Even prior to becoming a republic, South Africa has been Botswana’s primary 
economic, diplomatic, political and socio-cultural partner. Botswana’s relations with 
South Africa are more important than its relationship with any other country due to the 
intricate relationship that emerged prior to colonialism. Today, there are nearly three 
times as many Tswana speaking people in South Africa than in Botswana, and both are 
original members of the oldest customs union in the world SACU, established in 1910. 
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South Africa boasts regional hegemony in southern Africa, being the largest economy.  
Regional hegemony has generally been regarded as the outflow of superior material 
and/or military influence regionally, connoting a political order where a powerful state 
dominates a region (Prys, 2007:7).  This section will delve into the relations between 
Botswana and South Africa, and how this relationship has shaped institutional 
development in Botswana.  
According to Prys (2008) the projection of the hegemon’s values and interests is a 
defining feature of regional hegemony. Secondary states following a regional hegemon 
are generally socialized into accepting the values and rules of the hegemon as the “right 
thing to do”.  This acceptance of values may be translated into the choice of certain 
formal institutions which reflect the interests of the regional hegemon. Specific activities 
of the hegemon promote its own vision and values for the region, such as establishment 
of institutions and agenda-setting within those institutions, mediation of conflicts and 
financial assistance and if relevant, the conditions attached to it, a more immediate form 
of value projection is the direct construction of a similar political system in the secondary 
states. Lastly, Prys (2008) argues that regional hegemony is unique from other forms of 
hierarchical state relations in unilateral provision of public goods. It is with this 
theoretical backdrop that the selection of South Africa as a possible shaper of Botswana’s 
emerged.  
Until 1976, South Africa directly controlled Botswana’s monetary policies the 
Rand Monetary Area. Additionally, Botswana’s mineral reserved and manufacturing 
sectors were greatly impacted by the dependence on South African exports dictated by 
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the regional hegemon through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Botswana 
was diplomatically antagonistic towards South Africa’s apartheid system and at times 
was vulnerable to destabilization due to cross-border attacks on ANC forces based in 
Botswana. This was nevertheless to a considerably lesser degree than other countries in 
the region, and indirectly contributed to Botswana’s achievement of relatively higher 
growth rates. Botswana chose to maintain a close relationship with apartheid South 
Africa, pursuing pragmatic economic policies in light of its geopolitical circumstances. 
This section queries the role of this close relationship in the development of Botswana’s 
institutions through a historical analysis.  
 
Pre-1966 Botswana – South Africa Relations 
Botswana’s territorial integrity and identity has been under constant threat and its 
autonomy continuously challenged due to the hegemonic aspirations of its powerful 
southern neighbor South Africa. As mentioned in Chapter 3, prior to the formation of the 
Union of South Africa (present day South Africa’s predecessor) in 1908-1909, 
Bechuanaland had been divided into two unequal portions: British Bechuanaland and the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, respectively south and north of the Molopo River.  British 
Bechuanaland was part of the Cape Province of South Africa, which was the linchpin 
between the two Rhodesia’s (now Zimbabwe and Zambia) and German South West 
Africa (now Namibia). British Bechuanaland served as the administrative headquarters 
and railway corridor for the Bechuanaland Protectorate, which became Botswana at 
independence in 1966. Bechuanaland’s first capital was located in Vryburg, Cape 
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Province, until 1895, when it was moved north along the railroad to Mafikeng (then 
called Mafeking), another small town in the Cape. The Bechuanaland Protectorate’s 
administrative headquarters remained in South Africa in an area of Mafikeng known as 
the Imperial Reserve. The protectorate’s capital was finally relocated outside South 
Africa for the first time to Gaborone in 1965. From 1897, when the railway line was 
opened from Vryburg to Bulawayo in neighboring Zimbabwe, until September 1974, 
when the line was completed from Rutenga to Bainbridge, no movement could occur 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe without a Botswana transit.  
The Bechuanaland Protectorate was administered directly through the British 
government as one of three High Commission territories: Basutoland, Swaziland and 
Bechuanaland.   Each territory was governed by a resident commissioner who ruled 
according to decrees issued by the High Commissioner for Southern formulated in close 
consultation with the resident commissioners. Each territory had two advisory councils to 
represent the interests of Africans and European populations, respectively. A High Court 
of the High Commission Territories served as court of appeal in civil, criminal and 
administrative law and a system of tribal courts operated alongside the territorial courts. 
Law enforcement was under the charge of Bechuanaland Border Police, Bechuanaland 
Protectorate Police, Swaziland Protectorate Police and Basutoland Territory Police 
respectively. Economically, the main activities of the territories were subsistence farming 
and livestock rearing, with the majority of households subsisting on agriculture or 
migrant labor, primarily miners who remained in South Africa for 3 to 9 months. The 
Territories formed part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).  
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A major turning point in the history of all three territories came in 1910, as the 
British colonies in South Africa moved toward a political union with the former 
Afrikaner republics. The move manifested in the unification of Cape Colony, Orange 
Colony, Natal Colony and Transvaal Colony. From the inauguration of the Union of 
South Africa34 in 1910 until 1961, when South Africa became a republic, Bechuanaland 
Protectorate was under constant threat of incorporation into the union, and during that 
time period, its existence as an autonomous entity was heavily contingent upon the state 
of Anglo-South African relations. 
According to Dale (1995) there were aspects of the triangular relationship among the 
UK the BP and South Africa that bore on the question of Botswana’s autonomy. First, 
with respect to ethnographical considerations, the proposed transfer of Botswana to South 
Africa would have rejoined groups that had been separated administratively by colonial 
boundaries. Presently more than twice as many Setswana-speakers reside in South Africa 
than in Botswana itself35.  Despite the appeal of kith and kin arguments, white South 
Africans considered the ethnic arithmetic more than the Tswana of the BP. This was 
documented in the 1954 Tomlinson Commission Report, an 18 volume report that called 
for the development of the Union’s homeland areas called Bantustans for Africans. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The Union of South Africa is the historic predecessor to the present-day Republic of South Africa. It 
came into being on 31 May 1910 with the unification of four previously separate British colonies: Cape 
Colony, Natal Colony, Transvaal Colony and Orange River Colony. Following World War I, the Union of 
South Africa was granted the administration of the German South-West Africa colony as a League of 
Nations mandate and it became treated in most respects as if it were another province of the Union. 
35 1.7 million versus roughly 0.75 million. (2010 census estimates total population of South Africa 
49,991,300, 10.3% of South Africans speaks Setswana. This would be 5.2 million Setswana speaking 
people in South Africa. Total Population of Botswana is 2,024,787 2011 estimate. 78.2% Speak Setswana, 
a figure is 1.6 million estimated Setswana speakers in Botswana. This means that 325% more Setswana 
speakers in South Africa than in Botswana. 
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Report embodied the apotheosis of separate development apartheid philosophy, espoused 
by South African Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd. The report hinted at the inclusion 
of the three High Commission Territories (HCT’s) within the Union. 
The second consideration underlying the incorporation of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate into the Union of South Africa was white access to land. Land hunger among 
poor Afrikaners concerned the British in Southern Rhodesia, who rejected a 1922 
proposal by South Africa to join the Union due to hostility and fear of Afrikaner 
immigration.  
The third consideration was the prestige of South Africa. Having been defeated by the 
British in the 1899-1902 South Africa war, the Afrikaners transferred the contest for 
primacy in South Africa from the battlefield to the diplomatic fields. The Afrikaners 
wanted a republic as opposed to a monarchy, in order to reduce British influence over 
South Africa. The Afrikaners wanted to have autonomy to shape their own domestic and 
foreign policies including racial, trade and defense links with neighboring colonies. 
A fourth aspect to the question of BP transfer to Union of SA involved the question of 
the self-determination of the people of the BP. Leaders of the eight principal Tswana 
groups represented on the Native (later African) Advisory Council acquired  tenacious 
British protection against South African incorporation. The Tswana chiefs largely 
believed that British protection would offer them some security of rule and a defense 
against Afrikaner land appropriation. 
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A fifth consideration was the 1938 Anglo-South African agreement to broaden and 
deepen the technical, scientific and economic links between the Union and the HCTs with 
a view to creating a more favorable climate of local opinion with respect to the 
prospective transfer. To facilitate this enterprise, an allocation of 35000 pounds was 
made. The BaTswana had their doubts about what they perceived as Pretoria’s Trojan 
horse, which would ultimately lead to incorporation. The two governments established a 
Joint Advisory Conference on Cooperation, which included the resident commissioners 
of all three HCT and the South African secretaries of agriculture, finance and native 
affairs. It filed its first report in May 1938 which because of the Second World War was 
not published until 1952 when the transfer issue arose again (Dale, 1995).  
In  1962 South African Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd’s assertion that the 
transfer of  the three High Commission Territories to South Africa was no longer 
feasible, ended roughly a half century of diplomatic maneuvering between the UK and 
“the king of Southern Africa”. The conflict had emerged from the wording of the 1909 
South Africa Act, which allowed, but did not require, the transfer of the HCT to South 
Africa with the British government’s permission. In terms of Section 151 of that Act, the 
South African parliament could request a transfer of the HCT from the British monarch 
which would be guided by the Privy Council’s decision in the matter. Consequentially, 
South Africa's segregation policies and opposition of local chiefs halted the possibility of 
annexation.  
Although many expected Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland to become a 
part of the new Union of South Africa, British high commissioners, William Palmer and 
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Lord Selborne resisted such an amalgamation. Though he envisioned an eventual 
unification of the protectorates with the union, Selborne insisted that such a development 
could happen only in the long term. This development proved to be a mixed blessing for 
African leaders. Although it exempted the territories from increasingly repressive 
legislation implemented by the Union of South Africa, it was also predicated on 
maintaining “traditional” systems of governance and offered limited scope for popular 
change. The powerful economy of South Africa further complicated the territories' 
autonomy, as all three were still heavily reliant upon the remittances from migrant 
laborers who traveled into South Africa to work, particularly in the mining industry. The 
colonial tax introduced by the colonial government created the demand for job migration 
to South Africa to work in mines. As many Tswana males sought employment, job 
migration to South Africa and the Transvaal became widespread in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. By the year 1943, the majority of the BP’s male workforce between 15 and 
45 years were working in South Africa (Acemoglu et al. 2001: 14-15 and Schapera 1993: 
405). 
 
The South African Customs Union (SACU) and early Botswana/SA relations 
 The South African Customs Union (SACU) established in 1910 boasts the 
distinction of being the world oldest customs union. It came into being as a Customs 
Union Agreement between the Union of South Africa and the High Commission 
Territories (HCT’s) of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. Generally cited as a 
manifestation of South Africa’s hegemony, the SACU created benefits that have been 
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highly skewed towards the benefit of South Africa. According to Alden and Soko (2005) 
“SACU provides the most conspicuous example of how South Africa has acted as a 
‘malevolent’ hegemonic power” in Southern Africa (Alden and Soko, 2005:370). This 
section argues that instead of helping Botswana’s institutional development, the exercise 
of South Africa’s regional hegemony through SACU actually choked Botswana’s efforts 
to create its own independent and autonomous trade policies and regimes. Botswana’s 
trade institutions were greatly skewed towards catering to the needs of South Africa, and 
for the most part, participation in the SACU was a negative influence on Botswana’s 
institutions.  
It is apparent from the 1910 SACU document that South Africa wielded its power 
upon the rest of the members of the customs union since its inception. The original 
agreement, a short document containing 6 articles, outlines the terms of tariff and revenue 
allocation and bestows upon South Africa the custodianship of the policies. The 
agreement utilizes South African institutions like the Treasury and the Board of Trade 
and Industry as responsible for running SACU, with no provision of joint decision 
making or amendment to the agreement. Preamble 25 stated that the high commission 
territories should maintain a tariff similar to that which existed in the Union of South 
Africa. 
Article IV of the 1910 Agreement reinforced South Africa's right to determine 
unilaterally all issues relating to the Custom Union's common external tariff: 
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“The Territories shall, as far as possible, conform to the laws and regulations 
within the Union in respect to refunds, rebates, abatements, suspensions, methylation, 
prohibitions, removals in bond or otherwise and interpretations of the Tariff”.  
According to Gibb (2006) this clause effectively removed from the HCTs their 
power to independently increase public revenue. The 1910 agreement made no mention 
of the free interchange of products originating in the HCTs. Furthermore, it failed to 
make any provision for the HCTs to manage their own economies as economic 
development beyond resource extraction. In Gibb’s (2006) opinion, this was mainly 
because the HCT were expected to join the Union of South Africa eventually and the 
1910 agreement was therefore envisioned as only a provisional measure.  
When Britain began to delay the incorporation of the HCT, conflicts emerged, 
illuminating the depth of the unequal relationship between South Africa and Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). First, South Africa’s unilateral 1925 decision to 
implement protectionist policies of import substitution had a profound impact on BLS. 
Consumers in the BLS were forced to purchase South African goods at internationally 
uncompetitive rates, resulting in trade diversion and net loss of welfare in the HCTs. 
Although this was detrimental to the welfare of BLS states, it did not prompt the 
development of alternative institutions and these countries remained greatly vulnerable to 
South Africa.  This episode clearly illuminated the lack of fiscal discretion and influence 
of BLS over SACU’s industrial and fiscal policies. Second, South Africa's attempts to 
restrict the export of cattle from the HCTs to the Union during the period 1923-1941 
illustrated South Africa disregard for both the economic well-being of the Territories and 
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the obligations of the Customs Union. For Bechuanaland, one of the principal benefits of 
the 1910 Agreement was the enhanced and secure access it provided to the Union market 
for the export of cattle. In 1923, following several years during which the price of beef 
fell dramatically, South Africa and the HCTs agreed to establish a minimum weight limit 
of 800 pounds for cattle exported from the HCTs to the Union.  South Africa chose a 
weight limit, as opposed to quota restrictions, because it would affect less the significant 
numbers of cattle in Swaziland and Basutoland owned by Afrikaner farmers. The HCTs 
reluctantly accepted the weight restrictions in the face of threats by the South African 
Minister of Agriculture. Similarly, the South African government reinforced their 
protectionist policies by imposing quota restrictions on the export of Swaziland timber in 
order to safeguard South African pulp mills Gibb (2006). This period reflects the little 
power Botswana had in developing independent institutions and strategies for trade. The 
adoption of South African institutions for trade, created a dependency on South Africa 
from early on in the two countries’ history.  
During the period 1910-1969 the HCTs were characterized by economic 
vulnerability and political uncertainty. The territories remained heavily reliant on the 
Union for revenue and markets, with little to no influence over their own economic 
destinies. Both South Africa and Britain pursued a deliberate policy of active 
underdevelopment, albeit for dissimilar political reasons (ibid). The agreement was 
colonial in origin and reflected South Africa’s geostrategic desire to transfer the HCTs to 
South Africa. Second the agreement peripheralized the HCT and reinforced their 
subordinate position relative to South Africa. The HCT's tariff policies, industrial were de 
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facto transferred to the Union, essentially institutionalizing a transfer of sovereignty to 
the Union. Third, South Africa established a precedent of altering the agreements by 
protecting markets and changing the terms of market access. Lastly, the absence of an 
independent institutional structure designed to govern the Customs Union, maintained a 
profoundly unequal and asymmetric relationship between the BLS and South Africa.   
The inequities of the 1910 SACU agreement and the independence of the HCT in 
the 1960’s led to a renegotiation of the SACU agreement. The new agreement established 
the Customs Union Commission36 composed of representatives of all five members as the 
primary, but consultative, body of the customs union. By now, SACU had incorporated 
Namibia.  Similar to the 1910 Agreement, South Africa had the power to determine 
unilaterally SACU customs tariffs, rebates, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, 
excise and other duties. However the new agreement required South Africa to consult 
with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS).  
SACU tariff policy remained formulated and determined by South African 
institutions. In practice, Gibb (2006) argues the South African Board of Tariffs and Trade 
(BTT), an influential quango (quasi nongovernmental organization), funded by the South 
African Department of Trade and Industry and with no BLNS representation, had 
authority to make recommendations that were generally accepted. The absence of BLNS 
power to challenge South Africa, or even influence SACU policy, was illustrated by the 
creation and operation of the Custom Union's infant industry protection policies. Under 
Article VI of the Agreement the HCTs were allowed to: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 However, Gibb 2006 argues that the real power of SACU lay in the ad hoc Liaison Committees.  
214 
	  
“…levy additional duties on goods... to enable new industries ... to meet 
competition from other producers or manufacturers in the common customs area”. 
Although the 1969 Agreement made provision for industries of major importance 
(ArticleVII) and infant industries (Article VI) any action had to be sanctioned by Pretoria 
which had the right to deny access to the South African market to those goods afforded 
protection. Thus, whilst the 1969 SACU Agreement allowed for infant industry 
protection in order to encourage the development of the less advanced members and to 
afford all parties equitable benefits from trade, the reality on the ground was more 
complex. South Africa found itself unwilling to allow the HCTs to protect infant 
industries that could threaten South African trade. 
Only in the post-apartheid era, with the end of white minority rule in South Africa 
did meaningful negotiations commence on the range of issues? to address in the 1969 
agreement. Both the 1910 and 1969 SACU agreements had democratic deficiencies, with 
BLNS never having the ability to determine their own tariff and excise policies. This 
represented a serious loss of sovereignty and affected several key policy areas, including 
industrial, fiscal and development policies. The nature and extent of South Africa's 
institutional dominance of SACU, although embedded in the region's colonial experience, 
remained virtually unchanged for 94 years. Since 1889, the white-ruled parts of southern 
Africa dominated completely the various customs union conventions. After 1990, the 
customs union was referred to SACU as a 'colonial relic' and Nelson Mandela described 
the organization as a 'reflection of the colonial oppressor's mentality'. The institution was 
seen as colonial, undemocratic and, perhaps most importantly, a legacy of South Africa's 
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apartheid past. This led to steps by the Mbeki administration to renegotiate the agreement 
for a third time in 2002.The new SACU agreement signed on October 21, 2002 in 
Gaborone was far more comprehensive containing 51 articles and encompassed three 
main sections: institutions and governance, trade liberalization and regulation and 
revenue sharing. 
Early Botswana- South Africa relations can be understood within the context of 
semi-dependency, derived from the role of the South African mining industry. South 
Africa benefitted from the relationship through mining and trade profits extracted from 
Botswana’s cheap labor reservoir as well as from a market for South African 
manufactured products exported to Botswana that posed limited competition.  
 
Apartheid South Africa’s Relations with Independent Botswana 
The formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) [now African Union 
(AU)] in 1963 saw the institutionalization of pan-Africanism as well as a regional 
approach to undermining the regimes of African countries still under white minority rule.  
One of the main guiding principles of the OAU was its dedication to the eradication of all 
forms of colonialism, although its main challenges were in white minority led southern 
African countries. The OAU proposed two ways of ridding the continent of colonialism. 
First, it would defend the interests of independent countries and help to pursue those of 
still-colonized ones. Second, it would remain neutral in terms of world affairs, preventing 
its members from being controlled once more by outside powers.  
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The OAU strategy vis-à-vis white minority regimes consisted of two forms of 
activity. First it involved diplomatic action, both in Africa and in the United Nations 
whose objective was principally to impose sanctions on and to isolate the target regimes. 
Second the OAU strategy entailed financial and material support to liberation movements 
fighting white supremacist governments (van Walren, 1999). It created the OAU 
Liberation Committee, based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to channel assistance to black 
nationalists. Individual African states, notably Tanzania and Zambia, voluntarily 
provided rear bases and training for guerrillas, while Angola, Mozambique, and 
Zimbabwe were the “front line” states. 
According to van Walren (1999), it took until the late 1970’s for South Africa to 
be faced with a binding embargo. Boycott measures against the apartheid regime were 
taken relatively early on in the symbolic fields of support and culture. The OAU’s 
sanctions policy consisted mainly of attempts to increase the isolation of the apartheid 
regime 
At the Addis Ababa conference it had been resolved to: 
? Break off diplomatic ties with Portugal and South Africa 
? Prohibit imports from these white minority led countries 
? Close ports and airfields to South African and Portuguese planes and shipping and 
forbid their aircrafts from over-flying African states. 
The OAU strategy implied that not only should all member states agree to the 
means in which it sought to eradicate white minority rule in southern Africa, but it 
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assumed that all members were in similar economical, geographical and military position 
as regards to the target regimes. Upon independence in 1966, Botswana became a 
member of the OAU.  It argued that it could neither cut its links with South Africa, nor 
could it afford to harbor guerillas of liberation movements in view of its economic, 
geographical and military vulnerability. Botswana thus claimed the right to formulate its 
policies independently of the OAU, such as banning guerillas from its territory. 
Botswana’s refugee policy noted that the progress of the country towards becoming a 
democratic, prosperous and non-racial country could only be safeguarded by the strictest 
neutrality in its dealings with its white minority led neighbors: South Africa to the south, 
Namibia to the west, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe to the East and Northern Rhodesia/Zambia to 
the north. It acknowledged that all its neighbors were more powerful than itself bit 
emphasized that this was a “counsel of caution but not of timidity” (Masire, 2007:266). It 
however agreed to provide asylum to persons who would face loss of liberty as a 
consequence of political opinion if they returned to South Africa. In his memoir Very 
brave or Very Foolish, former Botswana President Sir Quett Ketumile Masire (2007) 
acknowledges that although Botswana emotionally and sentimentally empathized with 
the plight of the black nationalists of South Africa to remove discrimination, improve 
black empowerment and political equality,  they pursued a pragmatic approach, 
harmonizing their refugee policies with the UN Convention on Refugees and working 
through the organs of the United Nations rather than bilaterally. This act by Botswana 
although morally ambiguous, was a way to safeguard Botswana’s interests and 
institutions.  
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However, Botswana came under fire with apartheid South Africa over its 
perceived willingness to provide safe haven for the African National Congress (ANC) 
military wing, Unkhonto We Sizwe (MK), as well as various other black nationalist 
groups like the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA). Although Botswana 
officially barred ANC use of its territory as a base for assaults against South Africa, the 
ANC dishonored this policy throughout the 1980s, provoking several small-scale attacks 
by the South African Defense Forces (SADF) against ANC bases in Botswana. Although 
Botswana did express rhetorical condemnation against apartheid, it remained 
geographically and economically too vulnerable to South Africa deterring it from 
implementing any sanctions against South Africa, the only OAU member to do so. 
Furthermore, through SACU it maintained extensive but unpublicized trade relations 
(Brynes, 1996). This dissertation argues that Botswana neutrality towards apartheid South 
Africa can be viewed within the context of attempting to maintain institutional 
development in Botswana.  
 
Botswana-South Africa Relations and Domestic Developments in Botswana 
South Africa remains Botswana’s biggest neighbor and largest trading partner 
even in post-colonial times. Access to the sea remains exclusively through South African 
territory and up until 1976, the Botswana economy utilized the South African rand. 
Employment in and remittances from South Africa played a larger role at independence 
than cash employment at home. According to Masire (2007) the entirety of Botswana’s 
capital was in the Imperial reserve in Mafeking, South Africa.  
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Apart from being a strong economic player, South African hegemony in 
Botswana also plays out via its cultural influence. Botswana citizens read South Africa 
media, consume South African products, support South African sports teams, watch 
South African television shows and listen to South Africa music. The Botswana 
Broadcasting Corporation only hosts one television channel and South African Broadcast 
channels are widely available free of charge over Botswana airwaves, if a Motswana 
purchases a receiver. Ramidemoosi of the Botswana Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation acknowledged the cultural links, particularly because of 
Tswana in South Africa who are greatly represented.  
However, apart from the trade arena, post-apartheid South Africa’s relations with 
Botswana have not yielded much influence over domestic developments and institutional 
development in Botswana. Botswana has maintained autonomy over its domestic affairs, 
even countering South Africa over issues such as the crisis in neighboring Zimbabwe. 
However, one key tie that Botswana still has with South Africa is the company De Beers, 
founded by former Cape Colony Prime Minister Cecil Rhodes. The following section will 
discuss in depth how De Beers remains a key agent in Botswana’s institutional quality.  
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State - Firm Relations 
 
The third type of relationship that this dissertation is concerned with is that of 
states and important non-state actors. The contemporary international system is occupied 
by several mutually unique actors, including nation-states and multinational 
corporations37. States are territorially defined and provide a framework for the political, 
economic, social and cultural activities of domestic actors, in addition to pursuing 
national interests in order to promote the welfare of their population.  Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) on the other hand, expand their operations irrespective of state 
boundaries and cope with diverse political, economic, social, and cultural environments 
of acquired markets. Like all other firms, multinationals are driven primarily by private 
interests based on economy of scale, effective management, and global economic trends 
(Steinbockova 2007).  In sub-Saharan Africa, there exists an asymmetry in the 
relationship between states and multinational corporations, particularly those whose 
economies are based in the extractive industries. This is apparent in Botswana’s dealings 
with De Beers, which will be analyzed in-depth in a subsequent section. This section 
provides analytic background to the concept of state-firm relations.  
According to Kempton and Du Preez (1997) states’ strategic interests have 
evolved from primarily being the pursuit of power over territory, to increased 
competition for wealth within territories. As a result, wealth has become a primary end of 
statehood and no longer just a means of territorial expansion. They argue that states 
became the custodians of wealth creating capabilities of the institutions within their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Although multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations and other external actors are 
important, they have little significance to this analysis.  
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jurisdiction. One major result of this reorientation of state goals heralded a new 
partnership as well as a new competition with transnational firms (ibid). States have 
become dependent on transnational firms as they possess the capital, technology, 
expertise, and access to global markets that states require to transform their resources and 
labor into domestic wealth. Transnational firms provide states with technology, access to 
global sources of capital and access to major markets. Similarly, firms cannot function 
without the labor and raw materials which only states can provide. However due to the 
dependency of states on firms to achieve basic developmental goals, weaker states have 
found this juxtaposition of states and firms challenging particularly in terms of the 
amount of clout a multinational company can exert over a state.  
Vernon (1971) argues that the state no longer possesses sufficient control over its 
economic affairs due to the fact that MNCs have proven the ability to provide domestic 
economic welfare as well as establish effective production of goods on a much more 
efficient scale than the governments. Two major propositions back up Vernon(1971)’s 
claim that the majority of governments are unwilling or unable to sacrifice the advantages 
that transnational firms bring to the economy; and that most states are bound by the 
global strategies of the MNCs and as a result are unable to respond to the provisions of 
their home state’s jurisdiction. As a result, Vernon views the preponderance of MNCs as 
heralding the decline of state sovereignty. De Beers’s infiltration over the most important 
industry in Botswana provides insight into how a weak state can be vulnerable to a 
powerful multinational company.  
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Steinbockova (2004) reveals some interrelated aspects of the relationships 
between MNCs and nation-states from the literature. She argues that the costs and 
benefits associated with MNCs tend to be unevenly distributed across states, and 
challenged Vernon’s assertion that MNCs and states are partners in development. This 
concern is at the heart of dependencia theories. Steinbockova (2004) alleges that 
accepting foreign private investment from developed states increases economical 
technical and cultural dependency of less developed countries. She cited Poynter (1985) 
who compares foreign direct investment and the presence of MNCs in developing 
countries to a Trojan horse through which the outside states can exert their influence on 
the host nation. .Steinbockova (2004) also argues that the weakening of national control 
over the economy and economic actors due to multinational enterprise’s increasing role 
as the primary agents of interdependence, limits states control over domestic economy.  
MNC’s are concerned with raising profitability and growth while states seek to include 
the operations of private sector into their policy strategies how to promote economic and 
social welfare of their citizens. De Beers’ partnership with the Botswana government is 
reminiscent of this, as will be elaborated in the subsequent section. The company made 
strides towards maintaining the status quo in order to increase its share of benefits from 
the extractive industry in Botswana.   
According to Leonar, (1980) multinationals stimulate certain patterns and 
processes of economic development that may have long term political reverberations, 
particularly for developing countries.  They tend to promote economic development 
primarily in the modern sector, thereby reinforcing existing societal dualisms. They 
perpetuate bias towards the production of certain products, stimulate certain consumption 
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and utilize central technologies, all of which may help to further increase the gap between 
the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural. As a matter of self-interest, multinational 
corporations will normally use their economic power in bargaining to extract concessions 
from governments on matters such as protection, tax rebates, investment allowances, 
choice of factory sites, and access to resources. Because they deal primarily with elite 
groups in the business and governmental sectors, they may encourage patterns of external 
orientation that may alienate these groups from the wants and needs of the masses. 
Moreover, multinational corporations may well tie a developing country into 
international networks of mutual interdependence that will narrow social choices within 
as well as among countries.  
Apter (1980) developed a set of hypotheses about multinationals and developing 
countries which he deems middle-range hypotheses. First, he argues that with a greater 
degree of modernization, a state becomes more vulnerable to the influence of advanced 
industrial societies, particularly through multinational corporations. Second, as the degree 
of modernization increases and multinational presence, so does the political stability. 
Third, in the tertiary stage of modernization if a multinational is to protect and enlarge its 
investment, it becomes necessary for it to meddle politically (Leonar 1980:464). This 
dissertation’s findings greatly reflect these three prescriptions. Botswana’s close 
partnership with De Beers has been viewed as being pro-Western and has attracted 
further investment into the country. De Beers has also facilitated expanding its own 
investment and economic aspirations by intervening in Botswana’s politics. The 
following section will further examine the impact of De Beers on institutional quality in 
Botswana.  
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 THE ROLE OF DE BEERS IN BOTSWANA’S DEVELOPMENT 
There have been many constants in the Botswana story – the fact that the 
Botswana Democratic Party has been in power since independence in 1966, the fact that 
the economy has, to a large extent, failed to diversify to other sectors, and the close 
relationship that the Botswana government has maintained with De Beers. This section 
examines the role and impact that the close relationship with De Beers has yielded at 
these pivotal points. It begins with a broad analysis of De Beers as a whole, particularly 
within its context as a multinational of South African origin, and then examines the role 
of the multinational in Botswana’s economic and political institutional development.  
De Beers has garnered critical acclaim as the world’s leading diamond company. 
Since its inception in 1888, it has lived up to this reputation through unrivalled expertise 
in the exploration, mining, and marketing of diamonds. De Beers has dominated the 
diamond industry, diamond mining, diamond hops, diamond trading, and industrial 
diamond manufacturing sectors for over 120 years. By the mid-1960s, the company was 
active in every category of industrial diamond mining: open-pit, underground, large-scale 
alluvial, coastal and deep sea with the bulk of mining operations occurring in Botswana, 
Namibia, South Africa and Canada.  The company’s founder Cecil John Rhodes got his 
start around 1871, and by 1889, De Beers controlled diamond distribution channels via 
strategic negotiations with the London-based “Diamond Syndicate,” an alliance of 
diamond merchants; based on the maintenance of high prices and a notion of scarcity 
(Kretschemer, 1998). The company gained a reputation for utilizing monopolistic policies 
directed at the manipulation of the global diamond market via the employment of various 
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strategies. First, the company convinced independent producers to join a single channel 
monopoly. Second, it flooded the market with diamonds similar to those of producers 
who refused to join the cartel. Third, it purchased and stockpiled diamonds produced by 
other manufacturers in order to control prices through supply, (Lopus, 2003).  These three 
structures largely remained unchanged, and to a great extent have benefitted Botswana 
though stabilizing the global price of diamonds. Sight holders purchased the diamonds 
through the Central Selling Organization (CSO), a subsidiary of De Beers, which acted as 
a quality regulator and set the market price. Historically, the CSO controlled over 
80percent of the world’s diamond trade, however recently that share has dropped to a 
range between 65 and 75percent (Mail and Guardian, Nov 4, 2011).  
De Beers remains a tight-knit organization. Diamond producers are nominally 
diamond mines that are state-run in countries whose economic outputs are heavily 
skewed towards the extractive mining industry. These producers relationship with the 
company has been beneficial in insuring a steady inflow of foreign direct investment. 
Diamond dealers, on the other hand, enjoy predictability of prices and their continual 
increase over time, a burden carried only by consumers (Kretschemer, 1998). Ultimately, 
De Beers mainly benefits charging extortionate fees to diamond producers and charging 
discretionary process to diamond merchants, a situation that has greatly stabilized price 
fluctuations of diamonds to the benefit of producer countries like Botswana.  
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De Beers in Botswana 
Botswana hosts the world’s largest, most profitable and longest-life diamond 
mines in the world. Carat-wise, it is the most valuable diamond producer with a mined 
output in 2006 of 34.3 Mct (mega carats) valued at US$3.38 billion at an average of 
US$98.50/cy, a 7.5percent increase over 2005 when 31.9 Mct, values at US$3.13 billion, 
was mined. This output amount represents about a quarter of the world’s entire diamond 
production by value. It is widely claimed that sound macroeconomic policies and prudent 
use of diamond reserves have placed Botswana among the fastest developing economies 
in the world. As of 2007, the mining sector accounted for 90percent of the country’s total 
export earnings, 50percent of government revenue as well as a third of the country’s 
GDP. It is also widely cited that what facilitated this success was Botswana’s dominant 
relationship with the De Beers cartel. With the demand of diamonds increasing and very 
few discoveries made globally, Botswana has had unprecedented leverage in the diamond 
market, negotiating lucrative contracts with De Beers over the course of five decades.   
(Even-Zohar, 2007). Figure 6.1 shows World Diamond Productions in 201138. 
 
Figure 6.1 shows World Diamond Productions in 2011 
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  http://geology.com/articles/gem-diamond-map/	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Botswana’s second president Sir Quett Ketumile Masire (2007), in his memoir 
Very Brave of Very Foolish: Memoirs of an African Democrat asserts that since the 
1950’s Botswana dealt exclusively with Anglo-American/De Beers groups of companies. 
At the time, Anglo American Plc. was one of the world’s largest and most lucrative 
mining companies, with the largest share of gold production. De Beers was the largest 
producer of diamonds, controlling the vast majority of the world market share via its 
Central Selling Organization (CSO). Both Anglo and De Beers were controlled by the 
Oppenheimer family. De Beers began prospecting for diamonds in Botswana in 
1955(Even Zohar, 2007). The pioneer team of geologists was led by Gavin Lamont. A 12 
year prospecting led to the discovery of kimberlite, an ore that is indicative of the 
presence of diamonds, in Mochudi, and Harry Oppenhiemer informed Seretse Khama and 
Peter Fawcus about this discovery believing it was a viable deposit. In 1967, they 
continued prospecting, moving further north into Botswana and the first Orapa discovery 
was made in March 1967. The Orapa pipe39 was the world’ second largest pipe by area, 
after the Mwadui pipe in Tanzania, with a surface area of 146ha. According to Masire 
(2007), De Beers undertook the financing and execution of the entire diamond project 
including the infrastructure, mine and township, which was developed as a closed town 
for reasons of diamond security. In reaching the agreement with De Beers, Quill Hermans 
led the negotiating team. In 1967, the government received 15percent of the equity in the 
mining company in exchange for granting the mining lease, a 10percent royalty on 
diamond sales and income tax on the profits of the mine (Masire, 2007). This is a unique 
arrangement seeing that Botswana is the only government in the world to have a stake in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The word “pipe” here refers to a “kimberlite pipe”, a subterranean geological feature known to contain 
precious and semi-precious gemstones. 
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the company. This deal is considered particularly beneficial to Botswana as it increased 
the government’s bargaining power in negotiations and allows it to gain profits from 
abroad. Neighboring Namibia only places a representative - the permanent secretary of 
the Ministry of Mines and Energy, in De Beers´ board (Rieckeman, 2008). According to 
BenchMark, De Beers paid Botswana $20 million for a diamond concession in 1969, an 
investment which returned $60 million in profits that same year. De Beers Botswana 
Mining Co was then established to develop the deposit and the mine went into production 
in 1971, this was about the same time that the Indian diamond industry was taking off, 
becoming an important user of the relatively cheap Orapa rough. Orapa’s production 
averaged 2.5 Mct/y in the 1970s.  
In 1972, another mine was discovered Jwaneng mine, which was to be the largest 
gem diamond mine in the whole world. Ultimately, the discovery of the second mine 
gave Botswana the leverage to renegotiate the relationship with De Beers40. Between 
1967 and 1973, De Beers’s geologists located three richly diamondiferous kimberlite 
pipes in Botswana, with the eventual result that this poor under-populated nation in the 
Kalahari Desert would become the third in the world in diamond production as measured 
by carat weight, behind only Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) and Australia. 
In 1975 Lethlakane mine began operations. 
Botswana has led the world in diamond production as measured by value since 
the early 1990s. Many kimberlites occur in the country besides the main three (Orapa, 
Letlhakane and Jwaneng) and many smaller mines are now in operation. Nearly all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Secrecy surrounds the content of all negotiations between De Beers and Botswana. This information is 
not available to the public. 
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diamond production is controlled by the Debswana Diamond Company, a joint venture 
firm of which 50percent is owned by De Beers and 50percent by the government of 
Botswana.  Debswana emerged from a pact to govern the distribution of diamond revenue 
between the government and De Beers. The agreement’s contents have largely remained 
confidential. In fact, secrecy and anonymity have shrouded the multinational company to 
the extent that most people are now paranoid of its dealings (Mokhawa, 2005). The 
Botswana government is estimated to take about 75 percent of diamond mining income 
typically in the form of royalties, taxes and dividends.  The Central Selling Organization 
(CSO) – De Beer’s marketing arm, carried out the marketing of Botswana diamonds. 
Botswana currently contributes 60 percent of total sales through the CSO (ibid). 
Botswana’s original mining venture through Orapa was lucrative to the point that De 
Beers could recoup its investment within two years of the mine’s operation. Accordingly, 
the Botswana government as able to negotiate its shareholding in Debswana from 15 to 
50 percent. This invigorated a dividend policy that took full advantage of revenues to its 
fiscus41.  
According to Neo Moroka, the CEO of De Beers Botswana, the Botswana 
government and De Beers created Botswana Diamond Valuing Company (BDVC), a 
joint venture between De Beers and the investment arm of the Botswana government, the 
Botswana Development Corporation. In 1987, Botswana Mining Company (BMC) was 
given a shareholding of 5percent in De Beers Group, and through that the government of 
Botswana was entitled to sit on the De Beers board. The BMC was renamed in 1992 De 
Beers Diamond Company. In 1982, of significance was the completion of Orapa House 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The only other 50/50 joint venture that De Beers has is with the government of Namibia called NamDeb. 
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which is an iconic diamond building accommodating the sorting and valuing of 
diamonds. In 1998 De Beers dual listed its shares on the Botswana Stock Exchange, only 
to delist in 2001. The same year, the company was privatized and the Government of 
Botswana took in a 15percent stake. The following year, Damtshaa mine began 
operations. In 2006 the government established the Diamond Trading Company 
Botswana (DTCB).  At that time there was a sales agreement that allowed De Beers to 
sell diamonds until 2010. Also De Beers in 2007, of significance DTCB in the interest of 
beneficiation, the DTCB signed agreements with cutting companies. Sixteen companies 
were licensed in 2007 to cut and polish diamonds and these companies were to cut 
US$500 million worth of diamonds. The DTCB building was open in 2008.  
 
De Beers’ Impact on Economic Development in Botswana 
It is without doubt that De Beers has played a central role in transforming 
Botswana’s geologic luck into economic development. According to De Beers 
Botswana’s CEO Neo Moroka, the company has a simple operating philosophy – “living 
up to diamonds”. This has enabled the company to make a lasting contribution to both 
national and community development. This contribution has mainly been a result of 
mining infrastructural development as well as a translation of the De Beers’ commitment 
to corporate social responsibility reflected in a number of community development 
projects.  More importantly with the potential that De Beers saw in the fact that it was a 
long term project not a short term. With the demand of diamonds increasing and very few 
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discoveries made globally, Botswana found itself with leverage in the diamond market, 
negotiating lucrative contracts with De Beers over the course of five decades.  
Debswana is the government’s single largest employer. It employs 600 workers at 
its mines across the country and has facilitated the economic growth of Botswana. Over 
the past decade, on the back of a persistent global commodity price boom in diamonds, 
the Botswana economy grew annually between 12 and 13 percent. The 1980s saw the 
burgeoning of hospitals, schools and roads. Botswana followed a statist model for the 
delivery of universal free health and education until 2006, when extensive privatization 
began.  
Perhaps De Beers’ best impact to Botswana’s economy has been the fact that its 
monopolistic practices have increased predictability and stability of governmental 
revenue streams. This has greatly improved the country’s export earnings, with gross 
official reserves as high as USD 8.8 billion in October 2011; an equivalent of about 19 
months of imports of goods and services. Botswana’s outstanding external debt level is 
relatively low and sustainable, despite its recent rise following the global economic and 
financial crisis, and its credit rating is relatively high. In lowering its external debt, the 
country has ongoing fiscal consolidation measures that focus on completing current 
infrastructure projects and limiting expenditure on high return projects (Africa Economic 
Outlook, 2013). 
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Figure 6.2 Botswana trend in GDP per capita (USD) (1980-2010) 
Source: International Economic Statistics 
De Beers has had a negative impact on Botswana’s economy through active 
efforts to stifle diversification from the diamond and mining industries. Even-Zohar 
(2007) alleges, without elaborating, that De Beers has vehemently opposed Botswana’s 
aspirations to diversification particularly in the manufacturing sector42 and has given ‘lip-
service’ to domestic beneficiation, assuring that manufacturing would not be profitable.  
He argues that the company did everything to prevent the establishment of token 
manufacturing units.  On the issue of Botswana diversification, Gary Ralfe, managing 
director of De Beers stated: 
42 Botswana had limited manufacturing. From 1994 to 200 they hosted a Hyundai car assembly plant in 
Gaborone. However, in 2000 it was relocated to South Africa.  
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“... Particularly in the case of Botswana [the absence of manufacturing] is a 
recognition of economic realities. Botswana’s best interests are served precisely by 
having diamonds polished in the places where they can most economically be polished. 
Botswana is such a major [rough] producer and the Botswana government has such a 
clear view about these matters, that they recognize the truth of this. For a major diamond 
producer like Botswana, it would be national folly to prescribe that any percentage of 
their diamonds needed to be beneficiated locally. What Botswana, as the world’s major 
producer of diamonds needs to do, is to ensure that diamonds reach the place where they 
can achieve the highest price and that gives by far and away the best returns in terms of 
fiscal revenue.” (Grynberg, 2013:5) 
The Botswana Federation of Trade Unions argues that “...broad-based economic 
development can only be achieved when all Botswana citizens have access to the means 
of production. This invariably implies that government should empower Botswana 
citizens to participate in economic development as creators of wealth. Botswana citizens 
should be weaned from the culture of servitude and instead, an entrepreneurial culture 
should be promoted” (van Wyk, 2009:27).  
De Beers’s change of heart toward beneficiation in Botswana emerged from the 
reduction in its market share.  Figure 6.3 shows De Beers lowering market share over a 
25 year period: 
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Figure 6.3: The Decline of De Beers Market share percentage (1990 -2011) 
Source: Grynberg (2013:4) 
 
Currently, ongoing programs to address Botswana’s economic challenges include 
the National Economic Diversification Drive Strategy (NEDDS). NEDDS intends to 
improve the productive capacity of domestic firms and is expected to make considerable 
contribution to job creation and economic growth in Botswana. Furthermore, Ipelegang, a 
labor intensive government initiative was launched to provide for youth employment and 
create development funds in addition to providing social safety nets, (Africa Economic 
Outlook, 2013). 
It is difficult to argue that Botswana has not benefitted from the partnership with 
De Beers, but the issue of beneficiation has brought light the inadequacies of the 
partnership. Unlike in neighboring Namibia where beneficiation and downstream 
processing has been promoted in first place to generate employment, it is only recently 
that De Beers finally relented and agreed to have diamond beneficiation in Botswana by 
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moving the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) from London to Gaborone, enabling 
some beneficiation. Beneficiation, i.e. lowering the dependence from extractive mining to 
other activities such as polishing and cutting, has for the most part not progressed, not 
because of the government’s lack of willingness, but mainly because of De Beers 
dragging its feet and sometimes even sabotaging the efforts. According to the Sunday 
Standard (2006-12-04), De Beers sabotaged the Belgian diamond cutting company, 
Mabrodium, by selling rough diamonds at an exorbitant, non-negotiable price. The 
company left without ever making a profit. Similarly, the Teemane cutting plant set up in 
Serowe and Lazare Kaplan complained that their cutting factory in Molepolole was 
making losses because the diamond mix it bought from De Beers did not make for a 
viable enterprise. However when compared to other countries where De Beers operates 
like Namibia or where diamond companies are nationalized like Endiama in Angola the 
scale of production of Botswana through its partnership with De Beers is unprecedented, 
hence, has been greatly beneficial.  
The cartel nature of De Beers meant that there were no competitors for Botswana 
to consider as alternative partners. Within this context, De Beers can be given credit for 
assisting Botswana to achieve its level of economic development as well as its strides 
towards facilitating community development and addressing the HIV/AIDS issue in the 
country. However, where it suited De Beers, the company thwarted efforts for Botswana 
to diversify its economy as well as to beneficiate, situations that would have led 
Botswana to be less dependent on the extractive diamond industry and would have 
created employment for Botswana citizens.    
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De Beers and Botswana’s Political Development 
As the government of Botswana’s partner of choice, De Beers has been central to 
the development of the political landscape in Botswana. A grim opinion of Botswana’s 
source of political stability emerges through contentions that it may be artificial stability 
orchestrated by De Beers in order to perpetuate an environment in which it would reap 
optimal profits, the goal of many private companies.  Evidence of this is mainly in the 
form of assertions of party funding, giving the Botswana Democratic Party an edge when 
it comes to elections. Many interview respondents argued that although elections in 
Botswana are for the most part free, they are hardly fair, due to De Beers being a 
benefactor to the BDP at various points in the country’s history.  This is largely viewed 
as undermining the democratic process. This section evaluates the influence of De Beers 
in Botswana’s political arena and analyzes its possible impact on political development in 
the country.  
 
De Beers and Political Party Financing in Botswana 
The overwhelming consensus among interview respondents on the state of 
Botswana’s democracy, was that in Botswana elections are free, but grossly unfair, thus 
undermining the democratic process. The issue of party funding in Botswana has been the 
contentious one. The main point of disputation is the symbiotic relationship that seems to 
exist between De Beers and the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). De Beers’ 
involvement with Botswana politics goes back to the early 1980’s, at the beginning of the 
Masire presidency. By this time, Botswana’s crucial socio-economic institutions were 
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already in place. However, De Beers played a decisive part in influencing the quality of 
those institutions yielding both positive and negative results.  
According to the Sunday Standard (January 18, 2010) on the eve of the 1984 
elections De Beers helped put together a financial bailout plan for the second Ketumile 
Masire administration. Behind this bailout were De Beers’s directors Peter Layden, 
former Debswana Managing Director, Louis Nchindo, and a South African lawyer, Len 
Fisher, who had handled the De Beers patent dispute with GE years before. De Beers 
procured an expatriate farm manager for Masire’s farming company, GM Five, as part of 
the rescue plan. De Beers helped secure a P 186 228 bank loan for Masire’s GM Five 
from Barclays Bank. During his subsequent term in office, GM Five owed De Beers close 
to P 1 million. In September 1987, GM Five made a request to De Beers for a reduction 
of the total amount owing of P805 910 by the costs associated with the farm manager of 
P164 466 and the amount paid directly to Barclays of P186 228 leaving a net amount 
owing of P455 216. GM Five proposed to round the figure up to a round P500 000. In 
response, De Beers placed a moratorium on the repayment of the loan P500 000 for a 
period of five years, allowing repayment of equal installments over the period.  
A decade later, De Beers, seeing BDP’s growing unpopularity and Masire’s 
worsening finances as potentially explosive, needed a plan to assist in securing a BDP 
victory in the 1999 election (Good, 2008).  De Beers and Anglo American engaged a 
consultant; University of Natal’s Professor Lawrence Schlemmer to assess the BDP’s 
prospects and the secretive Schlemmer Report duly recommended that new leadership 
was essential. The consultancy recommended that Masire should step down to pave way 
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for a newer generation of leaders in the form of Festus Mogae. With GM Five still 
heavily in debt, Masire was reluctant to relinquish power. As a compromise, De Beers 
offered more money to GM Five, ensuring an adequate retirement package for Masire 
evidenced by a P4million transfer from De Beers. This transfer was done with the 
assistance of a ghost company the Clairemont Corporation in Panama to GM Five, under 
the pretext that they were buying into the company. Proceeds from the fictitious sale of 
shares would then settle GM Five loans with Standard Chartered Bank, National 
Development Bank, Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board and other sundry liabilities. 
De Beers upheld that the entire scheme was orchestrated by former Debswana Managing 
Director Louis Nchindo and they did not benefit anything out of it (Sunday Standard, 
2012-01-18). 
In a written response to the allegations in 2010, De Beers’s spokesperson, Chipo 
Morapedi, stated that: 
 “While it is difficult to comment on the specific sequence of events that occurred 
more than 25 years ago, it is true that, given the company’s investments and experience 
in managing farms at the time, we were able to provide management assistance and a 
loan facility to former President Sir Ketumile Masire.” 
The statement from De Beers further said: 
 “The purpose of the loan was to help the then head of state by relieving him of 
the burden of debt and providing him with resources for the farm to be independently 
managed and so enabled him to attend to the duties of his office and matters of national 
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interest. Louis Nchindo put the idea to Sir Ketumile and also recommended the assistance 
to the company. This was done in his capacity as an employee of the company at the time. 
In the present day and age, the De Beers family of company’s operates in a completely 
different environment with clear policy guidelines governing donations and for 
disclosure.” 
De Beers was quick to add that the purpose of the loan was to help the president 
by relieving him of the burden of debt in his troubled farm in order for him to concentrate 
on matters of office and national interest. 
Debswana managing Louis Nchindo has since died under mysterious 
circumstances in Gaborone, while being tried for corruption charges (Mmegi, 2010). It 
was during his trial that evidence of De Beers loans to senior government officials 
emerged, with many believing his deaths may have resulted from a fallout caused by his 
role in whistleblowing or spilling the beans.  
According to interviews by the Botswana Congress Party (BCP)’s Dr. 
Gobotswang and Dr. Taolo, the bane of Botswana’s democracy is the absence of legal 
instruments to disclose the sources of party finance. Bhattacharya (2012) argued that 
there exists a strong correlation between how much a party spends and its electoral 
performance.  A study on British elections done by Johnston and Pattie (2008) estimated 
that an extra $3.58, of electoral spending corresponds to one additional vote. Following 
this formula, if this is correct then the extra P5 million ($623000.00) more that the BDP 
got from De Beers would result in 174000 extra votes. Had an even financial playing 
field existed, the outcome of the election could well have been different. Although the 
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calculations may be imprecise, the point remains: there is a significant inequality of 
wealth between political parties in Botswana and this certainly influences electoral results 
and political advantages. Campaign spending this is a way of deploying one’s resources 
so as to alter people’s voting intentions. The more elections are decided by arguments, 
the more democratic the political system is, the more other influences intrude, the less 
democratic it becomes. If campaign spending becomes a more significant determinant of 
electoral success, this moves us away from democracy (Bhattacharya, 2012). Both Dr. 
Gobotswang and Dr. Taolo argue that unfair party financing is the reason for opposition 
parties in Botswana being weak, and for the BDP maintaining an unfair advantage at 
elections. 
It is the view of this dissertation that institutional development in the main sector 
of the Botswana’s economy, its diamond industry, has greatly been influenced by a sense 
of “obligated loyalty” to De Beers. BenchMark, a Christian NGO based in South Africa, 
argues that "The great danger in Botswana is that because of the 'marriage' between De 
Beers and Botswana, and the dependence of Botswana on a single commodity produced 
by a single corporation, the state (particularly where a single party has controlled the state 
for an extended period) begins to behave as if it were a corporation placing the country 
under the near total control of the state under the management of the dominant party” 
(Mmegi, (09/23/2009)). In the case of Botswana, institutional choice and the relative 
longevity of institutions of private property have greatly been shaped by De Beers. Such 
institutions protect the property rights of current investors and provide political stability, 
albeit artificial. However, De Beers’ activities have weakened the constraints on political 
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elites, particularly within the ruling BDP. This inadvertently affects the participation of a 
broad cross-section of the society. Although this dissertation does not go so far as to 
claim the ineffectiveness of institutions of property rights in Botswana, which it believes 
have generally been effective when compared to extractive institutions in other resource-
richcountries, it argues that the biased loyalty to De Beers and Debswana by politicians 
especially the presidency, and the general ignorance about the diamond industry by the 
man on the street, have perpetuated the status quo and limited competition.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to illustrate the role of exogenous actors in 
determining the setting into which political and economic development in Botswana 
played out. Influences stemmed mainly from Botswana’s colonial engagement with 
Britain, its relationship with regional hegemon South Africa, and its symbiotic 
relationship with the diamond cartel, De Beers. Botswana’s limited colonial engagement 
can be understood primarily in comparative perspective, and this chapter borrowed 
influences from the South Korea and experiences as to how the actions of a colonial 
master can greatly shape the resultant institutions and developmental capacity of a 
country to either be developmental and cohesive capitalist, or to be neopatrimonial. 
However, Botswana experienced the same type of colonialism as Nigeria and adopted 
similar institutions upon independence but with totally different results, thus limiting the 
utility of the colonialism argument. Botswana’s relations with South Africa were more a 
result of a multi-faceted relationship between the South African government’s bid to limit 
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Afrikaner encroachment as well as its employment of the ideology of separate 
development. South Africa’s control of trade in southern Africa, particularly within the 
context of the South African Customs Union, is the greatest manifestation of South 
Africa’s hegemonic aspirations, affecting Botswana directly. However, South Africa’s 
impact was limited to trade institutions and little evidence of deliberate steering of 
Botswana’s institutional development exists elsewhere.   
By far the greatest external effector was De Beers, whose involvement in 
Botswana at a pivotal moment in history, helped transform Botswana from a poor arid 
country based on agriculture to a middle income developing country. De Beers’ influence 
can also be seen in its dealings with the Botswana Democratic Party, with evidence 
showing an inclination towards facilitating political stability and political financing in 
order to enhance De Beers’ own goals. This dissertation argues that De Beers’s 
involvement in Botswana’s economy helped transform Botswana into one that is 
competitive, and helped the country achieve sustained rates of economic growth over 
four decades. However, evidence exists to show that De Beers’ involvement in 
Botswana’s political institutions had the opposite effect. The company undermined 
democracy by providing unfair advantages during the election process to support the 
ruling BDP.  Hence, one may become skeptical to the robustness of Botswana’s 
institutions as De Beers’ intervention hints towards a “negative peace.” De Beers has for 
decades supported what Kenneth Good referred to as a “structured autocracy” and have 
choked Botswana’s political institutions to an extent where there is limited civil society 
and media, dominance of a single political party, extensive executive authority and 
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increased marginalization of minority groups such as the BaSarwa.  De Beers has blurred 
the lines between what counts as government interests and what counts as BDP interests, 
thus altering the political climate of the country into a de facto one-party state. 
Furthermore, De Beers stalled in beneficiating diamonds to Botswana; a situation which 
would have greatly benefitted the country’s poor by creating employment. In summary, 
rather than hint towards strengthening Botswana’s institutions, the De Beers factor 
provides evidence of undermining the democratic process in order to pursue its own 
interests of making profit.  
This chapter concludes by arguing that the evidence collected greatly undermines 
the hypothesis that Botswana’s institutional quality is a result of British colonialism, 
South Africa hegemony or De Beers’s partnership.  Although these three actors 
contributed to Botswana’s economic and political development, they were neither 
responsible for nor disruptive of Botswana’s institutions and institutional quality.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ANALYSIS, APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION 
Synopsis of Dissertation 
Botswana has garnered analytic attention for being an anomaly to the norm of 
missed opportunities for the resource-rich countries of the developing world. This 
dissertation confronted the question of why Botswana, a small landlocked country, 
managed to build institutions that assisted in it translating its natural resource wealth, 
diamonds, into a motor of one of the fastest growing economies in the world for nearly 
half a century, while maintaining a peaceful and democratic political atmosphere. 
Botswana escaped three resource curses that have been studied empirically: the curse of 
violent conflict, the curse of underdevelopment, and the curse of authoritarianism. 
Beginning from a place of near –consensus that institutions play an intermediary role in 
determining the fate of resource-rich countries, this research in essence interrogated the 
sources of institutional quality in Botswana.  
 The research examined four variables that it assumed to have plausibly 
contributed to Botswana’s high level of institutional quality. The variables were divided 
into two broad categories: endogenous sources and exogenous sources. Thus defined, 
endogenous factors encompassed those that originated from within the country, and have 
evolved over time within its system. In this research, the endogenous variables were 
identified as legitimacy and historical continuity, political culture and ethnic identity 
management. Exogenous variables, on the other hand, were those that originated from 
outside the state system, but were assumed to have had a profound impact on institutional 
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choice, quality and development. In the case of Botswana these exogenous variables were 
identified as the type and character of British colonialism, the role of De Beers, 
Botswana’s main economic partner, and the influence of the regional hegemon, South 
Africa.  
The goal of this chapter is to reconcile the resource curse literature addressed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, with the substantive analysis of variables done in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 
6, in order to evaluate the underlying reasons of what helped Botswana escape the 
resource curse through institutional quality. In doing so, a robust analysis of the 
significance of each variable in determining Botswana’s institutional quality can be done. 
In the following section, I utilize the legislature as the institution of choice in tracing the 
processes of institutions at work in Botswana’s diamond industry. I describe how those 
same processes help the understanding of, and provide context to the failure of other 
resource-rich countries which have exhibited the resource curse.  
 
Botswana’s Legislative Oversight in the Diamond Industry: A Comparative 
Analysis 
The legislature in Botswana is a key institution in determining decisions and 
policies surrounding the diamond industry. The supreme legislative authority in 
Botswana is the parliament, consisting of the President and the National Assembly. It acts 
in consultation with the House of Chiefs (Ntlo ya Dikgosi). The primary functions of 
Parliament are to pass laws, to scrutinize and monitor government policy, and to allocate 
funds for government expenditure. Botswana’s legislature is greatly involved in the 
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decisions that affect the country’s extractive sector, principally the diamond mining 
industry that dominates the economy. The president’s cabinet is selected from the 
legislative branch, with the Minister of Finance and Development Planning and the 
Minister of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources, being selected from this pool of 
elected officials. Because cabinet-level ministers have greater access to information and 
to the confidence of the president, they are more influential in the legislature. The 
Minister and Permanent Secretary of Finance and Development Planning and the 
Minister of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources and his Permanent Secretary, in 
addition to the Attorney General, the Governor of the Central Bank and the Office of the 
President, are all members of the board that represents the Botswana government in the 
public-private strategic partnership between De Beers and the government, Debswana.  
According to Bryan and Hofman (2007), members of Parliament in Botswana are 
free to exercise their power of scrutiny over the diamond industry and perform legislative 
oversight in the mining sector. Recently, the parliament of Botswana has debated over 
and rejected a proposed beneficiation law proposed by the Shoshong Member of 
Parliament aimed at increasing the efficiency of diamond beneficiation in Botswana in 
light of the transfer of DTCI (formerly CSO) to Gaborone. Parliament settled for a policy 
instead of a hard piece of legislation (Daily News Feb 22, 2013). Parliament is however 
excluded from the negotiation of agreements between the government and the private 
sector and this is largely left to the “experts”. For example, the renegotiation between De 
Beers and Botswana on 25 year lease renewals for the country’s four mines was 
presented to members of parliament only after the final negotiation. As a result, 
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parliament tends to be more reactive than proactive in the decision-making process (NDI, 
2007). Parliament voted for Botswana to voluntarily enter the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) an international standard that ensures transparency around 
countries’ oil, gas and mineral resources. In addition, it volunteered to join the Kimberley 
Process, an initiative to stem the flow of “conflict diamonds43” though the certification of 
source of origin for every diamond sold on the world market (ibid).  
The central piece of legislation regulating the diamond industry is the 1977 Mines 
and Minerals Act, amended in 1999. It streamlines the issuance of exploration and 
mining licenses, conferring three types of mineral rights: reconnaissance permits, 
prospecting licenses and mining leases, to either individuals or companies.  According to 
an interview with	  Nchidzi Mmolawa, Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Minerals, Energy and Water Resources, Botswana’s legislation imposes a variable 
income tax of between 25 and 50 percent in companies, determined annually by 
referencing the mining company’s profit ratio. The legislation allows the government to 
retain rights to the acquisition of interest in new mines for up to 15 percent. His 
colleague, Gabotshwarege Tshekiso, Chief Engineer at the Department of Mines added 
that applications for mineral rights are made to the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and 
Water Resources through the Geological Survey Department or the Department of Mines. 
All mining revenue in Botswana is considered to be “national” and is placed in the 
Central Bank account and dispatched to different governmental branches through 
National Development Plans (NDP). These plans are developed every six years by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 A conflict diamond (or blood diamond) is a diamond mined in a war zone and/or sold to finance an 
insurgency, invading army's war efforts, or a warlord's activity. 
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Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and include annual budgets and mid-term 
reviews. The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning has a central role in the 
development and implementation of the National Development plan.  
Botswana’s legislature monitors the performance of its extractive industry from 
decisions regarding the extraction of diamonds, to the allocation of funds obtained from 
the diamond revenue. Parliament has to approve the use of mineral revenues for the 
NDPs as is reflected in a speech by former President Festus Mogae to the African 
Development Bank’s 2008 Eminent Speakers’ Program.  
“It was agreed between Cabinet and Parliament, that the mineral revenues would 
be used only for capital projects. In turn these were to be approved by Parliament in a 
National Development Plan. We had five, sometimes six-year rolling National 
Development Plans which were reviewed and updated every three years. Over the years, 
the definition of capital or development projects was expanded to include recurrent 
expenditure on education and training and health services. It was argued that these were 
part and parcel of human resources development and that human beings were the 
country's most precious resource. Hence, 95% of Botswana students at tertiary 
institutions in and out of the country are paid for by government. For a new project to be 
implemented, it had to be included in the National Development Plan whose amendment 
had to be approved by parliament. This way, there was discipline in government 
expenditure and it minimized waste, certainly prevented extravagance on prestige 
projects. It also minimized or helped to minimize corruption. While the government 
initiated projects, determined priorities and responded to national emergencies such as 
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frequent droughts, Parliament helped monitor the implementation of agreed policies and 
development priorities. The Government also allocated or gives subventions to District 
and Town Councils based on a formula, which takes into account population, 
geographical extent, climatic conditions, levels of development, etc. The strength of these 
arrangements is their transparency and accountability. These arrangements and 
practices are overseen by the constitutionally entrenched Auditor-General, the Public 
Accounts Committee of Parliament, Parliament itself, a free press and independent 
judiciary.” 
Source: Presentation by his Excellency the former President of Botswana, Mr. 
Festus G. Mogae on “Extractive Industries and Africa’s Development: Lessons from 
Botswana” at the African Development Bank’s 2008 Eminent Speakers program. 
(http://www.slideshare.net/simandef/extractive-industries-and-africas-presentation)  
As is seen in President Mogae’s speech, Botswana’s legislature’s role in its 
extractive industry goes beyond the management of diamonds. They approve where the 
money is allocated and prioritize which types of projects the money is spent on. This is 
telling of the level of scrutiny and participation that this institution plays in Botswana’s 
escape of the resource curse. The management of resource revenues and creation of the 
National Development Plans involves a broadly based consultative system. The lower 
house, the House of Chiefs (Ntlo ya Dikgosi), reviews all decisions made by parliament 
and provides advice. Most of their chiefs’ advice is aimed at issues that affect tribal 
organization and property, as well as those that affect customary law.  
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This dissertation is of the view that Botswana’s institutional success, as is 
illustrated by the legislature’s role in the resource industry, is a result of both endogenous 
and exogenous sources of institutional quality, which were a result of historical 
development. The role of the House of Chiefs reflects the legitimacy that Botswana 
places on institutions present before the country became a republic. Although the House 
of Chiefs has no veto power in the legislature, according to an interview by Moroka 
Moreri, executive secretary of the Ntlo ya Dikgosi,  it is still consulted and most decisions 
require consensus from the lower house. The House of Chiefs also acts as a liaison 
between the grassroots and top level officials in policy-making roles.  With these sources 
of institutional quality, among others discussed in this dissertation, it is clear that the 
reason Botswana fares well is not because of the institutions themselves, but of the 
setting into which these institutions are immersed. Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo have similar legal and regulatory frameworks as Botswana 
surrounding natural resources. However, they do not experience the same level of 
institutional success as does Botswana.  
Similar to Botswana, Nigeria’s federal government has managed its oil revenues, 
including their allocation, centrally since 1970. It has similar joint-ventures with 
multinational corporations that parallel the role of Debswana in Botswana, which also 
claim to invest in the country to develop corporate social responsibility agendas. Nigeria 
is a member of EITI. However, unlike Botswana which has one key partner in the 
diamond industry, Nigeria has a wide portfolio of institutions participating in the 
extractive industry sector of the country. Among these is a joint venture between the 
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government with Shell, Agip, ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco: the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The NNPC which administers subsidiary interests in oil 
exploration and production as well as marketing of oil and oil products. In addition,  the 
Ministry of Petroleum regulates the oil industry; the Crude Oil Reconciliation 
Committee, performs the reconciliation of the various revenue streams held in public 
accounts and the Petroleum Products Sales Committee reconciles revenues received from 
refined petroleum product sales. The Federal Inland Revenue Service, the Central Bank 
of Nigeria and the Office of the Accountant-General of the Federation are also key in 
administering revenue collection (Bryon and Hofman, 2007). The central piece of 
legislation regulating the extractive industry in Nigeria is the Petroleum Act of 1969. 
In contrast to Botswana, years of authoritarian rule in Nigeria under both civilian 
and military regimes undermined the development of an autonomous legislature. In the 
years following military rule, Nigeria’s constitution extended the mandate of the National 
Assembly to establish committees, conduct investigations and approve the President’s 
budget.  NDI (2007) argues that both the senate and the house have committees keen on 
monitoring various extractive industry issues. These include budget, appropriations and 
public accounts committees to supervise budget creation and implementation. In 2001 an 
ad hoc committee was established by the House Speaker to facilitate the investigation of 
crude oil exportation and the importation of value-added products. It exposed 
inconsistencies that allegedly implicated prominent executive branch officials, 
uncovering the misuse of scholarship funds set aside to develop Nigeria’s oil industry 
(ibid).  
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Unlike in Botswana, Nigeria’s legislature does not engage in dialogue with 
constituents or with the executive on extractive industry issues. Consequently, tensions 
between the executive and legislative branches erupt periodically. One such instance was 
when the anticipated NEITI bill delayed in the House of Representatives for over a year 
prior to passage by both houses. The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(NEITI) was established to fortify extractive industry management and oversight but the 
bill was hindered by the legislature. According to former executive secretary of the 
NEITI Professor Assisi Asobie, the legislature itself was to be blamed for the corruption 
in Nigeria’s oil and gas sectors44. Nigeria’s legislators are widely believed to be 
dependent on the income generated from political connections, facilitated by their power 
and patronage networks. This perception has its carry-over from decades of scandal, 
fraud and corruption perpetrated by public officials and the persistent discontent over the 
lack of investigation and prosecution of offenders. This political culture of corruption and 
lack of trust in the country’s institutions, is what this study argues are the reasons for 
Nigeria’s failures in its extractive industry. In the case of Botswana however, corruption 
by both members of the legislature and key officials in the diamond industry is 
vehemently criticized. Former Debswana CEO Louis Nchindo and his cohorts Joseph 
Malope Matome, Garvas Nchindo and an unnamed Asian associate were arrested, 
charged and convicted of fraud and corruption45. Very little evidence of legislators taking 
part in corrupt practices was uncovered in this research.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  http://www.channelstv.com/home/2012/06/15/blame-­‐the-­‐legislature-­‐for-­‐corruption-­‐in-­‐oil-­‐and-­‐gas-­‐
neiti-­‐boss/	  	  
45	  http://www.sundaystandard.info/article.php?NewsID=9025&GroupID=1	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Angola’s legislative engagement with the natural resource sector is greatly 
undermined by laws of the country which reinforce executive control over all aspects of 
the country’s oil and diamond industries. President Dos Santos is directly involved in 
negotiating concessions with multinational oil companies and NDI (2007) reports that 
substantial profits from the sector go unrecorded. His daughter, Isabel Dos Santos 
recently was crowned Africa’s first female billionaire (Forbes, 2013), a feat hard to 
fathom without her father’s access to the diamond and oil industry. Although it is given 
oversight over the extractive industry, Angola’s legislature is highly partisan, with the 
ruling MPLA holding 129 seats, UNITA holding 70 seats and other parties having 16 
seats. According to Reed (2009), Angola’s National Assembly often prioritizes party 
loyalty above constituent interests and allegations that elected officials extract personal 
gain from oil and diamond revenue are rampant. As a result, the legislature itself is 
complicit in the mismanagement of the country’s extractive resources, a situation that 
greatly undermines the legitimacy of the legislature by the Angolan people. As far as 
consensus-building is concerned, Angola falls short. According to the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (2010), in Angola there is ample reason to doubt that elected 
officials are genuinely invested in facilitating a healthy market economy and democracy 
in the country. Skepticism abounds with legislators from UNITA simply pressing for the 
reprisal of power and benefits, while those from MPLA exploit the discourse of 
democracy to acquire some degree of legitimacy and credibility. As a result, garnering 
public consent and approval for policy goals and agreement on concrete objectives has 
proven difficult in Angola. Although the country is a member of the Kimberly Process 
and has undertaken a series of reforms to improve public accountability in the diamond 
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sector, these fall short of full disclosure. Bryon and Hofman (2007) state that Angola’s 
government is protected by a law on state secrets, passed by the National Assembly in 
2003. This law provides the legislature with broad powers to regulate the release and 
publication of information deemed damaging to national interests. Under this law, the 
government has the power to censor publications that expose proof of corruption. 
Furthermore, confidentiality clauses are also common in Angola’s oil contracts with only 
the president and a limited number of high-level cabinet ministers having full access to 
these agreements (ibid). This greatly undermines the legislation covering the oil industry 
(the Petroleum Act) and the mining legislation (Codigo Mineiro).  
According to this dissertation, the context to Angola’s failure in legislative 
oversight is due to its sources of institutional quality, and not the institution itself. The 
country’s culture of corruption undermines the processes of development in the resource 
sector. The lack of legitimacy of the MPLA government by UNITA supporters makes 
consensus building daunting. Ethnic divisions emerging from the country’s long civil 
war, created a divided state, and intervention during the Cold War of nuclear powers 
supporting opposing sides of the conflict, greatly exacerbated divisions, which are seen 
today in the country’s legislature and beyond.  
The DRC contains Africa’s largest deposits of copper, cobalt and coltan as well as 
significant reserves of diamonds, gold and other minerals (Even-Zohar, 2007). This study 
finds that the country’s history, including prolonged kleptocratic reign of Mobutu Sese 
Seko, two large-scale wars and rampant corruption in the country, is what disrupted the 
institutional foundation of the DRC and only through that context can the 
mismanagement of natural resources and the resultant experience of the resource curse  
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be understood. The study finds that even if the DRC has the right formal institutions in 
place, it will be difficult for it to achieve sustained economic and political development 
because of the sources of institutional quality (or lack of quality). 
The legal and regulatory framework of the DRC is similar to that of Botswana. It 
is directed by the Mining Code ratified by President Joseph Kabila in 2002. The Code 
was put in place to strengthen the regulation of the country’s key industry and to establish 
guidelines for granting exploratory and appropriative licenses. It provides a revenue 
sharing scheme for mining royalties that grants 60 percent to the central government, 25 
percent to provinces and 15 percent to social service projects at the local level and also 
regulates the sale and transportation resources and provides guidelines for artisanal 
mining. The ultimate responsibility for overall policy formulation and implementation is 
on the Minister of Mines. In addition, the Ministry Registry was established to enforce 
the Code’s regulations and carry out administrative functions, including processing, re-
issuing and cancellation of mining exploration permits. An area tax (taxe de superficie) 
and an administrative fee (droit superficiarie) are also imposed to increase transparency 
in mining concessions.  The Sercice d’ Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale 
Mining (SAESS_CAM) provides small scale artisanal miners technical support 
(McGuireWoods, 2013).  
The DRC is currently under the regime of the Constitution of the Third Republic 
after being in interregnum between two constitutions for three years (2003-06) 
(AfDB/OECD, 2006). The current constitution institutes a regionalized semi-presidential 
republic, which exercises a separation of powers between the three government branches, 
as well as an allocation of prerogatives between the central government and the 
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provinces. The current legislature’s oversight of the DRC took over the monitoring and 
surveillance of the extractive industry of the country from the transitional legislature of 
the interregnum which was appointed rather than elected. The transitional legislature’s 
requests to the executive for funds to conduct legislative oversight over the mining sector 
were largely ignored or denied. Occasionally they submitted questions to or summoned 
ministers to address issues of corruption and mismanagement of state-owned enterprises, 
resulting in the calls for suspension of several ministers. According to Dinka (2006) a 
trail of tainted minerals has been well-documented in the DRC's recent wars as 
belligerents in both sides of the conflict obtained supplies and military hardware in 
exchange for smuggled resources. To address this issue, the transitional legislature 
created the Lutundula Commission headed by	  Congolese lawmaker Christophe 
Lutundula, consisting of legislators representing the traditional pre-war opposition 
parties, government, and civil society. The commision’s goal was to gather inventory of 
all deals signed during the two wars, analyze the terms of these agreements and their 
financial impact, recommend validation, amendment or cancellation of each deal and 
recommend payment to the government or its nationals for any loses suffered as a result 
of any stated contracts (Dinka, 2006).  However it experienced failure due to the lack of 
full cooperation from the country’s former belligerent factions hampering its ability to 
investigate a number of cases due to ongoing instability in parts of the country. By the 
time the legislative elections were held, the Lutundula Commission’s report had not been 
deliberated by the legislature. The elected legislature of the third republic provided for a 
two chamber legislature consisting of a National Assembly elected by direct universal 
suffrage and a senate whose members were elected by provincial assemblies. It was 
257 
	  
parliament’s duty to determine government policies including public finance, property 
taxes and the exploitation of natural resources. However, due to pertinent issues 
surrounding the country’s institutional environment, the revisiting of the Lutundula 
Commission‘s findings which would facilitate more robust legislative oversight in the 
mineral sector of the country, has proven difficult (NDI, 2007).  
As the findings of this dissertation projects, due to the DRC’s violent past, the 
foundations for the adoption of new institutions under the third republic will be very 
difficult. According to Dinka (2006) the country faces daunting logistical and 
communication constraints across the country making citizens unaware of developments 
beyond Kinshasa. The current institutions were built on a shaky foundation, with current 
contracts in the mining sector having been signed prior to the implementation of the 
mining code by persons sometimes not authorized to do so (NDI, 2007). 
As is illuminated in the experiences of Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, it is neither the institution managing the oil or mineral resource 
sector, nor the institution that monitors or provides oversight of the natural resource 
sector that determines whether a country will escape the resource curse. Nigeria, Angola 
and the DRC all have joint ventures similar to the one that manages Botswana’s 
diamonds. In addition, the legal and regulatory frameworks of all four countries are 
similar. The key differences lie in the sources of institutional quality in each country. 
Botswana’s the tradition of openness, dialogue and transparency which is grounded in 
regular consultations between the legislature and the diamond industry, between the 
upper and lower houses of the National Assembly and between the leaders and citizens at 
the local level greatly complemented the country’s institutional quality and distinguishes 
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itself from other resource-rich countries in the region. Through the government’s 
requirements for equity participation and board representation in the mining sector, 
Botswana serves as an example of how to organize the extractive industry. It provides a 
model for a lucrative partnership between government and the international mining 
multinational. As a result, since independence the country has built a reputation as a 
model of good governance and economic progress. This is unlike the countries of Nigeria 
Angola and the DRC whose political foundations were set with values not compatible 
with sustained political and economic development. Table 6.1 revisits the key historical 
foundations of all four countries.  
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Table 6.1: Summary of Key Variables in Explaining Variations in Institutional 
Quality 
  
 
 
Angola Congo Nigeria Botswana Validity of 
Explanation 
Resource 
Policy 
Código Mineiro; 2004 
Petroleum Act 
Mining Code of 2002 Petroleum Act of 1969 Mines and Minerals 
Act of 1999 
Little distinction 
therefore low 
validity 
Institution 
implementing 
Resource 
Policy 
Oil - SONANGOL (joint 
ventures with BP, 
ChevronTexaco, 
ExxonMobil, Total & 
Petrobras) 
Diamonds - ENDIAMA 
– (joint ventures with De 
Beers,  Odebrecht, BHP 
Billiton, Alrosa, & Petra 
Diamonds Ltd 
 
GECAMINES – joint 
ventures with Eurasian 
Natural Resources Corp. 
(ENRC) (UK), Tiger (Aus) 
Resources Ltd. (TGS), 
Jinchuan Group of China, 
China Minmetals Corp. and 
Lundin Mining Corp. 
(LUN) of Canada. 
NNPC – joint ventures 
with Royal Dutch Shell, 
Agip, ExxonMobil, 
Chevron-Texaco 
DEBSWANA Little distinction 
therefore low 
validity 
Institution 
Monitoring 
Resource 
Policy 
Legislature Legislature Legislature Legislature Little distinction 
therefore low 
validity 
Legitimacy Portuguese colonialism 
disrupted institutions 
through assimilado with 
aim to achieve 
Portuguese citizenship 
once having reached 
arbitrary levels of 
“civilization”. 
Institutions disrupted 
during slave trade  
Brutal colonialism through 
concessions sold to various 
companies by King 
Leopold.  
Colonialism brought 
together distinct 
populations.   
Institutions were 
disrupted and those that 
persisted were in conflict 
with the formal 
institutions introduced 
during colonialism.  
Minimal colonialism 
allowed for 
perpetuation of 
existing institutions 
with the least 
disruption. Helped 
foster legitimacy of 
existing institutions 
which were carried 
into the post-colonial 
era. 
High distinction 
therefore high 
validity 
Political 
Culture 
Political development 
marred by corruption & 
violence due to civil 
war. General distrust of 
government. Secretive 
state laws reinforce 
corruption. Big man 
presidentialism & 
patronage systems lead 
to rent-seeking behavior. 
Lack of transparency & 
government 
accountability.   
Kleptocratic government 
under Mobutu condoned 
corruption, political 
repression and violence. 
Very limited accountability 
and transparency in public 
institutions.  
Political culture of 
violence along ethnic 
and religious lines. 
Ranked one of the most 
corrupt countries in the 
world. Rampant 
extrajudicial killings. 
Access to public office 
through patronage not 
through merit.   
Emphasizes mutual 
criticism, consensus 
and dialogue over 
conflict. Political 
culture manifested in 
the informal 
institution of the 
kgotla. 
High distinction 
therefore high 
validity 
Identity 
Formation 
Civil war fought along 
ethnic lines. Portuguese 
colonial administration 
attempted assimilado 
reshaping ethnic existing 
ethnic identities. 
Ethnically motivated 
secessionist movement 
threatened in Cabinda.  
Highly divided population 
with ethnic factions 
competing for resources and 
public office.  
Existence of 
demographic fault lines 
according to religion, 
geography and ethnicity 
Assimilation policy 
that promoted the 
Tswana culture and 
the subordination of 
all other cultures to 
foster peaceful 
coexistence. Created 
the façade of an 
ethnically 
homogenous state.  
Medium 
Distinction 
therefore medium 
validity 
External 
Factors 
Angolan Civil War was 
partially a Cold War 
proxy war. UNITA 
being funded by the US 
and its allies, and MPLA 
being supported by the 
Soviet Union who 
provided Cuban troops.    
DRC’s natural resources 
have attracted rapacious 
adventurers and 
unscrupulous corporations, 
as well as vicious warlords 
from outside the country. 
Furthermore, the war was 
intervened by corrupt 
governments. 
Myriad of external 
actors affected Nigeria 
particularly agents of the 
slave trade, the influence 
of Islam from the middle 
east, and the disruption 
of institutions by the 
British colonial 
administration.  
Strategic partnership 
with De Beers 
pivotal in economic 
success with limited 
impact on institutions 
esp. the executive. 
SA hegemony had 
limited impact on 
choice & quality of 
institutions except in 
SACU.  
Too much 
variation 
therefore low 
validity 
Outcomes Resource Curse Resource Curse Resource Curse Escape Resource 
Curse 
  
Source: Own 
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The summary of findings in Table 6.1 puts into perspective Botswana’s success 
vis a vis the natural resource sector, when compared to the resource-curse countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa. The legal and regulatory frameworks of the extractive industries of 
these countries claim to provide the same powers of oversight and intervention to the 
legislature. However, the experiences of each country were determined, not by the formal 
institutions supporting the natural resource sector, but the sources of institutional quality. 
As depicted in table 6.1, Angola, Nigeria and the DRC all experienced colonial disruption 
to existing institutions, all have corrupt and violent political cultures, all have problems 
of ethnic heterogeneity and all have had external actors disrupting their internal 
institutions. Botswana to a great extent escaped these sources of institutional disruption 
which compromise the quality of institutions and provide the foundation for bad 
governance.  
 
Evaluating Variables Contributing to Institutional Quality 
Although not completely mutually exclusive, it is the view of this study that some 
of the four variables offer more explanatory value in understanding the Botswana 
anomaly. As such, this chapter attempts to analyze the strength of each variable in 
contributing to Botswana’s institutional quality. As defined in Chapter 2, institutions are 
“humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” 
(North, 1991:97). Thus, institutional quality reflects the effectiveness of that constraint, 
whether it is through a formal (constitutions, laws and property rights) or informal (e.g. 
taboos, sanctions, customs, traditions and codes of conduct) institutions.  
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Whether institutions function in keeping with their stated purposes depends on the 
setting into which they are inserted into and evolve in. According to Wagener (2011), 
whether entrepreneurship develops and in which direction, depends on its environment 
and the institutional structure of the particular society. This is due to the fact that 
institutions determine the pay-off of individual activity, since everyone is striving for the 
highest pay-off. Where profits are highest due to rent-seeking, piracy or corruption, these 
are the activities that most individuals and entrepreneurs will gravitate towards. However, 
where transparency and accountability provide the highest profits, good institutions 
prevail and constrain predatory economic behaviors.  
According to North (1991), effective institutions raise the benefits of cooperative 
solutions or the costs of defection. They reduce transaction and production costs per 
exchange, so that potential gains are realizable. This dissertation describes institutional 
quality as institutions that reflect characteristics of good governance. These eight 
characteristics are transparency, accountability, responsiveness, equitability and 
inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, pursuit of the rule of law, participatory 
practices and consensus (UNESCAP, 2013). Such an analysis is necessary to judge strong 
versus weak explanations of the same proposition, and it would also clarify the meaning 
of comparative explanatory judgments (Schupbach and Sprenger, 2010). This is done in 
order to offer lens through which the Botswana case can be understood.  
This dissertation first attempted to determine the sources of institutional quality in 
Botswana utilizing data collected from both primary and secondary sources, from key 
informant interviews and from Afrobarometer surveys. Key informant analysis on 
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adherence to rule of law, legitimacy of authority, characterization of political culture, 
impact of ethnicity and identity management, and the role of external actors were 
measured to weigh their contribution to institutional quality. Furthermore, the beliefs of 
citizens on whether the country is being governed according to the will of the people, as 
well as their trust in the system using Afrobarometer data, gaged the utility of each 
variable in the study. In determining the relative weight of each factor/ variable, this 
dissertation looked at the evidence to determine where the weight of the evidence lay. 
Where there is not sufficient evidence, no argument can be made. 
The second guideline that will be used to evaluate the variables is whether the 
hypothesized source of institutional quality primarily affected formal institutions or 
informal institutions. It is judged, following Siedler (2011)’s hierarchy of institutions, 
that informal institutions will have a greater role in contributing to the robustness of 
Botswana’s institutions. Siedler (see in Table 2.1) argued that, as opposed to formal 
institutions which at most define the institutional framework, informal institutions define 
the way a society conducts itself. This dissertation argues that the effectiveness of 
constraints i.e., institutions, depends equally on the principles that inform them, as well as 
the mechanism of their enforcement (Wagener, 2011).  The constraints of formal 
institutions are primarily the responsibility of the state, as the state has monopoly over the 
legal use of force.  As a result, states can produce either bad or good institutions. A state 
can foster corruption, big man presidentialism and clientelism (Bratton, 2007) or it can 
foster participatory democracy, the rule of law, transparency and accountability 
(UNESCAP, 2013).  Informal constraints are more difficult to ascertain. However, 
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according to Yu (2007), cooperation and the preservation of social order are self-
enforcing aspects of informal institutions. They serve to maintain social stability and 
prevent opportunistic behaviors (ibid). They are very persistent (Siedler, 2011). 
According to De Soysa (2006), informal institutions are determined to have quality, 
based on outcomes such as their conflict resolution mechanisms, effective property 
rights, information exchange and general social trust. Thus, in this dissertation, the extent 
to which each variable contributed to the factors that reflect good governance i.e. 
accountability, transparency, effectiveness and efficiency, participation, rule of law, 
equitability and inclusiveness, responsiveness and consensus, will reflect the extent of its 
contribution to institutional quality in Botswana. 
The third consideration in evaluating this dissertation’s hypotheses is whether the 
variable is external or internal to the state. Although external sources of institutional 
quality can be very important, they have been very difficult to internalize. As a result, 
those explanations that derive from within the state provide more utility in explaining 
institutional quality. Furthermore, when addressing the international context, it is 
assumed that the external effect should be experienced by other states alike and therefore, 
if they are to be the causes, the effects should be the same across countries. Internal (i.e. 
endogenous sources of institutional quality), are believed to co-evolve with the 
institutions in question. This co-evolution allows for an intricate correlation between 
cause and effect over long periods of time, that external (i.e. exogenous variables) cannot.  
Fourth, when evaluating the hypotheses, a determination of how spontaneously 
the given source of institutional quality resulted in the observed end point was made. Was 
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the outcome a result of deliberate action or spontaneous evolution? Was the outcome 
intended ex ante?  The intentionality of the outcome is very important in determining the 
sources of institutional quality. Countries with bad institutions do not set out to have bad 
institutions; their constitutions do not sanction corruption and they usually have 
legislation that condemns it. They have constitutions and laws that reflect the desire for 
democracy; however, the practice of democracy eludes most of these (developing, 
resource-rich) countries. Thus, the nature of the formal institutions and the intentions of 
their creators tell us little about the quality of how institutions function in practice.  
Instead, it is the effects that result from spontaneity that help us understand more whence 
institutional quality emanates. Most persisted forms of institutions, particularly informal 
institutions, are the results of accidents and unintended results of historical development. 
Informal institutions are usually more organic and evolutionary because their 
development is usually not intended ex ante. As a result they can emerge spontaneously 
and endure for generations.  It is assumed that path-dependence and incrementalism of 
formal institutions sometimes prevent the implementation of the most efficient 
institutional regime. The deliberate choice criterion stems from Adam Ferguson’s idea 
that “nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, 
but not the execution of any human design” (Wagener, 2011:184).  
Lastly, the variables will be evaluated according to which helped nurture the 
principles of good governance listed in Figure 2.1 (page 48). The explanations that 
provide more detail into how transparency, accountability, rule of law, consensus, 
effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness, equitability and inclusiveness as well as 
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participation emerged are given more weight. As a result, not only is the context of the 
variable under question a determination of institutional quality, but also the content of the 
variable.  
The following sections will evaluate each variable in turn; beginning with the one 
that offers the least support of institutional quality, to the one the study finds the most 
evidence. As a result, the discussions will not follow the chronology of analysis observed 
in the preceding chapters.  
 
The “Exogenous” Context 
The hypothesis that exogenous sources of institutional quality helped facilitate 
Botswana’s escape of the resource curse was considered in this dissertation primarily 
because Botswana’s autonomy came into question within the context of its geopolitical 
situation during the period in question. Prior to colonialism, Botswana was of strategic 
importance to the British as a way to “check” German realpolitik in southern Africa and 
limit its aspirations to colonize Bechuanaland along with Southwest Africa, a situation 
eventually avoided by the British. Although the British did not find any material interest 
in Botswana, they colonized the land with a minimal budget. This led to a partnership 
between the British and Tswana chiefs, who spontaneously requested protection from the 
British in the aftermath of a Boer attack.   Colonial Bechuanaland was constantly under 
threat of incorporation into the Union of South Africa, and it was later a member of 
SACU, a regional customs unions controlled by South Africa. In post-colonial Botswana, 
the country established a key partnership with De Beers, upon the discovery of two of the 
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largest diamond mines in the world in 1967. This discovery heralded the beginning of a 
lucrative partnership that would see Botswana become one of the richest countries in sub-
Saharan Africa.	  It is with this backdrop that Botswana’s post-colonial development 
trajectory was hypothesized to have emerged from these exogenous factors. However, 
this dissertation found the least evidence supporting the assertion that exogenous factors 
determined institutional quality in Botswana.   
The evidence presented in this dissertation illustrates that, for the most part, 
external influences were never fully internalized in Botswana. In the case of British 
colonialism, it is difficult to assess its impact on institutional quality in Botswana because 
its nature was one of benign neglect, and thus played more of a passive role in 
determining what is observed as institutional quality in Botswana today. In fact the 
British were very passive participants allowing for the greater part the continuity of 
Botswana’s pre-colonial institutions permeating into the post-colonial state. This 
inadvertently supports a separate hypothesis in this dissertation that will be addressed in a 
subsequent section of this chapter.  
As for the influence of South Africa, the only Botswana institutions affected were 
the institutions of trade. Despite apartheid South Africa exerting pressure on Botswana, 
the country remained largely autonomous to its influence. One key argument in 
characterizing the South Africa-Botswana relationship has been one of semi-dependency, 
particularly in the area of trade. However, Botswana’s autonomy is demonstrated by the 
fact that it achieved growth rates far outstripping South Africa’s. Botswana currently has 
a higher per capita income, as well as better development indicators than does South 
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Africa, an explanation which arguably lies in the fact that the country chose to engage 
South Africa on its own terms.   This fact alone greatly undermines the idea that South 
Africa played a pivotal role in shaping Botswana’s economic and political institutions. 
Furthermore, Botswana’s autonomy extended to the rest of the continent of Africa, even 
while the entire continent was calling for sanctions against apartheid South Africa, 
Botswana stood firm against the pressure and decided to continue trading with South 
Africa. But this course of action was not due to pressure from South Africa, but due to 
the calculation of Botswana authorities that this policy was in the country’s interest. This 
fact alone shows how strong Botswana was in determining and defining its own interests, 
and implementing policies in pursuit of them. 
In the case of De Beers, the company greatly influenced the diamond -led 
economy in Botswana and was one key to the development of Botswana’s economy. The 
half century co-operation between De Beers and the Botswana government is a public-
private partnership culminated with the establishment of Debswana.  The collaboration 
began only three years following independence from the British, in a country that was 
widely seen as poor and limited in future prospects. Today, Botswana is the largest 
producer of diamonds by value in the world and has emerged as a middle-income country 
with commendable achievements in economic growth, infrastructure and human 
development. Furthermore, De Beers has been greatly influential in Botswana’s political 
stability through its close relationship with the Botswana Democratic Party and its 
adherents, a situation that has inadvertently enhanced the country’s political predictability 
and hence its attractiveness as an investment destination. Yet when compared with other 
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countries, like Namibia, that have parallel public-private partnerships with De Beers (i.e., 
NamDeb), but much lower economic and political performance indicators than Botswana, 
the exact influence of this company in determining institutional quality comes into 
question.  
Overall, this dissertation argues that although exogenous factors contributed to 
some of the observed indicators of economic and political development in Botswana, 
they were neither responsible for, nor disruptive of, Botswana’s institutional quality.  
 
Endogenous Sources of Institutional Quality in Botswana 
Ethnicity and Identity Management in Botswana 
The hypothesis that ethnicity and identity management contributed to Botswana’s 
institutional quality emerged from a widespread set of literature citing ethnic 
heterogeneity as the bane of African economic and political development. Inspired by the 
central work of Easterly and Levine (1997), the hypothesis identified ethnic diversity, 
consolidated by the artificial drawing of colonial boundaries, as the greatest determinant 
of bad governance and low institutional quality in sub-Saharan Africa.  This dissertation 
argued that because identities in Botswana were transformed and managed (i.e., 
“constructed,”) through the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period, they provided 
the foundations of peaceful coexistence, thus strengthening institutional quality. The 
extent to which the country is viewed today as “homogenous”, linguistically at least, is a 
reality deliberately created by colonial and post-colonial authorities.  
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Botswana’s assimilation project immensely reduced what Caselli and Coleman 
(2006) refer to as “ethnic distance” in Botswana’s society. Low ethnic distance connotes 
an increased degree of understanding and intimacy between members of different identity 
groups, which is manifested in the readiness to establish more or less close social 
relationships with members of the group. The key idea is that when groups are 
formulated along ethnic lines, ethnic identity becomes a marker to recognize potential 
infiltrators. Identity management, through assimilation, in Botswana provided a 
mechanism for group membership and inclusion, which was used to avoid discrimination 
of access to national wealth. As a result, to this day, Botswana is greatly viewed as 
largely homogenous society. The country is named after the Tswana people and the 
language Setswana is the national language, spoken by over 80 percent of the population.  
The literature on ethnic conflict views natural resources as providing an incentive 
for agents to form groups to wrest control of resource assets from the rest of the 
population. The victorious group in a conflict allocates resources to ensure the exclusion 
of non-members because infiltration would result in less dividends being shared among 
the original group. However, this did not occur in Botswana. Early Botswana elites 
decided not to let access to natural resources be determined by ethnic heritage. Instead, 
they made assimilation to “Tswanadom” a criterion for such access. As long as minority 
groups adhered to the dictates of Tswana culture and linguistics, they could essentially 
gain access to all the privileges and rights accorded to Botswana citizenship. In the cases 
where specific groups opted out of Tswanadom, they inadvertently opted out of the 
privileges and rights enjoyed by the majority. Such was the case of the BaSarwa.  
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 In Botswana, most factors and conditions isolated by Blagojevic (2009) as 
contributing to ethnic conflict are largely absent.  The country has very little evidence of 
structural crises in its history and there is a general absence of historical memories of 
inter-ethnic grievances. Institutional factors have actually promoted ethnic tolerance, and 
the manipulation of historical memories by political entrepreneurs was utilized to evoke 
unity and peaceful coexistence, as opposed to negative emotions such as fear, resentment 
and hate toward the “other”. As a result, the evidence reflects that the Botswana case 
generally supports the hypothesis that ethnic homogeneity contributed to development in 
Botswana and contributed to the non-occurrence of ethnic conflict observed. One has to 
recognize that this homogeneity is far from natural or “primordial,” and in fact has 
resulted from the assimilation policy.  Yet it is also true that Botswana’s ethnic 
demographics permitted this policy to be pursued in a way that could not easily have 
been pursued elsewhere. 
A key weakness of the argument that this variable provided institutional quality in 
Botswana, however, stems from the fact that the unifying identity in Botswana was not a 
product of spontaneous evolution in Botswana, as some adherents to the primordialist 
approach to ethnicity might suppose. The primodialist approach, which accounts for the 
role of emotions and the conflict potential of ethnicity,  argues that the existence of 
ancient differences among ethnic and cultural groups, and the urge to “fear” and reject 
the “other” is natural and primal, dating back to human’s remotest ancestors and their 
animal predecessors. It argues that tendencies toward xenophobia and intolerance are 
natural to human societies, and has been a dominant approach in explaining ethnic 
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conflict. Upon investigating the variable of ethnicity and identity management in 
Botswana, it becomes apparent that Botswana’s “ethnic homogeneity” is not primordial. 
Instead, it is the product of an assimilation project implemented by nationalist Tswana 
elites in the few years following independence. This identity was institutionalized as the 
national identity. As a result, due to its path-dependence, the assimilationist project in 
Botswana raises more questions than it actually offers answers for the Botswana case and 
beyond.  Why were subordinate groups in Botswana willing to adapt to Tswanadom at 
the expense of their own cultural and ethnic heritages?  Furthermore, why did other 
countries with ethnic diversity not have the same success in pursuing assimilation 
policies?  If the policy of assimilation is all that countries need to put in place, wouldn’t 
they already have done that by now? In fact this observation raises deeper questions. 
Why was the assimilation policy effective in Botswana? Why was there no violent 
resistance to the subordination of cultures in Botswana? The fact that these questions give 
weight to other variables, weaken the particular hypothesis that Botswana obtained its 
institutional quality from ethnic identity management. Instead, it argues that variables 
that resulted due to evolutionary processes of longue durée provide better explanations 
and understanding of the Botswana case. 
 
Legitimacy and Historical Continuity in Botswana 
The evidence gathered by this dissertation strongly suggests that institutional 
quality in Botswana was not the result of any discrete policy decisions. Instead, it was the 
result of an evolutionary process of longue durée.  This is observable in the legitimacy of 
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authority in Botswana facilitated by historical continuity. Imported institutions across 
most of the remainder of Africa conflicted with existing institutions, and hence had low 
levels of legitimacy. The success of Botswana, however, reflects high legitimacy of 
functional and democratic institutions because they were heavily embedded in the 
historical traditions of the state.  
This study adopted a Weberian understanding of ‘legitimacy’ in that its 
conceptualization depended not so much on the behavior of leaders or the design of 
institutions, but on how these were evaluated by those whom the leaders and institutions 
claimed to govern.  Weber isolated three bases for legitimate authority.  Rational 
legitimacy, resting on a belief in the legality of rule and of those put into power under 
those rules to issue directions; traditional legitimacy, resting on the acceptance of the 
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under 
them; and charismatic legitimacy, resting on the dedication to the unique sanctity, 
heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person or group and the normative 
forms of orders ordained by them (Novak (2005:6). This dissertation found aspects of all 
three forms of legitimacy contributed to Botswana’s institutional quality.  
Legitimacy in Botswana on traditional grounds was facilitated by historical 
continuity. Unlike most other African countries which were crown colonies or settler 
colonies, Botswana was merely a protectorate of the British Empire. This enabled 
traditional authority in Botswana to thrive and, as a result, contemporary Tswana society 
sees a high level of continuity between its pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial 
institutions. Charismatic legitimacy emerged from Seretse Khama’s leadership, 
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particularly at a pivotal point in resource development.  Khama gained legitimacy, first, 
from his biological link to the traditional governance structures of Botswana, which gave 
him credibility especially among his rural electorate. This organic link to the population 
gave him credibility, as well as fostered a personal commitment to the economic growth 
of his country, facilitated by his inherent chiefly duty as custodian of resources and 
designator of responsibilities. These circumstances led to the pre-existing Tswana 
hegemony within the new structures of post-colonial statehood. Legitimacy, this time on 
rational grounds, was reinforced at independence whereby the adoption of a 
parliamentary system of democratic governance and the adoption of a constitution 
followed newly adopted formal institutions. Furthermore, the succession of Quett Masire, 
a commoner, into the rank of president, further consolidated the legitimacy of the newly 
adopted formal institutions. These new institutions were based on principles that greatly 
reflected Botswana’s traditional culture.  
In relation to the territorial state, generally regarded as the ideal form of state, 
legitimacy in Botswana enabled agents of the central state to achieve the voluntary 
cooperation and compliance of individual citizens and non-state actors without a reliance 
on coercion or surveillance. This was possible since most citizens regarded the agents as 
appropriate to having the rights and responsibilities surrounding the making and 
implementation of laws, policies and programs on their behalf—regardless of the short-
term performance or popularity of specific programs or leaders. In comparative 
perspective, African states are generally viewed as illegitimate, since their very existence 
results from colonization from alien Europeans; they had human settlement before 
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colonization that was not reduced to insignificance or assimilated under colonialism; they 
did not re-create a pre-colonial sovereignty through gaining independence; and after 
independence, they did severe violence to existing institutions. The foundations of 
political authority in independent African states bore little resemblance to those in pre-
colonial societies and rarely did the colonial state bear any relation to the economic 
systems, political organizations, and networks of social identification of the indigenous 
people. As a result, in the case of Botswana, the variable of legitimacy and historical 
continuity bears a considerable weight.  
Legitimacy and historical institutional continuity provide a substantial context to 
understanding Botswana’s escape of the resource curse. Most of the evidence collected 
and analyzed point to the role of continuity of institutions as a key determinant of post-
colonial success. Emerging from within the state, legitimacy provides an endogenous 
force contributing to institutional quality that evolved over decades and therefore is not a 
result of deliberate action, but of organic evolution. However, legitimacy provides no 
moral judgment to the institutions that were passed on and whose continuity they 
facilitated. For, in essence, Weberian legitimacy bears no moral significance or relativity 
to the institutions it legitimizes. 
In other words, the content of what was passed on over the three key periods of 
Botswana’s history, which led to the observed institutional quality, is not explained by 
the legitimacy hypothesis. In comparative perspective, countries like Ethiopia that were 
never colonized still have enduring institutions that were never disrupted, but these do not 
provide a good explanation for why their institutions are not as robust as Botswana’s.  
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Instead, the greatest explanation for Botswana’s institutional quality can be found 
through understanding its history using its political culture as the main variable.  
 
Political Culture and Institutional Quality in Botswana  
The evidence gathered in this dissertation greatly supports the idea that it was a 
political culture, evolved over centuries that provided the deepest foundation of 
contemporary democracy and institutional quality in Botswana. As will be described, 
political culture in Botswana is a factor endogenous to the society and state and one that 
resulted from spontaneous evolution. Botswana’s political culture is the key to 
understanding both formal and informal institutional quality in the country. It provides 
both the context and the content of economic and political development, particularly as it 
is the only explanation that mirrors many of the eight principles of good governance, 
among which are participation, consensus and the rule of law. More importantly, 
evidence uncovered through both primary and secondary sources of data, insights from 
key informant interviews, and Afrobarometer survey data provide a wealth of evidence 
supporting this claim.  
Political culture helps one understand Botswana’s institutional success and its 
escape from all three resource curses.  Botswana did not experience the resource curse of 
violence, because it was not its political culture to do so.  The country has no history of 
being a crusader society as were the Zulus of modern day neighboring South Africa, and 
violence and conflict have never been condoned by traditional Tswana culture. It 
espoused a culture of mutual criticism and dialogue instead of violence, facilitated by a 
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culture of consensus-building. As a result, Botswana also escaped the resource curse of 
authoritarianism, because its traditional political culture supports broadly democratic 
practices, beliefs and ideals. This political culture, which set the foundations of the 
kgotla, placed constraints on those in authority by holding them accountable. Finally, 
Botswana escaped the resource curse of underdevelopment, because its elite political 
culture of pragmatism enabled it to select the best possible courses of action that reflected 
its interests, whether it was through negotiating lucrative deals with the diamond 
multinational De Beers, or whether it was though withholding its participation from 
imposing sanctions on South Africa, its greatest trade and economic partner, despite 
continental pressure to do so. Pragmatism and rationality were revered above self-
interest, providing the foundation for functional institutions. Systems of corruption are 
generally not supported in Botswana and the beef-industry based elites avoid predatory 
practices in the profitable diamond industry, something which is atypical of elites in 
resource exporting countries, which tend to be rentier in character. 
This dissertation found most evidence of the crucial stage of evolution of 
Botswana’s political culture in its pre-colonial period. The underpinnings of Botswana’s 
political culture are found in the kgotla. The kgotla affords a model for serious and 
candid consultation among equals, which informs the patterns of interaction. It embodies 
basic values of sociability, respect and inclusiveness, with proceedings ranging from 
those of social significance and the adjudication of individual misdemeanors, to those of 
political significance, such as the bureaucratic division of labor (Young 2003:211). The 
kgotla has thus set the standard for highly functional social interaction that is 
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immediately emulated whenever the diffusion of information, the need to arrive at a 
decision, or the settlement of a conflict, is pertinent. The kgotla addresses a breadth of 
contexts, and as such is the hallmark of Botswana’s national political culture. Hence, for 
Botswana citizens, “the test of appropriate public behavior, decision-making and 
democracy thus lie in principle in the [kgotla type] of practical consultation” (Young, 
2003:211). Although the kgotla has not been historically a democratic institution, the 
basic principles that it espouses are democratic values. Hence, the adoption of a 
democratic republic upon independence held democratic expectations that were already 
part of the belief systems of Batswana. Furthermore, although the two systems evolved 
asynchronously, they emerged in the post-colonial setting, providing legitimacy and 
support to the new imported system.  
In the post-colonial era, most evidence is skewed towards the role of the political 
culture of Botswana’s elite, who institutionalized the democratic formal institutions, 
adopting pre-colonial political culture. As is predicted by North (1990), the perception of 
feasible alternatives in Botswana was greatly governed by the belief system of the 
players, which acted as filters to the information from experience. The statement by 
North (2005:59) that “the structure of an economic market reflects the beliefs of those in 
a position to make the rules of the game,” clearly reflects this experience.  The influence 
of elite political culture in Botswana has persisted. They have helped frame important 
institutions, and have been supported by the belief of others that they will stay in power 
makes these institutions work. The grand coalition of Botswana’s elite, incorporated both 
traditional and modern elites, public and private elites, rural and urban, hosting 
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consultative forums to foster participation of all decision-making stakeholders. This 
provided the foundation of equitability among interested parties. 
The content of Botswana’s political culture is just as pivotal as its context. The 
country has maintained a reputation for accountability and transparency, formalized 
through the constitution and supporting legislation which calls for open government. 
Despite the BDP remaining in power since 1966, the foremost political opposition party, 
the BNF, competes for seats in parliament freely. Furthermore, their ability to influence 
public debate has never been curtailed.  The BDP's tolerance is grounded in consensual 
agreement among the electorate, whose traditions include limiting the power of 
traditional leaders and holding local consultative assemblies, thus offering a basis for 
accountability and consensus within the party. Individual presidents have fused this 
tradition into their individual leadership styles, insisting on curbing corruption, despite 
the incentives for corruption postured by Botswana's strong diamond mining.  
Due to a culture of accountability, the government of Botswana has been 
responsive to the needs of the country’s population, particularly via the regularity of 
competitive elections. This is as a result of the need to maintain political support, 
particularly of the BDP. The BDP’s public sector policies, e.g. social services and 
physical infrastructure, have been made available to both rural and urban populations and 
to members of most ethnic groups, those that have “assimilated”. Furthermore using 
diamond revenue, the government, in partnership with De Beers, has put in place various 
AIDS programs aimed at addressing the country’s epidemic.   
To ensure the rule of law, Botswana has been conscious to ensure the 
independence of its judiciary. This has even left some decisions of the judiciary that are 
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unfavorable to the government. Individuals are free to challenge the constitutionality of 
citizenship laws as was the case of Unity Dow, an immigrant to Botswana. She alleged 
discrimination against her children who although born in Botswana, were not 
automatically granted citizenship. She won the case (Hoffman, 2003). Furthermore, 
within the diamond sector, the rule of law is exercised through the serious criminalization 
of diamond carrying by Botswana citizens and is under the jurisdiction of the Diamond 
and Narcotics Unit of the Botswana Police. The current sentence for the illegal carrying 
of diamonds by individuals is a minimum of five years and a maximum of fifteen years in 
prison. The corruption trials of Debswana director Louis Nchindo is also case in point, 
illustrating that in Botswana no one is above the law. These aspects of Botswana’s 
political culture greatly enhance the country’s institutional quality.  
Afrobarometer data analyzed on Botswana, shows that the mass political culture 
of the country greatly support the institutions that are in place, thus facilitating the quality 
of those same institutions. Botswana citizens champion competitive democratic elections 
and disparage a whole spectrum of other forms of governance. They generally are not 
tolerant of corruption and do not condone systematic violence. The observation of citizen 
apathy in elections, however, is buffered by the elite political culture, which generally 
protects both those who participate and those who do not equally.   
The Botswana case readily underscores ideas of how political culture can enhance 
institutional quality. Despite having similar legislative oversight and monitoring 
frameworks in the extractive industries, and despite having similar incentives and similar 
resources, Nigeria, Angola and Congo did not have the same fortunate outcome as 
Botswana.  This illuminates two areas of further research in the resource curse equation. 
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Scholars interested in the resource curse phenomenon, should play closer attention to 
endogenous sources of institutional quality like political culture and legitimacy of 
authority and of institutions into the countries they are covering, as these will illuminate 
the setting into which all planning, decision- making, implementation and monitoring of 
both resource-specific issues, and the decisions surrounding developmental management 
in resource-rich countries, are made. The implications of this research also project 
beyond the resource-curse issue in particular, and can be used to understand failures in 
other sectors of the economy beyond the extractive industry.  
CONCLUSION 
 
The argument for political culture (and to a great extent legitimacy) in evaluating 
Botswana’s sources of institutional quality provides the greatest understanding of 
Botswana’s escape of the resource curse. It shows how political culture in Botswana 
which was compatible with the principles of democracy and development, is what in 
essence provided robustness to Botswana institutions, enabling good governance and 
quality institutions in the country. The evidence shows that although institutional quality 
was aided by the historical continuity of its institutions, the legitimacy of those in 
authority, the management of the country’s identity and the partnerships with external 
actors, it was the political culture that provided the foundation for all these variables to 
bring about Botswana’s successful.  
Although this conclusion is found to be the most convincing, it is however a 
pessimistic view of the fate of non-renewable natural resource exporting countries. If this 
conclusion is correct, the deepest sources of Botswana’s institutional viability are to be 
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found, not in active policy decisions and choices, but in variables that persist for centuries 
and that are evolutionary and spontaneous rather than deliberate. As a result, it provides 
very little counsel to other countries that are resource cursed and highly dependent on 
extractive industries. To change a culture is a very daunting task, which involves the 
learning of new customs and the unlearning of old rules. However, this conclusion 
emphasizes the role of education among the populations of resource exporting countries, 
as with education comes the hope of the changing of attitudes, beliefs and customs that 
could facilitate institutional quality.  
This study concludes by encouraging scholars of the resource curse to look 
beyond the institutional and economic explanations of escaping the resource curse, and to 
look instead into the sources of resource-rich countries’ institutional quality such as 
political culture and legitimacy, as these may provide more insight and explanatory value 
into whether a country will suffer from or ultimately escape the resource curse.  
 
EPILOGUE: FURTHER RESEARCH 
The conclusions arrived at in this study have illuminated the role that political 
culture (and legitimacy) can play in determining institutional success or failure in a 
country.  For an even deeper understand of why Botswana’s institutions succeed, the 
linkage established in this dissertation could be explored further by examining other 
specific institutions in Botswana. For instance, one institution of interest is the Botswana 
military. According to Masire (2007), the Botswana Defense Forces focusses on anti-
poaching activities, disaster-preparedness and response, support to civil operations, and 
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assistance in foreign peacekeeping missions.  This is counter to the activities of armies of 
other resource-rich countries like Angola and Nigeria, which spend billions for weapons 
and military equipment from China, Russia, Ukraine, and Israel. According to the 
Guardian (April 26, 2012), in 2011, the Botswana military spent only US$371 million on 
arms, as compared to Angola which spent US$3,647 billion and Nigeria which spent 
US$2,410 billion (ibid). As the resource curse literature alleges, revenues from the export 
of non-renewable natural resources are frequently used to keep the armed forces well 
equipped in order to ensure political regime security. Botswana’s military has, however, 
not been intrusive into the country’s political institutions, despite the current president 
Ian Khama being a former commander of the Botswana Defense Forces. Furthermore, it 
has not been directly affected by the flow of natural resources in a way that is destructive. 
The question as to why the Botswana military has not partaken in similar behaviors as 
other resource-rich countries is possible focus for further research illuminating the 
functionality of Botswana’s institutions.  
Also worthy of further research are the caveats issued on Botswana’s escape of 
the resource curse. The plight of the BaSarwa, the HIV/AIDS epidemic that plagues the 
country, and high unemployment rates, all seem to call into question the rosiness of the 
Botswana experience. Botswana has a very high level of inequality as is evidenced by its 
high Gini coefficient46 of 0.63.  The BaSarwa experience is the epitome of this inequality, 
with most members of this identity group living well below the poverty line, suffering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion representing the income distribution of a 
nation's residents. It measures the inequality among values of a frequency distribution (for example levels 
of income). A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality, where all values are the same (for 
example, where everyone has an exactly equal income). A Gini coefficient of 1.0 (or 100%) expresses 
maximal inequality among values (for example where only one person has all the income).	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malnutrition, loss of land, poor education, and marginalization from access to most other 
benefits that Botswana’s diamond wealth entails (Ditshwanelo, 2001). Furthermore, 
Botswana has one of the highest adult incidences of HIV/AIDS in the world with the 
World Health Organization (2011) reporting a range of 25-30 percent of adults being 
HIV positive. In addition, according to the Africa Economic Outlook (2013), amongst 
other major challenges confronting the government are a national unemployment rate of 
17.5 percent. These troubling statistics call into question whether Botswana’s institutional 
effectiveness and success can be sustained in the future.  They also remind us that even 
well-functioning political institutions productive of political stability and formal 
democracy do not create social justice for us. Further research should be done to address 
these paradoxes, as past research efforts have placed them at the periphery of their 
analyses. 
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Appendix III 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Indicators of Institutional Quality 
Indicator Description 
Status of Democratic Development 
Stateness There is clarity about the nation’s existence as a state with adequately established and 
differentiated power structures. 
Monopoly on the use of force To what extent does the state’s monopoly on the use of force cover the entire territory of 
the country? 
State identity To what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the 
nation-state as legitimate? 
No interference of religious 
dogmas 
To what extent are legal order and political institutions defined without interference by 
religious dogmas? 
Basic administration To what extent do basic administrative structures exist? 
Political Participation The populace decides who rules, and it has other political freedoms. 
Free and fair elections To what extent are political representatives determined by general, free and fair elections? 
Effective power to govern To what extent do democratically elected political representatives have the effective power 
to govern, or to what extent are there veto powers and political enclaves? 
Association / assembly rights To what extent can individuals form and join independent political or civic groups? To 
what extent can these groups operate and assemble freely? 
Freedom of expression To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely? 
Rule of Law State powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights. 
Separation of powers To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)? 
Independent judiciary To what extent does an independent judiciary exist? 
Prosecution of office abuse To what extent are public officeholders who abuse their positions prosecuted or penalized? 
Civil rights To what extent are civil rights guaranteed and protected, and to what extent can citizens 
seek redress for violations of these rights? 
Stability of Democratic 
Institutions 
Democratic institutions are capable of performing, and they are adequately accepted. 
Performance of democratic 
institutions 
Are democratic institutions capable of performing? 
Commitment to democratic 
institutions 
To what extent are democratic institutions accepted as legitimate by the relevant actors? 
Political and Social Integration Stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the state; there is 
also a consolidated civic culture. 
Party system To what extent is there a stable and socially rooted party system able to articulate and 
aggregate societal interests? 
Interest groups To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate 
between society and the political system? 
Consent to democratic norms How strong is the citizens’ approval of democratic norms and procedures? 
Associational activities To what extent have social self-organization and the construction of social capital 
advanced? 
Status of Market Development  
Socioeconomic Level In principle, the country’s level of development permits adequate freedom of choice for all 
citizens. 
Socioeconomic barriers To what extent are significant parts of the population fundamentally excluded from society 
due to poverty and inequality? 
Market Organization There are clear rules for stable, market-based competition. 
Market-based competition To what level have the fundamentals of market-based competition developed? 
Anti-monopoly policy To what extent do safeguards exist to prevent the development of economic monopolies 
and cartels, and to what extent are they enforced? 
Liberalization of foreign trade To what extent has foreign trade been liberalized? 
Banking system To what extent have a solid banking system and a functioning capital market been 
established? 
Currency and Price Stability There are institutional or political precautions to control inflation sustainably, together 
with an appropriate monetary policy and fiscal policy. 
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Anti-inflation / forex policy To what extent do government and central bank pursue a consistent inflation policy and an 
appropriate foreign exchange policy? 
Macrostability To what extent do the government’s fiscal and debt policies support macroeconomic 
stability? 
Private Property There are adequate conditions to support a functional private sector. 
Property rights To what extent do government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property 
and regulate the acquisition, benefits, use and sale of property? 
Private enterprise To what extent are private companies permitted and protected? Are privatization processes 
conducted in a manner consistent with market principles? 
Welfare Regime There are viable arrangements to compensate for social risks. 
Social safety nets To what extent do social safety nets provide compensation for social risks? 
Equal opportunity To what extent does equality of opportunity exist? 
Economic Performance The economy’s performance points to solid development. 
Output strength How does the economy, as measured in quantitative indicators, perform? 
Sustainability Economic growth is balanced, environmentally sustainable and future-oriented. 
Environmental policy To what extent are environmental concerns effectively taken into account in both macro 
and microeconomic terms? 
Education policy / R&D To what extent are there solid institutions for basic, secondary and tertiary education, as 
well as for research and development? 
Transformation Management 
Level of Difficulty Assesses the structural conditions that influence the scope of political action. 
Structural constraints To what extent do structural difficulties constrain the political leadership’s governance 
capacity? 
Civil society traditions To what extent are there traditions of civil society? 
Conflict intensity How serious are social, ethnic and religious conflicts? 
GNI p.c. rescaled Per capita GNI PPP 
UN Educ. Index rescaled UN Education Index as a measure of the educational level 
Stateness & Rule of law Stateness and Rule of Law (average of BTI criteria values) 
Steering Capability The government manages reforms effectively and can achieve its policy priorities. 
Prioritization To what extent does the government set and maintain strategic priorities? 
Implementation How effective is the government in implementing its own policies? 
Policy learning How innovative and flexible is the government? 
Resource Efficiency The government makes optimum use of available resources. 
Efficient use of assets To what extent does the government make efficient use of available human, financial and 
organizational resources? 
Policy coordination To what extent can the government coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent 
policy? 
Anti-corruption policy To what extent does the government successfully contain corruption? 
Consensus-Building The political leadership establishes a broad consensus on reform with other actors in 
society without sacrificing its reform goals. 
Consensus on goals To what extent do the major political actors agree on democracy and a market economy as 
strategic, long-term goals? 
Anti-democratic actors To what extent can reformers exclude or co-opt anti-democratic actors? 
Cleavage / conflict management The political leadership establishes a broad consensus on reform with other actors in 
society without sacrificing its reform goals. 
Civil society participation To what extent does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the 
political process? 
Reconciliation To what extent can the political leadership bring about reconciliation between the victims 
and perpetrators of past injustices? 
International Cooperation The political leadership is willing and able to cooperate with external supporters and 
organizations. 
Effective use of support To what extent does the political leadership use the support of international partners to 
implement a long-term strategy of development? 
Credibility To what extent does the government act as a credible and reliable partner in its relations 
with the international community? 
Regional cooperation To what extent is the political leadership willing and able to cooperate with neighboring 
countries? 
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Appendix IV 
Political Institutional Quality Indicators (2010) 
(Angola, Botswana, Dem. Congo, and Nigeria) 
 
Source: Bertelsemann Transformation Index (2010) 
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Appendix V 
Economic Institutions Status:  
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria (2010) 
 
Source: Bertelsemann Transformation Index (2010) 
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Appendix VI:  
GDP per Capita Trend: 1965 to 2007 
 
  
302 
	  
VITA 
 
ANGELA GAPA 
 
    Born: Harare, Zimbabwe 
 
2002-2006    Bachelor of Science (Hons)  
Environmental Science and Health 
National University of Science and Technology 
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 
 
2007 – 2010    Master of Arts  
    International Studies 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, FL 
 
2010    Graduate Certificate  
National Security 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, FL 
 
2013      Doctoral Candidate 
International Relations 
    Florida International University 
    Miami, FL 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
 
Gapa, A (2012) “Legitimacy and Political Culture in Botswana’s Escape of the Resource  
Curse” Paper Presented for the International Studies Convention, April 1st to 4th, 
San Diego, CA  
Gapa, A. (2010) “Botswana’s Escape from the Resource Curse: The Case of State 
 Legitimacy” Paper presented for the African Studies Association, November 17- 
20, San Francisco, CA  
Gapa, A. (2010) “International Resource Regimes and the Prospects of Peace and 
 Development  in Sub-Saharan Africa” Paper presented for the International  
Studies Association October 20-21, St Petersburg, FL  
Gapa, A. (2007) “Corruption: Tracing the Effects, Charting a Sustainable Future”  
 pages 81-92, World Bank, Bled Slovenia 
303 
	  
TEACHING EXPERIENCE  
 
2010   Adjunct Professor,  
   Florida International University 
 
Department of Politics and International Relations 
International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa  
African Politics 
Contemporary International Problems 
International Organizations  
 
Department of African & African Diaspora Studies 
China and India in Africa 
 
2007-2010  Teaching Assistant 
Florida International University 
   Department of International Relations and Geography 
 
International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa 
Contemporary International Issues  
International Relations of the US 
World Regional Geography 
Political Geography 
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
 
2010 – 2011   Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and Citizenship Studies 
 
ACADEMIC AWARDS  
 
2011    Dissertation Evidence Acquisition Fellowship  
FIU-University Graduate School  
 
Graduate Assistantship 
Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and Government Studies 
 
2009   Adolpho Henriques Scholarship  
 
2006  Vice Chancellor’s Prize for Best Graduating Student in Faculty 
National University of Science and Technology 
 
2006  NUST Book Prize- For Best Graduating Student in Department 
   National University of Science and Technology 
 
